CHAPTER LXXI. IT has been stated, that "the origin of the great parties, which have divided this country, had an intimate connection with the project of forcing General Washington from the command of the army." These parties were now distinctly formed; and it becomes necessary to suspend this narrative, in order to a just perception of the motives and influences, which actuated the opponents of the Govern ment. The hostility to Washington, as Commander-in-Chief, it has been seen, did not proceed on the ground of any alleged abuse of the powers confided to him, an allegation which his eminent virtue forbade, but of his imputed incapacity. His want of capacity to command was the pretext for the selection of Gates, who, had he possessed abilities equal to the pre-eminence to which he aspired, might have changed the course and character of the Revolution. But, the true source of this opposition is to be found in the jealousy of New England towards Virginia, then "the most populous State in the Union"—" proud of her ancient dominion" "thinking she had a right to take the lead.”* It was in the commencement, a geographical division—the Democratic East againt the Aristocratic South. Letter of John Adams to T. Pickering. To establish the Independence of this country, an exertion of all its resources was necessary. The friends of Washington were, therefore, the friends of energetic counsels. His opponents, resorted to the usual instrument of disaffection, an appeal to jealousy of power. The Revolution could not be accomplished without an efficient direction and exertion of the United energies of the States. The friends of Washington, were therefore, (as the political power was divided,) necessarily, the friends of Federal powers. His adversaries claimed to be exclusively the advocates of State Rights. The supporters of the Federal Republic were subsequently denomi nated The FEDERAL PARTY. The advocates of the separate sovereignties formed the germ of the Democratic party. When the necessities of the country prompted an enlargement of the powers of the Confederation, the same array of parties and of individuals was seen. When the question assumed the still more interesting form of the institution of a National Government, the division was the same; but, in the progress of the discussions to which it gave rise, STATES and individuals changed their ground. The Commercial interests of New England, overcame her prejudices; and rendered her favorable to a Government, armed with powers adequate to their protection. She gave it a zealous and hearty support. The ambition of New York and Virginia, based on their large territorial possessions, was hostile to such a Government. Unwilling to adopt, and afraid to reject the Constitution, these reluctant members of the Union, for a long time, regarded it, with an unfriendly eye. Had it been possible to have regulated the Commerce of the whole United States, without affecting the internal polity of the Individual States, the benefits of such regula tion would have soon reconciled them to the relinquishment of their power over this great interest. But this regulation involved a control of other subjects, the most deeply interesting to political bodies, tenacious of their own independence. No regulation of Commerce could be made, without legislation upon Revenue, and upon taxation, as the means of raising revenue. This has been seen, to have been the great dividing question from the termination of the War, to the adoption of the Constitution. The difficulties of this question were increased by the unavoidable disposition of another; the apportionment, not merely of the future, but, of the past burdens of the country. The action of the Congress of the Confederation was frequently embarrassed by this question. Its Legislation was too often warped, by attempts to elude a due participation in the necessary contributions. These attempts familiarized the public mind to false views; and rendered current, opinions hostile to the first principles of public and private justice. In determining the extent of the powers of the new Government, the difference of opinion on this subject was constantly operative. When the idea of taxing the States, in their collective capacities, was abandoned in the Convention; the disposition of the taxing power became a subject of much difficulty. One set of opinions was in favor of conferring on the National Government, a paramount, general power of taxation; and, a subordinate or limited power on the States, specifying its objects. Another, would have confined certain objects, exclusively, to the United Government, and others to the States; thus dividing the power of taxation. A third, was in favor of a general concurrent power of taxation in the National and State Governments; and ultimately prevailed, with the exception of the revenue from Imports and Ton nage, which, necessarily, was exclusively vested in the Union. The adoption of this compromise, though not unattended with serious difficulties, in the beginning of its operation, was one of the greatest triumphs of an enlarged view of the wants, interests, duties, and powers of a Nation. The supporters of the Federal Constitution, when it was established, looked to it as the only means of preserving the Public faith. Its opponents, provided they could enjoy the fruits of the Revolution, were not sedulous as to the obligations it had imposed. But the debt of the Revolution, if paid, must be paid by the agency of a well-digested system of public credit. No exertion of the resources of the country would be equal to its immediate discharge. Thus, in the great division of parties, the friends of the Constitution, and the friends of public credit were identified. It was a natural consequence of this division, that the creditor part of the people were of the party of the Constitution. The debtors, in general, arrayed themselves with its adversaries. Hence, in its very commencement, the National Government was compelled to encounter the hostility of this most numerous portion of the community; and, Hamilton, as the head of the Treasury department, was the member of the administration against whom that hostility would be, and was directed. In no human breast, was the love of justice a more dominant feeling. He truly regarded it, as the great "end of Government" that, to which all others ought to be subordinate. With its establishment, he identified his political fortunes and his fame. The previous narrative has disclosed the remarkable "Justice is the end of Government."-Federalist, by Hamilton. fact, that the opposition to his administration, commenced with an opposition to the measures recommended by him, "to answer the calls of justice"-the proposed Discrimination between the public creditors, and the opposition to the Assumption, being, in reality, appeals to the debtor part of the community. Of this opposition, commenced in the Legislative deliberations, it has been seen, Madison was the leader. The evidence having been given, that he had committed himself explicitly to every one of the principles of Hamilton's system of finance; repudiating a discrimination between the different classes of creditors, as impolitic and unjust;* explicitly approving the assumption of the State debts; † recommending an excise; ‡ and urging, in addition, an early resort to a direct tax, and a limited Stamp tax; the grounds of his opposition to it must necessarily be traced to some other motive or influence, than a genuine distrust of that system. Succeeding to the highest office in the Government through the influence of Jefferson; and, thus, commanding the favor and the credence which high office often. gives; surviving all the other members of the Federal Convention; and, thus, without fear of contradiction, in * Address to the Public creditors of 26th April, 1783, from the pen of Madison, ante vol. ii. 524. "The voice of policy no less than of justice, pleads in favor of all the creditors." + Ibid. page 518.-Resolved, "that, conformably t the liberal principles on which these recommendations are founded, and with a view to a more amicable and complete adjustment of all accounts between the United and Individual States, all reasonable expenses, which shall have been incurred by the States without the sanction of Congress in their defence against or attacks upon British or savage enemies, either by sea or by land, and which shall be supported by satisfactory proofs, shall be considered, as part of the common charges incident to the present War."-Autograph report of Madison on files of the Department of State. Letter to Hamilton, infra, p. 61. |