Reports of Committees: 30th Congress, 1st Session - 48th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 2 |
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Page 28
... believe the enemy would trouble Washington so long as we had a powerful army in the vicinity of Richmond , and did not share the apprehensions for the safety of Washington that were entertained by a great many . " I asked for 50,000 men ...
... believe the enemy would trouble Washington so long as we had a powerful army in the vicinity of Richmond , and did not share the apprehensions for the safety of Washington that were entertained by a great many . " I asked for 50,000 men ...
Page 29
... believe that they were not held in strong force when our army appeared before them ; and we know that they were far from complete . The prestige of power , the morale , were on our side . It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain ...
... believe that they were not held in strong force when our army appeared before them ; and we know that they were far from complete . The prestige of power , the morale , were on our side . It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain ...
Page 47
... believe to be between Bunker Hill and Winchester . I promise you that I will give to your views the fullest and most unprejudiced consideration , and that it is my intention to advance the moment my men are shod , and my cavalry are ...
... believe to be between Bunker Hill and Winchester . I promise you that I will give to your views the fullest and most unprejudiced consideration , and that it is my intention to advance the moment my men are shod , and my cavalry are ...
Page 48
... believe that no armies in the world , while in campaign , have been more promptly or better supplied than ours . " Third . Soon after the battle of Antietam General McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements in ...
... believe that no armies in the world , while in campaign , have been more promptly or better supplied than ours . " Third . Soon after the battle of Antietam General McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements in ...
Page 52
... believe that we were going to move in the direction of Gordonsville , and then to make a rapid movement of the whole army to Fredericksburg ; " for the rea- son that " we would all the time be as near Washington as would the enemy , and ...
... believe that we were going to move in the direction of Gordonsville , and then to make a rapid movement of the whole army to Fredericksburg ; " for the rea- son that " we would all the time be as near Washington as would the enemy , and ...
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Common terms and phrases
a. m. to-morrow Adjourned to 11 advance Alexandria Answer Aquia creek arrived artillery attack batteries battle battle of Williamsburg Bottom's Bridge bridge brigade Burnside Captain cavalry Centreville chairman Chandler Chickahominy Colonel committee met pursuant corps cross despatch direction division enemy enemy's fight following witnesses force Fort Monroe fortifications Fortress Monroe Franklin Fredericksburg Frémont front G. B. MCCLELLAN General-in-Chief Gooch guns H. W. HALLECK Harper's Ferry HEADQUARTERS ARMY Heintzelman horses infantry James river Major General H. W. Major General MCCLELLAN Manassas McDowell miles military morning move movement night o'clock Odell officers operations opinion peninsula pontoons position Potomac President pursuant to adjournment quartermaster Question railroad Rappahannock re-enforcements rebels received regiments retreat Richmond road Secretary Secretary of War sent side Sumner supplies suppose telegraph tion troops wagons WAR DEPARTMENT Warrenton Washington Williamsburg York river Yorktown
Popular passages
Page 76 - State from the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives in whichsoever house it shall last have been so approved, and he shall carefully preserve the originals.
Page 525 - In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.
Page 340 - I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you.
Page 310 - Ordered: That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of all the army corps shall leave said city entirely secure.
Page 24 - I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can- A.
Page 46 - You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania; but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he docs so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.
Page 9 - MY DEAR SIR: — You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
Page 45 - As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named.
Page 44 - The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south.
Page 11 - That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day.