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benefit of another. To my mind, if that state of things is to continue, federation, the blessings of union, the harmony which we expect to result, would largely disappear, and we should have each constituent part of the commonwealth watching every state in connection with the railway tariffs, and in a constant condition of irritation with regard to the progress of trade. It does seem to me, as my right hon. friend has just declared, that a dominating feature of this federation is freedom of trade, freedom of intercourse, but I disagree with him to this extent, that it appears to me that the barriers you erect in connection with your railway tariffs are now, and will in the future, be just as troublesome and just as detrimental to that perfect freedom of trade which you wish to secure as are your border custom-houses, and your border duties.

An HON. MEMBER: It will be a delusion altogether!

Mr. SYMON: Therefore, I hope that if we sweep out from the measure as drafted in Adelaide the inter-state commission, we shall be able to introduce something instead that will be equally effectual for the purpose. Just one word as to the rivers. That is a matter which concerns the colony I have the honor to come from very intimately indeed. The same principles, perhaps with intensified force, that apply in regard to the railways apply also to the rivers. But I gathered to-day a considerable crumb of comfort from my hon. friend, Mr. Lyne, who told us that he-and, I understood him, the people of New South Wales-have no desire to so use the river Murray as to prevent its being navigable. Now that embodies the contention which I am disposed to fight for.

An HON. MEMBER: That is all we want! Mr. SYMON: All we seek is that the great stream of the Murray, which is not only a channel of communication, but a vehicle of traffic, shall be open along the

whole of its course, so far as it is now navigable, for all time. We do not wish that interfered with or lessened. I hope the people of New South Wales will believe that we have not the slightest desire to interfere with that great public object they have in view in the development of their country by means of irrigation. At least, personally, I have not. I agree that in a country like this it is impossible to treat waterways on the same footing as in other countries, where waterways and rivers are abundant, and we must all feel that to deprive New South Wales of the particular dealing with the affluents of the navigable river Murray for the purposes of irrigation would be to take away from them that control which in eastern countries was sought to be exercised over the wells of water about which there is so much dispute recorded in Holy Writ.

Mr. GLYNN: If you let them carry out their schemes you will have to navigate on dry land!

Mr. SYMON: I do not agree with my hon. friend as to that. My experience, which is not very extensive, but is useful as far as it goes, is that when you improve streams, in themselves originally small, for the purposes of irrigation, you develop very often, if not generally, the water supply. You may utilise streams in the way I have indicated and still preserve the navigability of the main river, where it is navigable now. At any rate, I believe that is the case, and I am not prepared to ask the people of New South Wales to yield up their control for the purposes of irrigation of the internal rivers of their present system. It may be that the federal parliament, under the powers embodied in clause 95, to which my hon. friend, Mr. O'Connor, referred, may be enabled to deal with this question should difficulties and trouble arise. But at present my view is that the arrangement made in the Convention at Adelaide will be ample for

the purposes of South Australia-for the purposes of all Australia, because all Australia is interested in keeping the Murray navigable. I believe it will be sufficient for that purpose, and I hope that to that extent, at any rate, it will be preserved. I should like to say also in regard to the taking over of the debts of the various colonies, that I hope the provision in the bill will be allowed to remain as it is-in other words, that it will be permissive to the commonwealth to take over the debts. If I had entertained any doubt on that subject before, it would have been removed by the very excellent and convincing speech made yesterday afternoon by my hon. friend, Mr. Holder. That the debts ought to be taken over some time or other, and that they will be taken over, probably, goes without saying. But if we were to embody in this constitution an obligation on the part of the federal parliament to take over the debts, it would at once send our stock to a premium, and it would paralyse the hands of the federation in making terms for an advantageous conversion.

Mr. GLYNN:

Mr. SYMON: We hope to convert before the stock expires, and I think we may be able to do it if to use the word of Mr. Higgins in connection with another matter-we have a weapon in our hands, or a lever which we can use for that purpose. The Hon. J. HENRY: How would the hon. gentleman set about it?

Mr. SYMON: I would set about it in the way my hon. friend, Mr. Holder, indicated yesterday. I think he put it this way: If you make it obligatory, your stock immediately increases in value, and you have nothing to offer to the stockholder in order to induce him to give up his stock and allow it to be converted.

The Right Hon. Sir G. TURNER: The moment it was known that the federal parliament intended to convert, up would go the stock!

The Hon. J. HENRY: Exactly!

Mr. SYMON: If my right hon. friend were treasurer of the federal government he would take care not to intimate the intention until he had first negotiated.

The Right Hon. Sir G. TURNER: The moment you started to negotiate the rise would take place!

