tions as had been issued by our naval and military commanders, before Copenhagen, previous to the attack, and for the substance and dates of all information transmitted by his majesty's ministers at the court of Denmark during the last year, respecting the naval force of that country, and more particularly respecting the measures that had been adopted for augmenting the same, or for putting it in a state of forward preparation for sea. The former part of this motion was agreed to; the latter gave occasion to another discussion of the whole subject at length. The possibility of Denmark defending Zealand against France was questioned by Marquis Wellesley, had she been disposed to defend it. The ordinary state of the Belt in winter, he said, was to have the passage intercepted by floating ice, which was carried off by the current, and dispersed by the wind, or occasionally melted during an interval of warm weather, so as wholly to disappear. There were no tides there, and the course of the stream accompanying the wind, nothing was more frequent than for vessels in that channel to be driven off from their station. In this situation the enemy might easily effect a descent from the opposite shores. While it was easy to invade the island, there were circumstances which rendered it difficult to defend it. Zealand did not produce provisions sufficient for the maintenance of its own inhabitants; and was, therefore,

even for the ordinary demand, dependent upon Holstein and Jutland for the principal articles of subsistence. If numerous forces were collected there, the demand would be proportionately greater, whereas the means of supply would be cut off, France being in possession of those countries: and whatever might be the disposition of England to assist them, it might be physically impossible to render assistance; for the inclemency of the season would probably prevent access at the time when communication was absolutely necessary to their support. The passage of the Belt had been represented by Lord Grenville as not less difficult than that between France and England; it was, however, considerably narrower, and there was another most material circumstance which had been overlooked; the difference be tween the resources of England and Zealand. It had never been doubted that the French might push over a body of ten, fifteen, or twenty thousand men to this country; in this country such a force would instantly be crushed; but in Zealand it would be sufficient for its object.

In reply to this, Earl St Vincent * declared, that he should think it more practicable to invade England from Boulogne, than Zealand from Holstein. The Earl of Buckinghamshire asserted, that so far from cruisers not being able to keep their station in the Belt in ordinary seasons,

the anchorage was so good as to render it perfectly practicable; and by placing gun-boats upon the coast ready to put off, any armament, unsupported by a superior naval force, might be easily resisted. Lord Hutchinson also delivered it as his opinion, that Zealand might have been defended with success against the French. It seems, indeed, equally certain, that it could have been defended, and that it would not. A more important part of the debate related to what had passed in the commons, concerning the instructions given to Earl St Vincent in his expedition to the Tagus, and the tenor of Lord Howick's dispatches to Mr Garlicke. It was maintained by the former, that there was no resemblance whatever between the conduct which he was charged to pursue, and what had been done at Copenhagen; and, with respect to Mr Garlicke, Earl Grey affirmed, that, so far from representing the Crown Prince as under the dominion of France, he had uniformly described him as of a disposition and spirit to resist every idea of compulsion, and every attempt to induce him to deviate from his neutrality. Earl Grey admitted, that he did, in one of his letters, figure a possible case, and give directions accordingly; but, in the very next sentence, he expressed his conviction that such directions were unnecessary. He challenged administration to produce his dispatches, if they should presume to intimate that they breathed any different language. In this, and in every other part of his

official duty, he said, he was particu larly anxious that his conduct and character should be fully examined.

Nothing, however, which occurred in this debate, excited so much attention as a statement made by Lord Hutchinson concerning his mission to Russia. "I think it," said he, "the more necessary to say a few words respecting that mission, in consequence of partial extracts from my letters having been communicated in another place, by which I have been held out as giving opinions which were never delivered by me. The Russian army in Poland never amounted to more than 70,000 men, with the exception of two detached divisions, amounting to about 30,000. The French troops were estimated at 150,000. After the battle of Friedland the loss of the Russians amounted to 40,000 men; they lost also 1898 officers, and 29 generals. I was then perfectly convinced that Russia must make peace with France. I believe, also, that the Emperor of Russia was sincere in his desire to mediate, if possible, a peace between this country and France; but, at all events, I then believed that peace might have been preserved between Great Britain and Russia. The treaty of Tilsit was signed on the 7th of July. On the 23d of August, I had a conversation with the Emperor at Kaminkostroff. His Imperial Majesty asked me, whether I had not admitted to Count Stragonoff, three days after the battle of Friedland, that it was necessary for him to make peace? I told him that I had done

