2 tional controul over affairs of this nature, it had been compelled to dissemble its inquietude, especially because it would have been dangerous to manifest any apprehension while a probability remained that the object of the French might be generous, and that they intended to support the interests of Ferdinand. When the court were preparing to emigrate, and had ordered the troops from Madrid to escort them, the council trembled for the safety of the prince, and endeavoured to impede or retard, as much as possible, the departure of the soldiery, that they might at least be able to facilitate his escape, for which they were assured that secret measures had already been taken. They therefore presented a report to the king, in which they endeavoured to make him abandon his design, and to lessen his confidence in the favourite; and urged him, if any extraordinary measures were necessary, that he would consult with a competent number of well-informed subjects, devoted to their sovereign and to their country; adding, that if they were thought worthy of being advised with, they would deliver their opinion briefly, sincerely, and faithfully, having in view nothing but their duty to God, the king, and the people. The subsequent events, till the departure of Ferdinand for Bayonne, were but too well known. On the 20th of April, a printer informed them that some Frenchmen had requested him to strike off copies of a proclamation, signifying, that the royal parents were about to re-ascend the throne: in consequence of this information, two Frenchmen, who stated that they were in the service of General Grouchy, were arrested, and put in confinement. The council then came VOL I. PART I. to a resolution that all the provinces should be called upon to raise forces in proportion to their population: the number of the whole, according to their estimate, might amount to 300,000. After much consultation, however, with the infante Don Antonio, and with persons who came with confidential instructions from Ferdinand and Cevallos, that resolution had been abandoned, as tending to endanger the king's person, and prematurely to put to hazard the safety and independence of the kingdom. Don Antonio, nevertheless, engaged to transmit instructions privately to the captains-general of the provinces, to take every measure consistent with prudence for increasing their military force. And when the junta of government ordered the council to send a circular notice to all the provincial tribunals, enjoining them to see that the most cordial reception was given to the French troops, they transmitted a memorial in reply, expatiating on the dangers which might result from any attempt to repress the high spirit of loyalty and affection towards Ferdinand, with which the people were animated. The day after the dreadful massacre of Madrid, a memorial had been laid before them from the captaingeneral of Catalonia, stating the means to which he had had recourse for the relief of the poor of Barcelona, and requesting their sanction. Convinced that this was only a pretext on his part to obtain the funds necessary for procuring arms, they immediately sanctioned his proceedings, without those previous enquiries which the usual forms required. They had received a decree from Murat, directing the formation of a junta of police, having two Frenchmen for its commissaries: they 2 B had refused to obey, quoting the law, which excludes all foreigners from any share in the public administration of justice-thus was the door shut against the favourites of the grand duke; thus were those mischiefs obviated which must have come upon the state, had they been appointed; and Madrid thus continued under her own magistrates. When they were called upon to acknowledge Joseph Buonaparte as their king, in consequence of the renunciation of Ferdinand and his parents, they argued, that such a renunciation was altogether nugatory, and incompatible with the laws of the constitution: it was monstrous to suppose that the royal family could give away the sovereignty of the nation, or that any one act which they had performed could be considered binding, on account of the time, the situation, and the circumstances in which they were placed. Once, however, they observed, that, supposing the treaties of abdication and cession were valid, and that the throne devolved to a branch of the imperial family, it was their opinion that the King of Naples, Joseph Buonaparte, appeared the fittest person for it. This fact indeed was too notorious to be denied or dissembled, and it invalidates the whole apology. When they were called upon to publish the decree for convoking the assembly at Bayonne, they suspended its publication, and sent in a memorial to the grand duke, Murat, observing that their body never had ta. ken, nor could, according to the laws, take upon itself the national representation, that they were consequently, and by the same laws, excluded from the election of their sovereign, that whatever change took place in the succession was entirely the concern of the nation; and that when a succession took place, without the proper forms, it was to be deemed, according to the actual constitution of the monarchy, null and void. This spirited answer, they affirmed, drew upon them much indignation, and they were even threatened with a process for sedition,--but they admitted, that, at length, confessing themselves influenced by the reasons signed by the president of the assembly at Bayonne, and likewise by the request of Joseph Buonaparte, they ordered the documents to be printed. "From that time, they had perhaps greater difficulties to struggle with," they said, “than the nation was aware of. They were threatened with the loss of their authority; but they determined to yield it up altogether, rather than retam it when polluted. Persecution, banishment, and death, became familiar to their ears; but the consciousness of their integrity supported them amidst all their trials. Such was the state of affairs, when they had the unexpected happiness of witnessing the sudden departure of the French. The omnipotent Ruler of human events, by a supreme act of his divine providence, delivered the council from the imminent danger which hung over it, thus rewarding the purity of its intention, and the unshaken loyalty, which, amidst all its troubles and all its difficulties, it had preserved inviolated. Joseph Buonaparte departed with his army, and the council had never taken the oaths to him, never been introduced, nor on any occasion paid him even those honours which they had always been in the habit of performing, as marks of respect, to foreign princes." The council of Castille so far succeeded in its appeal to the compas sion of the people, that its weak members were pitied, and its guilty ones remained unpunished. Shocked at the atrocities of the French revolutionists, the Spanish patriots have erred on the side of clemency: they should have censured this council as soon as a provisional government was formed, and have displaced all its members, as men who, by their own admission, had failed in their duty, and lent their aid to the degradation and subjection of Spain. Meantime, the necessity of a central government was felt by all the provinces, various projects were talked of, and the different juntas seemed to expect the decision of that of Seville, which, not less from the wisdom of its measures than from its favourable situation, had hitherto, in some degree, been regarded as the leading authority. That junta published, upon this occasion, a paper of great importance. Hitherto, they