per cent. less than their nominal value. But the report of this case shows, that the holders of the paper concurred in the liquidation. This precedent was therefore obviously inapplicable.

Another instance was also alleged. It was the case of Debentures issued in seventeen hundred and thirteen, in consequence of a deficiency in the civil list, to persons who had furnished supplies. They depreciated, and an act was passed by Parliament, authorizing the original creditors who had sold them, to redeem them from the assignees, by repaying the actual price with interest, and declaring all assignments void. But the debt contracted by this issue, for the support of the household of Queen Ann, was not liquidated, and was disallowed by a vote of the Commons.

In vain, were precedents sought to sustain this extraordinary proposal, to violate a contract in the hands of the assignee, assignable on its face, accepted by the origi nal creditor in discharge of his debt-purchased with a full understanding of the parties, that its value was contingent upon remote circumstances, and its time of payment indefinite; and for which, the faith of Congress had been distinctly pledged in the address of seventeen hundred and eighty-three, of which the mover of this proposition was the author!*

"In enumerating the Public creditors," Madison remarked in that State paper, "the debts were due to a class of creditors, composed partly of such of our fellowcitizens as originally lent to the public the use of their funds, or have since manifested most confidence in their country, by receiving transfers from the lenders; and partly of those, whose property has either been advanced

*The original in Madison's autograph, is on the files of the Government.

or assumed for the public service. To discriminate the merits of these would be a task equally unnecessary and invidious. If the voice of Humanity plead more loudly in favor of some than of others, the voice of Policy, no less than of Justice, pleads in favor of all. A wise nation will never permit those who relieve the wants of their country, or who rely most on its faith, its firmness, and resources, when either of them is distressed, to suffer by the event."

In reply to the obligation of this pledge, Madison remarked, that at the period of its being given, the transfers were not numerous, and at little loss-that the number of the subsequent transfers, and the immense loss, had altered the case. It may be asked, whether, as this solemn act sanctioned, and encouraged, and increased the number of these transfers, it did not increase, if possible, the injustice of tampering with the rights they conferred?

It has been mentioned, that Burke, the original proposer of this discrimination, withdrew it. At the close of the debate, he stated, "that he deemed it altogether impracticable, and that he was not convinced that such a measure was honest and consistent with public faith. He did not think himself at liberty to give it his support. The United States have repeatedly pledged themselves in terms, plain as language can express, to pay to the bearer a specific sum; and to commit a violation of this promise, appeared to him, both unjust and impolitic. He believed and hoped, they had the ability to perform it; and, even in the case of inability, he was of opinion, should bankruptcy ensue from the honorable attempt to do justice, this would be preferable to a stain cast upon these States, at the commencement of their political career, by a cool and deliberate act of injustice to the public creditors-should we pollute our country

by suffering her to commit a breach of honor, it will be such a public calamity as no money can compensate!"

Other members, whose sentiments as to the obligations of national faith were not the most severe, refused their support to this proposition. After a long debate, the original Resolution passed; the amendment being voted for by only thirteen members, nine of whom were from Virginia. Such was the discredit cast upon it, that it was not proposed in the Senate.*

* Madison thus consoled himself for his failure in a letter to Dr. Rusi, March 7, 1790. "If we are to take for the criterion of truth, a majority of suffrages, this ought to be gathered from those philosophical and patriotic citizens who cultivate their reason, apart from every scene, that can disturb its operations, or expose it to the influence of the passions. The advantage enjoyed by public bodies in the light struck out by the collision of debate, is but too often overbalanced by the heat, proceeding from the same source. Many other sources of involuntary error might be added. Without looking, therefore, beyond innocent causes of fallibility, I can retain the sentiments which produced the late motion, notwithstanding the proportion of numbers by which it was outvoted," &c.

* Jefferson, writing from Paris to the American Bankers in Holland, remarked, "Here an opinion had arisen with some, and propositions had even been made in the Legislatures, for paying off the principal of these debts, with what they had cost the holder, and interest on that. This opinion is far from being general, and I am of opinion will not prevail." D. C. vol. ii. 451. His Biographer ascribes the small minority in its favor, to the influence of speculators-" as it is said, by the more potent appeals to the interests of the majority."-Life of Jefferson, i. 321. By George Tucker, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE great question raised in the fourth Resolution. 'That the debts of the respective States ought, with the consent of the creditors, to be ASSUMED, and provided for by the United States," was the next most important topic of discussion.

As the efforts of the Revolution were for a common object, from which a common benefit was to be derived, the burthens of it ought to have been distributed equally among the citizens of all the States, to be borne according to their respective abilities-but this could have been only effected by contributions to a common treasury, levied under the joint authority of the whole United States, or by loans raised on their joint credit, or by the disposition of the public lands, and of confiscated or of captured property, for their joint benefit, by their united authority.

Prior to the accession of the States to the Articles of Confederation, this might have been done by the delegates in Congress, who were chosen with plenary powers, by a direct commission from the people, to take care of the Nation; but it was a power only partially exercised, and, in a great degree, relinquished to the clamors of the State governments.

But a widely different policy prevailed. The general

credit of the United States, in Loans and Emissions, was employed for part of the Public charges-Requisitions on the States, in various forms, was another source of supply; while the spontaneous exertions of individuals in different modes contributed the residue.

From this state of things, and from the course of the War, it resulted,-that the burthens of the different States were necessarily unequal. The evidences also of their relative contributions were many of them imperfect, many of them lost. Their resources also were unequal. Some States had large bodies of public lands. In others, large confiscations had been made; and in some, vast aids were derived from captured property.

This combination of circumstances rendering it impossible to make any settlement of the State claims, which could produce strict justice, Hamilton remarked, that, "all that could be rationally aimed at was, to pursue such a course as promised most certainly the greatest degree of justice."

The debate on this important part of the Fiscal system was opened by Livermore of New Hampshire, in opposition to the proposed Assumption. From his preliminary remarks, it would seem, that the first object was to postpone the consideration of this branch of the Treasury Report beyond the session. This course was defended, on the grounds, that neither the State creditors, nor the States were anxious for it; that they had not applied to Congress; that possibly they were already satisfied with what the States had done; that the task of providing for the real debts of the Union was sufficiently arduous, and that the Assumption might disable them from doing justice to the Continental creditors; that the amount of the State debts was wholly unknown; and, before Congress determined to assume them, it was at least incumbent on them