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"On his return from the Italian campaign, Napoleon himself declared, in his address to the Corps d'État, that, although he found Europe in arms ready to dispute his successes or to aggravate his disasters, he would have still continued the war if the means to be employed had not been disproportioned to the intended result; that, prosecuting the struggle on the Adige, he would have been obliged to accept the challenge on the Rhine, strengthen himself by an alliance with revolution, and risk what a sovereign should never do except for the independence of his own country; and, pleading the interests of France as the cause which had induced him to put an end to the war, he closed his address with the following words: "The peace which I have concluded, as every day will reveal, will be fruitful in good results for the happiness of Italy, the influence of France, and the quiet of Europe.' Looking now to Italy, united from Susa to Syracuse, a union perfected within less than two years from that time, we see the glorious fulfilment of those prophetic words; and the peace which seemed a mortal blow to the dawning hope of the Italians, by the stipulation, at first withheld from public knowledge, that no coercion would be employed to enforce its offensive terms, inaugurated in Italy the great principle of popular sovereignty, and became the keystone of the Italian nationality.” Discourse, pp. 60, 61.
However easy it may be to explain the treaty of Villa Franca at the distance of two years, it was none the less a bitter disappointment, at the moment, to Cavour and to the Italian nation just born. Cavour did not attempt to reconcile his established policy with the new condition of things, and retired from the cabinet to his estates, for the first time in nine years. But the government did not march well without him; and after six or eight months Ratazzi, his successor, withdrew, and Cavour resumed the position, which he held thenceforth as long as he lived. He at once cut several of the tangled knots which had seemed so complicated; he proclaimed the Sardinian Constitution in the Duchies and the Romagna, and thus rescued them from that anomalous position which had been so dangerous for their people and so difficult for their rulers; and in his foreign and domestic policy alike attempted to consolidate and "unify" the new possessions of his king.
Of the remainder of Cavour's "reign," the expedition of Garibaldi to Sicily and Naples, and his wonderful successes there, the question which those successes opened for the solution of the Sardinian government, the vigorous and in
stantaneous solution which Cavour gave those questions by anticipating Garibaldi in advancing the Sardinian army into the Roman States, make up together the chief history. The public of the day, led by the newspapers, chose to think that Garibaldi acted under orders from the Sardinian government. But it is evident now, that, though the government dared not, indeed could not, prevent him, although it supplied him with munitions and even with money, his expedition was at the moment an embarrassment to Cavour, and formed no part of his programme.
"This brings us to the most embarrassing period of the political career of Cavour. On one hand it was impossible for Sardinia openly to take part in the expeditions of Garibaldi, directed against the king of the Two Sicilies, still on his throne, and holding with her neutral if not friendly relations. Such a step would probably have induced Austria again to take the field, and, in the face of such a flagrant violation of international law, France would have been unable to protect the country from an armed intervention. On the other hand, that movement could not be prevented without seriously endangering the national cause. The idea of political unity had taken such deep hold on the public mind, that any attempt to check its development would have resulted in revolution.” — Ibid., p. 65.
Cavour's consummate skill showed itself at this juncture with more brilliant success than in any other moment of his career. He undoubtedly secured by it the real result at which Garibaldi aimed, namely, the unity and independence of Italy. But he actually did it in spite of Garibaldi, — in face of Garibaldi, though by means of Garibaldi, — and, which is a pity, he had to do it in such a way as to pain poor Garibaldi, who became from that moment his bitter enemy. With Sardinian money and Sardinian arms, Garibaldi and his men landed on the shore of Sicily. For no particular reason, but that it was the habit of his race, the young Bourbon king of Naples ran away. Garibaldi took possession of the city, and at once fell into the hands of all the intriguers and conspirators who chose to beleaguer his good-nature. He moved against the royal forces, to be checked in the first serious encounter. Opposition irritated him, and of a sudden he proclaimed that he
would proclaim the unity of Italy by crowning Victor Emmanuel King of Italy at the Quirinal in Rome.
"Cavour saw that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring certain defeat, involve Sardinia in a war with Austria, break up the French alliance, cause the abandonment of the non-intervention policy, and probably sacrifice the conquests already achieved. Had Garibaldi been able to carry out his dream, to make his triumphal passage across Umbria and the Marches, rout the troops of Lamoricière, put to flight the French army, expel Austria, and bring aid to Hungary and Poland, his very successes would have provoked an armed intervention. His triumphs as well as his defeats appeared equally fatal to Italy. There was no time to lose. If we do not reach the Cattolica before Garibaldi, we are lost,' said Cavour to a friend. By a master-stroke of policy, he determined at once to take possession of Umbria and the Marches, push forward the army to Naples and Sicily, and to wrest from Garibaldi the leadership of the nation. The deputations from those provinces demanding immediate annexation were at once favorably listened to, Cardinal Antonelli was summoned, in the name of Italy, to disband his mercenaries, the Sardinian army crossed the frontier, and the fleet set sail for the Adriatic. We need not here describe the victory of Castelfilardo and the siege of Ancona, when the papal army was scattered to the winds, Lamoricière taken prisoner, Perugia avenged, and the national flag unfurled over the papal dominions. Victor Emmanuel, at the head of his troops, now entered the Neapolitan territory, and, on approaching the camp at Capua, was met by Garibaldi, who, amidst the enthusiastic cheers of the two armies, saluted him King of Italy.
