P. S.-General Pope thinks, if you fall back, it would be much better towards York river than towards the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph. A. LINCOLN. MCCLELLAN'S, June 27-10 a. m. The night passed quietly. During it we brought all wagons, heavy guns, &c., to this side, and at daybreak drew in McCall's division about three miles. This change of position was beautifully executed, under a sharp fire, with but little loss. The troops on the other side are now well in hand, and the whole. army so concentrated that it can take advantage of the first mistake made by the enemy. White House yet undisturbed. Success of yesterday complete. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Major General. My change of position on other side just made by Jackson and two other divisions. Hon. E. M. STANTON, MCCLELLAN's, June 27-12 m. Major General. p. m. MCCLELLAN's, June 27-37 We have been fighting nearly all day against greatly superior numbers. We shall endeavor to hold our own; and if compelled to fall back, shall do it in good order upon James river if possible. Our men fight like veterans, and will do all that men can do. If we have to fall back on James river, supplies should be passed up to us, under protection of the gunboats, as rapidly as possible. McClellan has telegraphed you several times to-day. You may rely upon it, the rebels are concentrating their greatest efforts at this juncture. Hon. E. M. STANTON, R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. Secretary of War. MCCLELLAN's, June 28-12.20 a. m. I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several very strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do-all that soldiers could accomplish; but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order; my regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand, fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond, but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible for this; and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the government must view the matter with the same earnestness that I do; you must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely reiterated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. I should have gained this battle with ten thousand fresh men. If, at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I would gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand men more would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly-I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that. The government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. Hon. E. M. STANTON, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major General. The President to Major General McClellan. WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862. Save your army at all events. Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed re-enforcements; I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel my misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that re-enforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government, that is to blame. Please tell at once the present condition or aspect of things. Major General MCCLELLAN. A. LINCOLN. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC, Haxall's Plantation, July 1, 1862. GENERAL: My whole army is here, with all its guns and material. The battle of yesterday was very severe, but the enemy were repulsed and severely punished. After dark the troops retired to this position. My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire to night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can render more aid in covering our position. Permit to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed. I hope that the enemy was so severely handled yesterday as to render him careful in his movements to-day. I now pray for time. My men have proved themselves the equals of any troops in the world, but they are worn out. Our losses have been very great; doubt whether more severe battles have ever been fought. We have failed to win only because overpowered by superior numbers. Very truly, yours, Brigadier General L. THOMAS, Adjutant General United States Army. WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1862. It is impossible to re-enforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fortress Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. Major General G. B. MCCLELLAN. A. LINCOLN. WASHINGTON, July 2, 1862. Your despatch of yesterday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you for a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defence of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included in and about Washington seventy-five thousand men. Now, please be assured that I have not men enough to fill that very plan by fifteen thousand. All of General Frémont's, in the Valley, all of General Banks's, all of General McDowell's not with you, and all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, sixty thousand. With General Wool and General Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of your army, seventy-five thousand men east of the mountains. Thus, the idea of sending you fifty thousand, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If in your frequent mention of responsibility you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept. Major General MCCLELLAN. [Received Washington, D. C., July 3, 1862, 12 m.] A. LINCOLN. BERKELEY, Harrison's Bar, July 2—5.20 p. m. I have succeeded in getting this army to this place, on the banks of the James river. I have lost but one gun, which had to be abandoned last night, because it broke down. An hour and a half ago, the rear of the wagon train was within a mile of camp, and only one wagon abandoned. As usual, we had a severe battle yesterday, and beat the enemy badly, the men fighting even better than before. We fell back to this position during the night and morning. Officers and men thoroughly worn out by fighting every day, and working every night, for a week. They are in good spirits, and after a little rest will fight better than ever. If not attacked during this day, I will have the men ready to repulse the enemy to-morrow. General Ferry is here. Our losses have been very heavy, for we have fought every day since last Tuesday. I have not yielded an inch of ground unnecessarily, but have retired to prevent the superior force of the enemy from cutting me off, and to take a different base of operations. I thank you for the re-enforcements. Every thousand men you send at once will help me much. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Hon. A. LINCOLN, President of the United States. Major General. General McClellan to the Secretary of War. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, SIR: In order to insure a perfect understanding of the exact condition of this army, I have directed my chief of staff, General R. B. Marcy, to repair to Washington and give you full explanations of the events of the last few weeks. A simple summary is that this army has fought every day for a week against superior numbers, holding its own, at least, after repulsing the enemy by day, then retiring at night. Our light and heavy guns are saved, with the exception of one; all the wagons are now within the line of pickets, and I hope all will be saved. The army is thoroughly worn out, and requires rest and very heavy re-enforcements. Our losses have been very great, for the fighting has been desperate, and officers and men behaved heroically. I am in hopes that the enemy is as completely worn out as we are. He was certainly very severely punished in the last battle. The roads are now very bad; for these reasons I hope that we shall have enough breathing space to reorganize and rest the men and get them into position before the enemy can attack again. I have ordered Burnside to bring up all his available force, and leave to your judgment the question of evacuating Newbern and its dependencies, so as to bring every available man to re-enforce this army. It is, of course, impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but doubt whether there are to-day more than fifty thousand men with their colors. To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond and putting an end to this rebellion, re-enforcements should be sent to me rather much over than less than one hundred thousand men. I beg that you will be fully impressed by the magnitude of the crisis in which we are placed. We require action on a gigantic scale-one commensurate with the views I expressed in a memorandum to the President submitted early last August, when first ordered to command the army of the Potomac. The safety of the country and the preservation of its honor demand the utmost energy and intelligence. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General Commanding. [Received Washington, 12 50 a. m., July 5.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4—1 p. m. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of yesterday afternoon. I thank you for your expression of satisfaction with the conduct of this army and myself. On yesterday I ordered General Burnside to send me such re-enforcements as he could afford. I thank you for the order to General Hunter to send me all the troops he can spare. I regret that General Halleck considers all his force necessary to maintain his position. I do not wish to endanger, in any way, the secure occupation of what has been gained in the southwest. I will do the best I can with such force as I have and such aid as you can give me. I think the army of Virginia should keep out cavalry reconnoissances in the direction of Richmond, lest the enemy should prefer an advance to Washington to attacking this army. I wish to be advised fully of all matters in front of that army. If the capital be threatened, I will move this army, at whatever hazard, in such direction as will best divert the enemy. Our whole army is now drawn up for review in its positions, bands playing, salutes being fired, and all things looking bright. The PRESIDENT. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major General. EXECUTIVE MANSION, MY DEAR SIR: I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula When I was with you the other day we made out $6,000 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. Not more than 5,000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. I believe half or twothirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for the future? Major General MCCLELLAN. A. LINCOLN. [Time received, 8 p. m.] July 15, 1862, Your telegram of yesterday has been received. The difference between the effective force of troops and that expressed in returns is considerable in every army. All commanders find the actual strength less than the strength represented on paper. I have not my returns for the tri-monthly period since arriving at Fort Monroe at hand at this moment, but even on paper I will not, I am confident, be found to have received one hundred and sixty thousand officers and men present, although present and absent my returns will be accountable for that number. You can arrive at the number of absentees, however, better by my return of July 10, which will be ready to send shortly. I find from official reports that I have present for duty: Officers, three thousand two hundred and fifteen; enlisted men, eighty-five thousand four hundred and fifty; in all, present for duty, eighty-eight thousand six hundred and sixty |