said, the cause of the Spaniards had been prosperous, and nothing could impair or frustrate their hopes of eventual and complete success, except a want of union among themselves. Their enemies were anxious to foment divisions. Human passions, personal interests ill understood, the ignorance, the weakness, the blindness of men, might perhaps assist these evil designs, destroy a beginning so glorious, and facilitate and consummate the ruin of Spain. This they were endeavouring to guard against, protesting, before God and man, whose aid they invoked with all fervency, that they would write nothing but what was dictated by the love of their country, for the preservation of their king and of their rights, not mingling with it any thing that appeared to partake of passion, of interest, or of any other personal motive; but being always ready to hear the opinions of the other provinces, and to amend their own errors, whenever it should be shown that they had committed any. The chief care should be to avoid whatever was not absolutely necessary, and might serve to sow the seeds of disunion: of this nature were all discussions concerning the royal house, and the order of succession in the different families which derived a right from it. The laws upon this point were well known; but are we, said they, in a situation to talk of this? Long live our king and indisputable severcign Ferdinand VII., and long live his august brothers, heirs of the crown after his attested decease! Why anticipate enquiries which could only be necessary in default of them? It was both absurd and dangerous to dispute about the succession in cases evidently remote; and the provinces ought to confine themselves to avowing the general principle of hereditary succession, according to the fundamental laws of the monarchy. The second question which agitated the people was of a different nature:---Was there a necessity for creating a supreme government, which should unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till the restitution of Ferdinand to his throne? The junta of Seville declared, that, from the beginning, they had been persuaded such a supreme government was by all means necessary, and that without it the country was in danger. Many juntas and many military commanders had expressed their conviction of this truth, -a conviction arising from the indispensable necessity in every nation of a civil government, whose duty it is to attend to the happiness of the kingdom, and to which the military may be subordinate. The confidence of the nation, the public funds, and the capitals of individuals must have a civil government for their support. Without it the military power would inevitably be compelled to employ violence, with the view of acquiring that confidence which it never could attain, and getting a command of those capitals which it would be equally impossible for it to bring within its grasp; and thus it would ultimately destroy that public prosperity and happiness which ought to be the sole object of every government. Spain had derived a lesson of wisdom from the history of past ages, and had never thought of appointing a military dictator. Her generals (and the fact was most honourable to the Spanish name) had been the first to embrace, with the utmost cordiality, a system of things as ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The experience of these times, the confidence of the people in the supreme juntas, the facility and abundance with which pecuniary resources had been placed at their disposal, the heroic loyalty with which the generals and the army had acknowledged and obeyed them, and the happy issue, thus far, of their civil administration, and of the military enterprizes which they had directed, placed in the most conspicuous light, and established, beyond all doubt, this fundamental truth, and most essential political principle. But who was to create this supreme civil government? Who were to compose it? Where should be its place of residence? What the extent of its authority? How might it be established, without interrupting the public tranquillity, and producing disunion among the different provinces? How was the public opinion to be so regulated, as that this tranquillity could be obtained without opposing it, and all risk of disturbance obviated? These were the important questions to be examined. It had been said that the cortes should assemble, that the council of Castille should convoke them, and the whole proceedings be executed under the authority of that tribunal. But the council of Castille never possessed the right of convoking the cortes,-why then should they give it that authority? Was it because it had lent the whole weight of its influence to the usurpation? Because it had acted in opposition to those fundamental laws which it was established to preserve and defend? Because it had afforded every facility to the enemy to usurp the sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the crown, and the dynasty legally in possession? Because it had recognized and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of the shadow of a title to it; for it was incontrovertibly manifest, that the renunciation of Charles IV. could give him no such claim? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a government convoked by an authority, incompetent, illegal, and guilty of acts which might justly be ranked with the most atrocious crimes against their country? But the council of Castille being thus excluded from all consideration, who was to convoke the cortes? It was the peculiar and exclusive prerogative of the king to summon them; the provinces would not submit to any other authority; they would not unite: thus, therefore, there would be no cortes, or, if a few deputies should assemble, that very circumstance would occasion divisions in Spain, the very evil which all were anxious to avoid. Be sides, some of the cities which have Hence, if there were any province in which the military power subsisted alone, it was absolutely necessary that a supreme junta should be constituted there, by which the people might act; this being indispensable, in order to concentrate the legitimate power of the people; for, under the present circumstances, the supreme government could not be legitimate, unless it originated in their free consent. The junta of Seville was therefore of opinion that all the supreme juntas, meeting on the same day, should each elect, from its own members, two deputies, to form the supreme government; and the persons so elected should, from that moment, be acknowledged and obeyed as governorsgeneral of the kingdom. The supreme juntas ought nevertheless to be continued till the termination of the present state of things, being invested with the internal management of their respective provinces, but under due subordination to the general government. They ought to give instructions to their deputies constituting that government, and it would be the duty of those deputies to observe them, and to represent and support the claims of their provinces, as far as was consistent with the public weal. If there were one of the royal family capable of presiding in the supreme government, he, and no other, ought to be appointed to that office; but if there were no person of the royal-blood, then it must elect a president from its own body; and, to obviate all danger, the presidency should be only for such a limited time as might seem best. The juntas would appoint a place for the seat of government, which the government might afterwards change, by a majority of votes, if it should see cause. |