domestic question, they have no control. The world may not now, but soon will be, ready to exempt all unfortified coasts and cities from blockade, and all private property, by land and sea, from capture, except when used to aid the war. This would be a corollary from the proposition to give immunity to private property, by limiting the war to an armed duello of nations. Now is the time to stop powerful navies from irritating searches of neutral vessels on the sea, and from conveying such vessels and the property therein belonging to the subjects of States belligerent to distant ports for confiscation. Now is the time to give vigor to the maxims of Mr. Webster, of August 8, 1842, that the entry into the vessel of a neutral by a belligerent is like the entry into its territory, is an act of force, and is, prima facie, a wrong, a trespass, which can only be justified where done for some purpose allowed to form a sufficient justification by the law of nations, whose sphere is the ocean, and under the sanction of which law any merchant vessel on the seas is under the protection of her own nation. Now is the time to give practical development to the great American doctrine, not by adopting the Paris declarations, unless as a preliminary step toward a complete reform of the maritime law, whose effect will free the seas from the whirlwinds and maelstroms of war, and place in the hands of commerce the palm and the olive-victory and peace!

The surrender of the insurgent ambassadors to the demand of a neutral Power is of little moment, if it be the occasion for a settlement of the law in favor of neutral rights. This country would, in one sense, be repaid for the terrible trials of its present domestic conflict, if out of it arises such a policy as will free the millions which are every day embarked upon the main from the atrocities of war. If the extent to which it is legitimate to injure an enemy in time of war, by land and sea, shall be defined in the interest of humanity through our exertions, how magnificent will be our reward! Millions yet unborn shall bless America! God will smile upon us with signal benignity!

One of the topics cognate to that of neutral rights-indeed, the principle lying at its root-is the amelioration of war by giving to it such laws as will smooth its wrinkled front. For this purpose a great and Christian nation, either in a congress of nations, or in its domestic councils, might well inquire: First, whether, if war come, it is not desirable to make it as short as possible; secondly, how to make it short; thirdly, whether its injuries to non-combatants, of whatever trade, age, condition, and sex, tend to its brevity? The result of such inquiries would show to the dispassionate nations that wars are not shortened, but prolonged, by rapine, cruelty, pillage, and revenge. Such is the history of the savage tribes, and of the middle ages. I heartily agree with the conclusions of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. THOMAS] who has just spoken, and who very happily reached the same conclusions to which my own thoughts tend, with reference to the rules of war upon the land with respect to private property. All the history of mankind shows that a war wherein towns are sacked, property confiscated, villages burned, fields laid waste, the inhabitants treated with contumely, penalties, insults, and barbarities, does not hurry, but procrastinates peace. By such means the object of the war, which is peace, is frustrated. Atrocities are

the seeds of future strife. They stimulate conflict and perpetuate hate. Every such contest is sure to be renewed when the two antagonists recover from their exhaustion. This reasoning seems to have been adopted with regard to warfare upon the land by all the moralists of our time. If true for the land, why not for the sea?

Again: war is now an affair of Government, not of individuals. No man can now go to war unless he becomes a part of the official organization of his Government. Hence, no spoliation of the effects of non-combatants, and no appropriation of individual property without compensation, should be allowed. Why not adopt this doctrine upon the sea, both with regard to public and private armed vessels? Reforms are being made in this connection by the silent progress of opinion and the adjudications of the courts. Until recently the theory and practice were, that war dissolved contracts between individuals. Private property of enemies found in the country at the commencement of hostilities was confiscated. But even an English judge, Lord Ellenborough, declared that the Danish act which confiscated private debts was illegal. (6 Maule & Selwyn, p. 92.) And the great Powers of Europe at the commencement of the Crimean war provided against the spoliation of enemies' property found in their ports at the breaking out of hostilities. The object of reform in this matter is to separate private citizens, and especially the producing classes, from those whose business it is to carry on the war; and to exempt the former as much as possible from the consequences of war. This was the declared object of the American statesmen, Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Quincy Adams, Clay, and Marcy, in the action taken by them on the occasions to which I have referred. What is now wanted is the formalization of these doctrines by a congress of the maritime Powers.

