ture to give an explanation; and if the Constitution is totally silent, Congress may use its discretion;" and this discretion was used by a false induction, implying an exception in favor of the President, of a most important part of the general power of appointment-confided expressly to the President and Senate, jointly-to the exclusion of the Senate.*

Having, by the largest possible implication, conferred on the President the power of controlling and corrupting the nation; and with it, increased the temptation to do so, Madison defended the measure, on the ground, that "when it is considered, that the Chief Magistrate is to be selected from the mass of the citizens by the united suffrages of three millions of people, notwithstanding the WEAKNESS INCIDENT TO A POPULAR ELECTION, he could not suppose, that a vicious and bad character would be chosen."

Usurpation is prolific. Thus having given to the President the sole uncontrolled power of removal, one more constructive violation of the Constitution became convenient. After indicating how the power of appointment should be exercised, to guard against contingencies, the Constitution provided, that "the President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that MAY happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next session." At a later period of our history, the construction given by the Democratic leaders was, that this clause conferred a power to cause a vacancy by removal, and then to fill it! It is to be observed, that these views as to the power of the Presi

* Madison to Jefferson, January 24, 1790-"I was apprehensive that the alarms with regard to the danger of monarchy, would have diverted their attention from the impropriety of transferring an executive trust, from the most to the least responsible member of the Government."

dent, were not advanced by Madison for the occasion. In a debate in the Convention upon this subject, he avowed, that it was sufficient to declare, that "a National Executive be instituted, with power to carry into effect the National laws; to appoint to offices, in cases not otherwise provided for; and to execute such other powers, not legislative or judiciary in their nature, as may, from time to time, be delegated by the National Legislature." To a motion to expunge all, but the first member of the proposition, he assented, on the ground of "the whole being, perhaps, included" in it.*

With these doctrines, Hamilton's views and language may be compared. When commenting on this part of the Constitution, he speaks of the President's power, as "the power of nomination; " + and points to the co-opertion of the Senate in appointments, "as an efficacious source of stability in the Administration."

In further examination of this subject, he observes: "It has been mentioned, as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the Administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace, as well as to appoint. ‡

* Debates, 765.

Federalist, Nos. 76, 77.

In a letter of Madison to W. C. Rives, this statement is seen-" Selections," &c., by J. C. McGuire, p. 108; January 10, 1829. "In the Federalist, he (Col. Hamilton) had so explained the removal from office, as to deny the power to the President. In an edition of the work at New York, there was a marginal note to the passage, that Mr. H. had changed his view of the Constitution on that point.'" No such marginal note, or equivalent, or similar, or proximate statement ever existed or now exists in any edition of the Feder alist. In the edition revised by John Wells, Esq., with Hamilton's sanction, published at New York, in 1802, this marginal note is to be seen to the passage referred to in the 77th No. of the Federalist, and no other: "This construction has since been rejected by the Legislature; and it is settled in practice, that the power of displacing belongs exclusively to the President."

VOL. IV.-28

A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the Government, as might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man, in any station, had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension, that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself. Those, who can best estimate the value of a steady Administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision, which connects the official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body; which, from the greater permanency of its own composition, will, in all probability, be less subject to inconstancy, than any other member of the Government." *

The same regard to the letter and to the spirit of the Constitution, led him to declare, in reference to the "power to fill up all vacancies, that may happen during the recess of the Senate," that these terms imply casualty, and denote such offices as, having been once filled, have become vacant by accidental circumstances.” †

Widely different, also, was Hamilton's view of the second article of the Constitution. Instead of arrogating all executive power to the President, with "one exception," he admits, in analogy with the other parts of the Constitution, "that the Executive power of the nation is vested in the President, subject only to the exceptions and qual

*In the 72d No. of the Federalist, Hamilton says-"These considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men, to fill the subordinate stations; and these causes, together, could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the administration of the Government."

+ Hamilton's Works, v. 255.

ifications which are expressed in the Instrument;" and, when discussing that department, he examines each power in detail, as enumerated in the Constitution, and explicitly confines the President's powers to those specially enumerated; * claiming for him, no others, than such as are necessarily implied to execute the powers expressly granted.

The earlier political action of Madison was conformable to his earlier thories. In the organization of the Executive departments, he is beheld, a strenuous advocate for all the trusts confided to those departments; and foremost to deride apprehensions of the undue influence to result from those trusts.

When the question of the pay of the respective branches of Congress came up, he contended for a higher rate of compensation to the Senators, as a proper distinction. "My opinion was, in favor of a difference founded on a reduction of the sum proposed with regard to the House of Representatives, and an augmentation as to the Senate." Yet, he sanctioned a subsequent statement, that this distinction "seemed more consistent with the spirit of aristocracy, than the equality of rights in a Republic," + and, though he condemns a Senator from Virginia, who

* Having reviewed the nature and extent of the six first powers conferred upon it, he proceeds--"The only remaining powers of the Executive are comprehended in giving information to Congress of the state of the Union; in recommending to their consideration such measu.es as he shall judge expedient; in convening them or either branch, upon extraordinary occasions; in adjourning them, when they cannot themselves agree upon the time of adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; in faithfully executing the laws; and in commissioning all the officers of the United States."-Federalist, No. 77.

Madison to Monroe, August 9, 1789.

Tucker's Jefferson, i. 312, 316. Nearly the whole of the first volume, the author states, 46 was submitted to Madison, and received the benefit of

his correction, as to matters of fact."

had been preferred to himself, for his vote to confer a title on the President, yet, when in the Federal Convention a title was proposed to be annexed to that office, he voted for it. *

Thus on a survey of Hamilton's first plan of a Constitution--for his second plan was still more popular -of his views of the theory of this Government; of his exposition of its powers; of his system of finance, he is not found in any position, as to which Madison could consistently take an opposite stand, as the champion of opinions more favorable to freedom; to State rights; or to wise popular influences. This survey indeed shows, that while Hamilton's progressive course was to a more popular form of Government, that of Madison was in an opposite direction.

When released from fealty to the British Crown by the Declaration of Independence, at the age of twenty, Hamilton is seen, in seventeen hundred and seventy-seven, the advocate of a popular Government. "A Representative Democracy," he wrote, " where the right of election is well secured and regulated, and the exercise of the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary authorities, is vested in select persons, chosen really, and not nominally, by the people, will, in my opinion, be most likely to be happy, regular and durable." His apprehension then was, that, "the Senate" (of New York) "from the very name, and from the mere circumstance of its being a separate member of the Legislature, will be liable to degenerate into a body purely aristocratical." †

"On

Madison to Jefferson, May 21, 1789. Madison's Debates, 1417. the question for vesting the power in a single person, it was agreed to nem con. So also on the style and title." Hamilton was absent at this time, August 24,

1787.

Hamilton's Works, vi. 582.