such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on the journals of the two houses, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the General Court then next to be chosen, and shall be published; and if, in the General Court next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of the senators and two thirds of the members of the house of representatives present and voting thereon, then it shall be the duty of the General Court to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people, and if they shall be approved of and ratified by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon, at meetings legally warned and holden for that purpose, they shall become part of the constitution of the Commonwealth.

The following form of return was adopted, viz. :

Town of

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

County of

At a legal meeting of the freeholders and other inhabitants of the town of qualified to vote for senators or representatives, holden on the second Monday of April, A. D. 1821, pursuant to a resolution of the Convention of delegates, assembled at Boston on the 16th November, A. D. 1820, for the purpose of revising the constitution of the Commonwealth :

The votes on the several amendments submitted by the Convention, were as follows:

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE.

The following is the Address of the Convention to the People of Massachusetts, accompanying the Amendments proposed to be made to the Constitution:

FELLOW-CITIZENS,

It was provided in the constitution, established in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty, that revision might be had, after an experiment of fifteen years. When these years had elapsed, the people declared that they were satisfied; and that they desired no change. The same satisfaction was manifested during the next twenty-five years, and would probably have still continued, if the separation of Maine from Massachusetts had not made it proper to take the opinion of the people on the expediency of calling a Convention.

It appeared that not one fourth part of the qualified voters in the State saw fit to express any opinion; and that of the eighteen thousand three hundred and forty-nine votes given in, six thousand five hundred and ninety-three were against a revision.

We have inferred from these facts, that you did not desire any important and fundamental changes in your frame of government; and this consideration has had its just influence on our deliberations, in revising every part of the constitution, which we were required to do, by the words of the law, under which we are assembled.

We have kept in view that the will of the majority can alone determine what the powers of government shall be, and also the manner in which these powers shall be exercised; and that it is, consequently, your exclusive right to decide, whether all, or any of the amendments, which we think expedient, shall be adopted or rejected.

In the performance of our duty, we have been mindful of the character of MASSACHUSETTS; and, that the profit of experience is justly valued, and that the precious right of self-government is well understood in this community. Perfect unanimity is not to be expected in a numerous assembly. Whatever difference of opinion may have occurred as to expediency, there has been no difference as to the ultimate object, viz., the public security and welfare. If we have not all agreed in every measure which we recommend, we are satisfied, that natural, and honest difference of opinion, must ever prevent, in a like numerous meeting, greater accordance than has prevailed among us.

Every proposed change or amendment has been patiently and fairly examined, and has been decided upon with the utmost care and solicitude to do right.

We have the fullest confidence that you will take these things into view, when you perform the serious duty of deciding, for yourselves, and for successive generations, on the result of our efforts.

In framing a constitution, or revising one, for an extensive Commonwealth, in which various interests are comprised, nothing more can be hoped for, than to establish general rules, adapted to secure the greatest good for the whole society. The revised constitution, which we now respectfully submit to you, can only be considered as one general law, composed of connected and dependent parts. If any one part, considered by itself, seem not to be the best that could be, its merit and the justice of its claim to approbation can be known only by its connection in the system to which it apper

tains.

With these remarks we beg leave to state the amendments which we have agreed on, and our reasons for having done so.

THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

It is known to us, that the eminent men who framed the constitution under which we have lived bestowed on the only article of the declaration of rights, which has occasioned much discussion among us, the greatest attention. They appear to have considered religion in a twofold view; first, as directory to every rational being, in the duties which he owes to the Creator of the universe; but leaving to every one to decide for himself, on the manner in which he shall render his homage, avow his dependence, express his gratitude, and acknowledge his accountability; and, secondly, as a social duty, prescribing rules to men in their intercourse with each other as members of the same family. They held social worship to be most intimately connected with social welfare. They believed moral excellence to be no less the effect of example, and of habit, than of precept. They seem to have been convinced, that in proportion as the members of civil society are impressed with reverence for the social rules contained in revealed religion, will they be faithful in performing those obligations on which political happiness depends. Upon such principles they rested those provisions which require an habitual observance of the Sabbath, and the support of public teachers in the sacred offices of that day. In all these sentiments we do most heartily concur.

But we have thought it necessary to propose some changes in the third article.

The public sentiment on that part of the article which invests the Legislature with authority to enjoin attendance on public worship, has long been definitely expressed, and is well understood; and we, therefore, propose that so much of this article as relates to this subject, should be annulled.