This brings me to the question of privateers. The committee do not favor their abolition, except it be accompanied with such a reform, like that proposed by Mr. Marcy, as will obviate the necessity for their use by a nation like ours with a large commerce and a small navy. Privateering may be a denationalization of the contest for private gain, but public spoliation of private property is none the less detestable. Both inflict great injury upon one nation, without corresponding benefit to the other. In our time, steam has greatly alleviated the injuries caused by privateering. Even that smart craft, the Sumter, is but an accident and an exception. The United States has been willing to abolish privateering, on the prin ciple that private property of unoffending non-combatants, though enemies, should be exempt from the ravages of war. This principle must be adopted as a principle. Unless it be adopted as a principle, there is nothing gained, but much disadvantage, inequality, and loss. If you disallow privateers to prey on private property, and allow public vessels of war to do it, what principle is gained? The principle involved is the protection of property, not the mode of its destruction. If you are to except property from seizure by private armed vessels, and allow public cruisers to do the same thing, you might as well say that steam vessels should be allowed to prey on private property, but sailing vessels ought to be forbidden. Indeed, it is far more wrongful to allow public than private vessels to commit such devastation. The American prin

ciple must be adopted, otherwise the surrender of privateering is only a partial alleviation of the injuries to private property on the sea. So long as private property can be seized or molested by public armed cruisers, it enjoys no immunity; it might as well be at the mercy of privateers. Says Mr. Marcy :

"If such property is to remain exposed to scizure by ships belonging to the navy of the adverse party, it is extremely difficult to perceive why it should not, in like manner, be exposed to seizure by privateers, which are, in fact, but another branch of the public force of the nation commissioning them. If it be urged that a participation in the prizes is calculated to stimulate cupidity, that, as a peculiar objection, is removed by the fact that the same passion is addressed by the distribution of prize money among the officers and ships of a regular navy."

Therefore, Mr. Marcy was in favor of relying upon our mercantile marine to protect our commerce, until private property received full immunity from public armed vessels as well as privateers. He apprehended that, if privateers were abandoned, the dominion over the seas would be surrendered to those Powers which adopt the policy and which have the means of keeping up large navies. That Power which has a decided naval superiority would be potentially the mistress of the ocean. Hence England refused Mr. Marcy's proposition. Hence France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Italy, and other maritime Powers would accept it. For, if privateers were abolished and private property were respected by both public and private armed ships, the dominion of the ocean would be given up to the pursuits of peace, nations would find it for their interest to keep but a small navy, and the calamities of war would be confined to belligerents themselves, while neutrals would pursue their ordinary trade prosperously and unmolested. In that event, it would be seen that it is neither desirable, dignified, nor effective to injure the unoffending merchant, and that liberal concessions to neutral flags and neutral cargoes would be an advantage to the State granting them as well as to the State with which it was at war. Then it would be seen, too, that it is neither chivalric nor Christian to involve individuals in the horrors of a war in which they took no part, either in its origin or prosecution.

I do not despair of bringing England into the alliance for neutral. rights, at least so far as privateering is concerned. She would abolish it to-morrow, so far as the United States are concerned, but she is loth to give up her immense navy, which is our equivalent for the abolition. She has a lively recollection, recently refreshed by Mr. Bright, of what our privateers did for her commerce in our late war. In 1814, her tonnage was three million five hundred thousand tons, and her exports were £40,000,000, and her imports the same; and during the two years of that war our privateers took twenty-five hundred of her ships, worth £21,000,000, or $107,000,000. Now, with a tonnage four times as great, between twelve and thirteen millions of tons, with imports and exports upwards of £120,000,000, and with the American marine increased even more, what might not England suffer from our militia of the sea? Do you not think that, in fear of the renewal of such consequences, she will be anxious to make us her belligerent, or that, if thus anxious, she will not agree to relieve private property from capture by public as well as private cruisers?