Mr. SYMON: My hon. friend would, no doubt, be astute enough and careful enough in the interests of the federal government to make adequate arrangements in that respect, and I am satisfied that my hon. friend, Mr. Holder, would be perfectly able to devise some method of securing-Iwould not say all the benefit-but some of the benefit for the federal exchequer.

The Right Hon. Sir G. TURNER: He would not be astute enough for the English capitalists!

Mr. SYMON: We can only face the difficulty when it arises. Without prognosticating on which side the advantage will be, of the two methods the better is that advocated by my hon. friend, Mr. Holder, to leave it permissive rather than to make it obligatory on the federal authority. In regard to the financial adjustment and the regulation of trade, undoubtedly that is the most important part of what may be described as the commercial bargain into which we are entering, and I would only say, after the view which has evidently been adopted by the Convention as to the desirability of leaving the question to be dealt with by the federal parlia ment, that the principle it seems to me is to give back to each state as nearly as possible what it contributes, less its proportion of the federal expenditure. That seems to me to be really the guiding principle of the whole subject. If each state contributed equally per head there would be no difficulty whatever; but that is nci so, and I think we ought to bear in mind that it never will be so. I do not believe you will have an equal contribution per

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head from the states of the commonwealth any more than you will have it from towns, parishes, or other districts. A great deal of misapprehension has arisen, and a great deal of what I regard as very unjust criticism has been cast upon the labours of the Convention in Adelaide, because that fact has been forgotten. is said that so much per head will be produced by New South Wales, so much by Victoria, and so much by South Australia. These inequalities must, more or less, always exist, and all we can hope to arrive at is a fair approximation. The object is really twofold. First, to get as near as you can, if you are to settle it in the constitution, or to leave it to the federal parliament with all the knowledge which will be at its disposal, with the data by which it may be guided in order to finally settle it. I have always been opposed to having it settled in the constitution, and for this reason: It seems to me that we are simply going blind. Whatever effort we may make to arrive at some approximation we are dealing with matters of prophecy, and not matters of fact. No human being-I do not believe even an archangel from heaven-could at this moment introduce into the constitution which it is our mission to frame a provision which would do justice all round upon the financial question.

The Hon. J. HENRY: Have archangels any speciality in regard to finance?

Mr. SYMON: I have no doubt my hon. friend is not merely a great authority in regard to finance, but he has great qualifications for being an archangel as well. Even a combination of the two would not produce in this constitution an arrangement in respect of finance which would give satisfaction to the people of the colonies. It would, at any rate, give, as it has given before, the greatest stimulus and the widest scope for all kinds of criticism. But that is about all. If it is a matter of prophecy,

then they tell you that it is like the Lamentations of Jeremiah, that it is all to the injury of some particular state or some particular set of taxpayers. Therefore, I am glad, as I think we must all be glad, that the feeling is crystallising in favour of what was really adopted by the bill of 1891 -the ultimate disposal of this question by the federal parliament; and as the Premier of New South Wales has said, to what better authority can we possibly commit that task, a body elected on the widest franchise available, a body which will be as patriotic as any states parliament will be, a body which will be certainly as competent as any other legislative assemblage can possibly be, and concerned not only for the interest of the entire commonwealththe union of all the states--but concerned to see that in securing that general welfare the interests of no individual state are sacrificed? My belief is that we shall have in the federal parliament a legislative machine that will be actuated by the highest possible principles, and that it will not be open to the charge that it will be likely to view any particular section of the Commonwealth with more favour than another. I would remind hon. members that, in the bill of 1891, which was subjected to a great deal of criticism, and was condemned by its author-Sir Samuel Griffith--with very trenchant criticism, really the power of disposing of this matter was left in the hands of the federal parliament. We know the difficulties which have arisen. We know that the best minds and the best experience have been brought to bear upon this question. We know, as I have said, that in the bill of 1891 we had provisions that for the moment were considered admirable. They were condemned. We know that in Adelaide we had a Finance Committee which sat for a good while thoroughly investigating the subject, and the proposals they brought forward were allowed to slip under

the table and were heard of no more. Then came a reference of the Treasurers, and we find that throughout the whole of Australia great denunciations were heard of these proposals, although I am bound to say that, looking at the sliding scale in the light which Mr. Holder has cast upon it in his pamphlet, and also in his speech yesterday, I am inclined to think that if we were to deal with the matter now, the sliding scale system is about as near an approximation to what is fair and just as we could possibly meet with.

Mr. WALKER: Extending over twenty years!