"The wisdom of the policy followed by Cavour on this occasion can only be questioned by those who make the principle of nationality subservient to the interests of dynasties and to the claims of despotism. By taking possession of Umbria and the Marches, and by occupying Southern Italy, he defeated the rash designs of the republicans, and put an end to the not less menacing projects of Lamoricière and Francis II. He showed also a just appreciation of the character of Garibaldi, on whose patriotism, loyalty, and generous instincts he confidently relied ; and he was not mistaken; for scarcely had the king announced his intention to proceed to Naples, when the great chieftain, listening now to the voice of his heart, at once summoned the people to the ballot-box, and, the annexation being voted for by a large majority, he at once resigned his dictatorship and retired to his humble home.
"In reviewing the events of 1860 in Southern Italy, if we were
unacquainted with the actual sentiments of Garibaldi toward Cavour, and his aversion to all diplomatic artifice, we might suspect that he had purposely allowed the irregularities of his administration, and menaced Rome and Venice for the sole object of alarming the European powers, and thus of paving the way for subsequent events. As it was, it is due to Cavour that great impediments were turned into powerful means, and that the unity of Italy was secured by the co-operation of his friends, as well as by the opposition of his foes."-Ibid., pp. 69, 70.
From the moment when Cavour thus anticipated Garibaldi in the States of Rome, from the moment when Victor Emmanuel met the generous liberator, and recalled him from the pestilent plotters who had misled him, from the moment, which followed as a consequence, when the united Parliament of Italy met and proclaimed Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, Cavour's triumph had come. Like all other triumphs, it had its thorns, and its roses would wither. He had the Roman question to settle, he had Garibaldi as a thorn in his side, — he had the horrible imbroglio of Italian administration to simplify and harmonize. In this last task he died. Second causes of his death were such matters as ill-regulated appetite and Italian practice in medicine, terribly "heroic." But the first cause was overwork; he died because no man could live doing what he tried to do. But he died successful. Italy was one. It was one constitutional kingdom. And Victor Emmanuel was its king. To secure this end Cavour had devoted his life. And he laid down his life in securing it.
The Englishman, in his biography of Cavour, seems tempted to measure his greatness by his success. The Italian is more disposed to examine his plans and his theories. Both of them, of course, show us Cavour as a man of that eminently practical turn, that he never quarrelled with his instruments. Theorists will be disgusted with his indifference to the means he employs. But the world has lost so much at the hands of its Girondists of different generations, that it will be apt to hold to its verdict of praise to this man, who, having conceived of the union of Italy in a constitutional monarchy, actually compelled all things to work together till he had attained that high design.
Dr. Botta closes his spirited and very eloquent discourse by this view of his hero:
"The grandeur of Cavour's character as a statesman must be estimated by the magnitude of his object, the boldness and the prudence with which he executed his designs, and the extraordinary power which he possessed of foreseeing results and of converting obstacles into means. He combined the originality and depth of a theorist with the practical genius of a true reformer; he understood the character of the age in which he lived, and made it tributary to his great purposes. He made self-government the object of legislation, political economy the source of liberty, and liberty the basis of nationality. Aware that neither revolution nor conservatism alone could produce the regeneration of his country, he opposed them in their separate action, while he grasped them both with a firm hand, yoked them together, and led them on to conquest. He saw that Italian independence could only be attained through the aid of foreign alliance; he recognized in Napoleon III. the personification of organized revolution, and the natural ally of the Italian people; and the work, which he foreshadowed in the union of the Sardinian troops with the armies of England and France in the Crimea, and for which he laid the foundation in the Congress of Paris, was achieved with the victories of Magenta and Solferino, and the recognition of the new kingdom of Italy."- pp. 92, 93.
ART. III. HERESY AND HERETICS IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.
1. Replies to "Essays and Reviews." Oxford and London: J. H. & J. Parker. 1862. 8vo. pp. 516.
2. Aids to Faith; a Series of Theological Essays by Several Writers. Being a Reply to "Essays and Reviews." Edited by WILLIAM THOMSON, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. (American Reprint.) New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1862. 12mo. pp. 538.
VERY few writers who have published books or essays on the subjects and for the purposes had in view by the now famous contributors to the "Essays and Reviews," ever had such cause as they have for congratulating themselves upon the eminent success of their main object. When we read their book and made it the subject of an article in this journal, we