If on land we apply these principles to private property, why should

we not further limit the consequences of war by lessening the objects of its attack; in other words, by narrowing the arena of strife upon the sea as well as upon the land; by making war a duel between combatants and not a devastation of neutrals? If we narrow the theatre of war on land to the camp and beleaguered fort or city, why on the water should it not be narrowed to the ocean armament and the blockaded port or assailed fort? If upon land we do not infest the tranquil home with violence, and if the graces of art and the libraries of knowledge are free from the spoiler, why destroy the peaceful occupations of commerce on the sea in the hot passions of war? Why place in jeopardy the immense trading interests of nations? Why expend immense sums in insuring cargoes from the "king's enemies"? Why place before the cupidity of men or nations the golden freightage of California and Australia, and the steamers and packets which connect Europe with America, and both with the Orient? Why offer up to a worse than heathen fury the peaceful craft which, at great peril, supply our daily wants, and waft to us the teas and spices, sugars and silks, of the world? Why arouse the ardors of war in despoiling neutral commerce under suspicions of hostility? Why not forever banish from that common of the world-the free seathe prying, avaricious, and revengeful belligerent, whether he sail under a letter of marque or a legal commission as a public cruiser? Why compel the neutral to arm, or what is worse, to profit slyly by the restrictions of war and the chances of immunity? Why embroil the commerce of mankind with the difficulties and dangers of a quarrel between two monarchs, or a punctilio between two ministers, resulting in war, and a war too which would inflame other nations in a general conflagration? Why not imitate the benign example of Providence, by ruling the raging of the seas; or the more beautiful example of the Saviour, who said to the tempestuous waves, "Peace, be still!" How eminently desirable, therefore, it is to prevent such calamities by fixed and authoritative rules of international conduct! How desirable for belligerents! How much more so for neutrals! Such reforms as I have indicated must be the product of public opinion. In this age, the empire of opinion is only divided by the reign of that universal conscience which is informed and inspired by its teachings. When these influences rule in the cabinets and councils of nations, we may hail their supremacy as the "instauratio magna" of juridical reason in the world of nations. For the purpose of contributing to that opinion and conscience, which is the source of the law of nations, and of expressing the judgment of the American Congress and people, the Committee will report back the resolutions last referred to them, with an amendment, thanking the other Powers besides France, for their liberal sympathy in behalf of neutral rights. I trust that the American Congress will adopt them, and thus vindicate and elevate into its proper place the great American doctrine, which would enfranchise commerce, guarantee peace, and give an impulse to civilization.

IV.

SECESSION.

SECESSION REFUTED AND DENOUNCED-PLEA FOR COMPROMISE-WARNINGS

TO NORTH AND SOUTH-WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES PREDICTED-THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER-APPEAL FOR NATIONALITY.

THIS speech was delivered in the midst of the excitement of actual secession. It was a difficult duty for a Representative, who stood between the extremes and appealed to them for moderation, to reach a class of men whose characteristics were immoderation and violence. Anxious to keep the peace and avert war, and at the same time unyielding as to the Union, I was compelled to weigh carefully each word, lest what was intended for oil on the waters, might be oil on the flames. This speech was delivered January 6, 1861.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I speak from and for the capital of the greatest of the States of the great West. That potential section is beginning to be appalled at the colossal strides of revolution. It has immense interests at stake in this Union, as well from its position as its power and patriotism. We have had infidelity to the Union before, but never in such a fearful shape. We had it in the East during the late war with England. Even so late as the admission of Texas, Massachusetts resolved herself out of the Union. That resolution has never been repealed; and one would infer, from much of her conduct, that she did not regard herself as bound by our covenant. Since 1856, in the North, we have had infidelity to the Union, more by insidious infractions of the Constitution, than by open rebellion. Now, sir, as a consequence, in part, of these very infractions, we have rebellion itself, open and daring, in terrific proportions, with dangers so formidable as to seem almost remediless.

From the time I took my seat this session, I have acted and voted in every way to remove the causes of discontent and to stop the progress of revolution. At the threshold, I voted to raise the committee from each State; and I voted against excusing the members who sought to withdraw from it, because I believed then that such a committee, patriotically constituted, had in it much of hope and safety; and because, to excuse members from