Mr. SYMON: I do not say anything about that. The extent of its duration is another matter. Whether it is five or ten years is a matter which I hope the experts on the Finance Committee will be able to settle. No doubt if it is adopted in the constitution something of that kind will probably be secured. At the same time, we are not able to escape from the bookkeeping system which for some period or other must be adopted. But the vice of all these proposals and schemes is that it is not so much in the details of them as it is in the inherent impossibility of settling prophetically a practical question which depends on data not now available, and which afterwards will have to be obtained. Passing over a number of other matters with which it seems unnecessary to deal, I wish to say a word as to the suggestion of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, as to the establishment and payment over of a minimum. I disapprove of that altogether. If we trust the federal parliament we should trust it all in all. If we are to endeavour to fix a minimum, we are met on the very threshold with the anomalous position of Western Australia. We all agree that Western Australia must receive some special treatment; but if we are to deal with that special treatment now, we shall be entangled in the very thing which we

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wish to avoid, namely, entering upon the details of a financial inquiry by the light of what a particular customs tariff may produce. I therefore think, with the Premier of New South Wales, that we should leave the matter to the federal parliament. A minimum would undoubtedly have the effect of being an encouragement. It might remove difficulties from the path of some who may feel some hesitation as to the state of the particular finances of their own colony; but if we have confidence-confidence in the machine as my right hon. friend put it then I think we may fairly say to the people of the colonies from which we come, "We recommend you to trust the federal parliament throughout, not only to deal with particular items-maximums or minimums-but to deal with the whole question, so that each colony shall be fairly served, and that each colony's finances shall be fairly maintained." I do not propose to occupy one moment longer upon some other aspects of the matter which have presented themselves, and which are of considerable difficulty, because the main question is really whether we shall or shall not remit this adjustment of the finances to the federal parliament; and if we convey that intimation, as I think, it has been very generally conveyed, to the Finance Committee, it will give them a basis upon which to work, and a beacon by which they may proceed. I will only say this further: It is a mistake to be always on the look out for a "lion in the path." We are very apt to imagine that we see a "lion in the path" when no lion exists. No one can tell what particular difficulties may crop up; and no one can deny that there are difficulties to be overcome-great difficulties; but, if any recommendation would be of influence, as I have no doubt it would be, what I would say to the Finance Committee is, if there is a difficulty--if there is a nettle, let them grasp it firmly let them not be afraid to meet

the difficulties that lie before them; and if they do grasp the nettle firmly, then, out of it, I am quite sure that we, in this Convention, with their help, will be able to pluck the flower of safety and success.

The Hon. J. W. HACKETT (Western Australia) [432]: At this late hour of the Convention's proceedings to day I do not propose to trouble hon. members with very many remarks; but, as the tone of the debate for the last two or three hours has largely occupied itself with local questions by which I mean questions not peculiar to any one state, but which involve the interests, not of the whole commonwealth, but of two or three statesperhaps you, sir, will allow me a few minutes to speak generally on the question, and afterwards to put a few aspects of the matter from the Western Australian point of view, which, if they have been alluded to, have only been alluded to in general terms, and not specifically. I think that, in the first instance, I may congratulate the Committee on the course taken in putting into the forefront this financial difficulty. The feeling that has been evinced, and the expressions which have been called forth in the course of the debate, must very materially shorten the work of the Convention in arriving at its desired conclusion. Had indeed this matter been as fully and freely debated in the Adelaide Convention, with the materials which this Committee possesses at present, I believe that our work at this adjourned Convention would have been so shortened, would have been so satisfactory in every way, that we might have been prepared to take a poll of the people before many months are over. I take it that the main difficulty now in our path is this financial question. The arrangement of the relations between the states and the commonwealth has never seemed to me to be of such a formidable character as to threaten a suspension of the work required to bring the common

wealth into being. But I have all along felt-and any one familiar with the history of my own colony for the last few years must also have felt, especially if he had been in my own position, labouring in a small minority on behalf of federation and against a great body of doubt and misgiv ing that unless we could give a satisfactory reply with regard to the financial bearings between Western Australia and the commonwealth, we might as well spare ourselves the trouble of appealing to our people. Of course the main difficulty in the matter arises from the fact—and it cannot be divorced from it-that the one source of unencumbered revenue-by which I mean revenue, no part of which is applied in payment for services rendered-is the customs. The customs, by the terms and implication, must pass into the hands of the federal authority. It is its natural revenue. But it so happens that the transfer of that revenue to the federal authority is attended with three grave contingencies, every one of which represents a vast body of difficulties that would have to be surmounted before the commonwealth is brought into operation. The first is that the customs must inevitably bring in a revenue immensely greater than the commonwealth will require for its own purposes. That would have a natural tendency to create extravagance-to cause carelessness and indifference on the part of the financial authorities of the commonwealth

unless they were very closely looked after. The second point is that if it interferes in a fundamental degree-and we cannot close our eyes to the fact that it must interfere in a fundamental degree-with the fiscal policy of one of the largest states of the commonwealth, the probability-I hope not the certainty—is that it would lead more or less to the reversal of that policy. That is the second difficulty which is contingent on the appropriation of the customs by the federal power. The third

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