so, that I was of that opinion then, which subsequent events had confirmed; that I thought myselfbound in justice to him, and to myself, publicly to avow it, which I should continue to do as long as I lived. His imperial majesty said, We are, then, both agreed on the necessity there was to make peace? I answered in the affirmative. His imperial majesty proceeded to state, that he had offered his mediation to England; that he attached no false vanity (gloriole was the French word) to the acceptance or rejection of his mediation; but that it was his most sincere and anxious wish that England should make peace, as he was sure that it was his interest, and also that of Europe, and ours, that we should restore tranquillity to the world. I said to his imperial majesty, that he had not given sufficient time for England to accept or reject his mediation, because a much longer period than a month must elapse before any answer could be received; and though the disposition of my mind inclined towards peace, I, nor no other man in England, would accept it, but on conditions the most reasonableand honourable; and that, as far as we were concerned, the events of the war had been highly favourable. To which his imperial majesty replied, that the time allowed was of no importance, because we might take three or four months, if we pleased, to accept or reject his mediation: but his anxious wish and desire was, that we should make peace. That he had a perfect knowledge of the feelings and character of the people of England; that he had been made acquainted by Buonaparte with the conditions of peace proposed to be offered, and he had no doubt that even I myself would consider them to be

highly reasonable and honourable.Some confidential conversation followed, which I do not think myself at liberty to disclose; but from what then passed, as I have already stated, I was justified in believing, that the relations of peace and amity might have been preserved between the two countries. It has been stated in another place, that I had given an opinion, that if the attack on Copenhagen had not taken place, Russia would not have gone to war with this country. My lords, I never gave any such opinion, nor do I mean now to say, that if that attack had not been made, there would have been no war with Russia; but I mean to say, that the result of that expedition did materially change the relations between Great Britain and Russia, and give rise to sentiments of a very hostile nature at the court of Petersburgh. Intelligence of the result of the attack on Copenhagen arrived at St Petersburgh on the 27th or 28th of August. On the 4th of September I saw the emperor a second time at Kaminkostroff. His imperial majesty began the conversation by asking me, "what I thought of our attack upon Copenhagen?" I replied, that I was entirely ignorant of the circumstances which had occasioned that attack, but that I hoped the administration in England could justify themselves, and prove to the world that the Danes were on the eve of joining all their forces to the French, to make common cause against England. His imperial majesty told me in reply, that it was impossible for me to be of that opinion, if I would recollect the repeated conversations which had taken place between us, on the subject of Denmark, at Bartenstein, in which he told me that he had used every

effort in his power to bring forward the crown prince of Denmark, and to induce him to join the coalition against France; the answers of the prince had always been explicit and uniform, that he had maintained for many years a system of neutrality, in which he was determined to persevere, as the people whom he governed had flourished and prospered under it; and that no consideration should ever induce him to depart from it. His imperial majesty added, that I must be acquainted with the decision of character which belonged to the crown prince, that nothing was so difficult as to shake his determinations, or to induce him to change any line of conduct which he had once adopted; and that he was sure no connection existed between the French and Danish government previous to our attack on Copenhagen. I then said, that I believed lord G. L. Gower had delivered to his imperial majesty's minister a note on the subject; to which his imperial majesty answered that he had, but that the contents of it were nugatory, as it contained no sufficient explanation, or offer of satisfaction. His imperial majesty then proceeded to state the great concern which our unjustifiable aggression had given him; that the French government never had done any thing so strong that it justified every thing they had done or might do hereafter. If such proceedings were admissible, there was an end of all those relations which had usually influenced the conduct of nations towards each other; that every body was at liberty to do just what they pleased, and that he might attack Sweden to-morrow. His imperial majesty then told me in the most peremptory language, tone, and man