We are also of opinion that members of all religious societies ought to have the right and privilege to join, and worship with, any other society of the same denomination; as they now have the right to join themselves to any society, of a different denomination

from that with which they have worshipped;-furthermore, that the power and duty of the Legislature to require provision to be made for the institution of public worship, and for the support and maintenance of public teachers, should extend, and be applied as well to societies which are unincorporated, as to those which are incorporated.

We recommend also, a provision, that all taxes assessed for the support of public worship, upon real estate of any non-resident proprietor, shall be applied towards the support of public worship in the town, precinct, or parish, by which such taxes are assessed; unless such proprietor shall be resident within the Commonwealth, and shall be of a different denomination of Christians from that of the town, precinct, or parish, by which such taxes are assessed.

We propose further to amend the declaration of rights, so as to provide, that persons on trial for crimes may be heard by themselves and counsel, instead of themselves or counsel, as the article now stands.

We propose another amendment, that no person shall suffer imprisonment, or other ignominious punishment, on official information; nor unless on indictment by a grand jury; except in cases expressly provided for by law. This amendment takes from public prosecutors the common law right to arraign, of their own authority, any citizen for misdemeanors, or crimes, without the intervention of a grand jury representing the people of each county..

ALTERATION OF THE POLITICAL YEAR.

We recommend that there should be ordinarily but one session of the General Court in a year. We believe that one is sufficient; that the expense of legislation will be thereby diminished, and that it will be convenient to bring the common and the political year into conformity.

A necessary consequence of this change is an alteration of the time of holding elections; the day most convenient for this purpose, in the opinion of the Convention, is the second Monday of November. We propose that all the elections of State officers, which are to be made by the people, shall be made on that day. This provision will lessen the number of days, which, by our present constitution, must be devoted to elections. It will, we believe, induce a fuller attendance of the people, and a more certain expression of the public voice, in the important duty of choosing public officers.

ELECTORS.

We are satisfied that the qualifications as now required in electors, produce some inconveniences, and are liable to some abuses. After a patient investigation of this subject, we have concluded that a residence of twelve months within the State, and of six months in a town, or district, next preceding an election, and payment of a state or county tax, in the Commonwealth, constitute a uniform and intelligible rule, as to the right of voting; and we propose the adoption

of this rule, in all elections of State officers, and the abolition of all other qualifications now required.

We believe that the change, which we recommend in this respect, will relieve selectmen from much perplexity, and will enable them easily to distinguish between those who have a right to vote, and those who have not.

THE SENATE.

After the most careful and faithful examination of the principles of government, we have not found it expedient to change the basis on which the senate was placed, by the constitution which we have revised. It is an admitted principle, that the legislative power should be given to two distinct assemblies, each having an absolute negative on the other.

In considering this subject, we have distinguished between THE PEOPLE, of whom we are ourselves a part, and those who may be chosen to legislate. It is the people who are to be secured, in their rights and privileges, by a constitution, and not their public servants. This object can only be effected by a clear and permanent limitation of the power which is to be exercised.

It

The PEOPLE may impart whatsoever power they see fit. Their security consists in doing this in such manner, that the trust which they create may not be abused, nor the public welfare betrayed. is therefore wise to provide for frequent elections; and to require certain qualifications in the elected; and the concurrence of different legislative branches on all public laws; and so to constitute those branches, as that no act shall obtain their joint approbation, which is not intended to promote the common welfare.

All free governments of modern times have found it indispensable, not only to have two distinct legislative branches, but to place them on such different foundations as to preclude, as much as possible, all such dangerous sympathy and union, as may govern and direct the will of a single assembly.

If the number of inhabitants be the rule by which the members of the two branches are to be apportioned, and all are to be chosen at the same time, and by the same electors, we think that the safety which the constitution is intended to effect, may not, always, be obtained. If an election should take place when very strong and general excitements are felt, (and from such, no human society can be always exempt) there would be little to choose between placing legislators so elected in the same, or in two different assemblies.

We repeat that the people's agents ought ever to be distinguished, in settling a frame of government, from the people themselves; and that no more should be hazarded on the manner in which power may be used, than necessarily must be, to give power enough to do that which should be done.

The mode in which the two branches should be constituted, to secure the check which we consider to be so highly important, is