5

ner, that he would have satisfaction, complete satisfaction, for this unprovoked aggression. That it was his duty as emperor of Russia to demand it, and that he would have it; and he asked me whether even I myself would venture to differ with him on that subject? He then said that he was bound to Denmark by the most solemn treaties and engagements, which treaties and engagements he was determined to adhere to and fulfil. His imperial majesty then added, that he supposed we meant to make an attack on Cronstadt; he did not know what the event of that attack might be, but this he knew, that he was determined to resist to the last man, and to prove himself not entirely unworthy of filling that high station to which it had pleased Providence to call him. I told his imperial majesty that I had strong reason to hope and believe, that no attack would be made on Cronstadt. His imperial majesty said he was prepared for such an event, and had taken his determination upon it, which was that which he had before stated to me. He then closed the conversation, by repeating, with much emphasis, that "he would have satisfaction for Denmark."-My lords, after such a declaration, is there any man who can say that the attack upon Copenhagen has not had a considerable effect upon the disposition of the emperor of Russia? I must even think that it formed a principal part of the immediate cause of war with Russia; and I will ask if this was not a good cause? The reason it was not immediately declared, I have reason to believe, was, that Russia had two fleets at sea, and in some measure in our power. My lords; I cannot sit down without complaining of the

Liberties that have been taken by the English newspapers, with the character of the Emperor of Russia. While in his dominions I repeatedly experienced the most unpleasant sensations, on perusing the false and scandalous animadversions of our public prints. There was a time when such unjustifiable attacks would not have been permitted, or would have been punished. To the good faith, magnanimity, and perseverance of the Emperor Alexander, I wish to bear my testimony. I am persuaded that there was not a soldier nor a cannon in all his dominions, that was not called forth in the war." This statement was triumphantly appealed to by the opposition, and their partizans. Yet to what does it amount? To this only, that in Lord Hutchinson's opinion, the Emperor Alexander was disposed to be at peace with England before the expedition to Copenhagen, and to the fact that the Expedition was made a pretext for declaring war against us. Russia had no other pretext for an act so absurdly inconsistent with its former policy, and with its own interest; was it to be doubted then, that, having been duped or bribed into such a resolution, she would eagerly catch at so specious a plea? For, as to arguments deduced from the good faith, magnanimity, and perseverance of the Emperor Alexander, this answer suffices; he swore eternal friendship to the King of Prussia, upon the tomb of Frederick the Great, he went to war with France in alliance with that king, and he concluded the war by sharing with France in that king's spoils. Whether he was cajoled into the treaty of Tilsit by the artifices of Buonaparte, or compelled into it by his arms, the inference is equally certain, and in either case he was made

VOL. 1. PART I.

subservient to France. The intentions of France respecting the Northern Powers were open and avowed; and, if we had not supplied Alexander with a plea for going to war with us, he would have gone to war without one.

On the same evening, Mr Whitbread, acting in concert with Earl Grey, moved, in the Lower House. for the production of that correspondence with Mr Rist and Mr Garlicke, from which Mr Canning, he asserted, had produced extracts garbled to serve his purpose. Mr Canning replied, he had no objection to produce the note of Mr Rist, since it would tend to throw light on the nature and propriety of the late orders in council. The other correspondence in question he had quoted, not by way of recrimination or imputation upon Earl Grey, but to show that that nobleman had resolved not to suffer the surrender of the Danish fleet to the enemy;—the very opinion and advice which he himself would have suggested in the same circumstances. This he designed to prove by the extract, and this was proved by it. Therefore, he said, as no case whatever had been made out for the production of these papers, he must object to it, chiefly because, if granted, it would go to establish a precedent for publishing all papers and foreign dispatches whatever. There would be no end to distrust; and, from the sample which was now exhibited, there would be no end to the demand and production of papers. These

papers were accordingly reFeb. 26. fused. Yet, on the 26th,

Mr Canning himself moved for these very papers, in order, as he said, to correct those misconstructions which had been put upon his conduct and language in

D