intrust to him, agreeably to the Constitution; but, in all other particulars, its provisions were similar to those of the department of Foreign Affairs.

The bill constituting the TREASURY DEPARTMENT was essentially different. The other departments were rendered directly and solely amenable to the President. That of the Treasury, though by the Constitution regarded as an "Executive Department," was, by the act creating it, more immediately connected with the Legislative body; and, thus possessed a twofold relation, being, in some respects, under the control of the Executive as the head of a department; and, in others, having a more direct responsibility to Congress.

66

Early in the year seventeen hundred and seventy-six, prior to the Declaration of Independence, Congress passed a resolution, that, "A standing committee of five be appointed for superintending the Treasury." This was the germ of the Fiscal Department. Two months after, a Treasury office of Accounts" was instituted, under the superintendence of this Standing Committee. In September, seventeen hundred and seventy-eight, were established the offices of "Comptroller," "Auditor," "Treasurer," and "two Chambers of Accounts," to consist each "of three Commissioners," to be annually appointed by Congress. In seventeen hundred and seventy-nine, on the eleventh of February, the office of "Secretary of the Treasury" was created. Its duties were not defined; and it was of short duration, followed in the same year, as has been stated, by the establishment of a "Board of Treasury," composed of five commissioners, of whom three were permitted to hold their seats, only six months in continuance-of an Auditor General-Treasurer-two Chambers of Accounts, and six Auditors. The interference of the Board of Treasury in their respective duties,

led to the necessity of declaring, that Board paramount to all the other branches of the Treasury department. The inefficiency of this system led Hamilton to advise the appointment of single heads of departments; which, after much delay, were established-among these a "Minister of Finance." To fill this office, as stated, Hamilton was in view. On the seventh of February, seventeen hundred and eighty-one, it was resolved, that there be a "Superintendent of Finance-a Secretary of War, and a Secretary of Marine." Soon after, the "Board of Treasury," with its adjuncts, was abolished; and, "in aid of the Superintendent of Finance and his Assistant Secretary-a Comptroller, Register, Treasurer, and Auditors," were authorized to be appointed, and their duties prescribed. After nearly three years of arduous, effective service, the Superintendent of Finance, driven to this course by the impotence of Congress, resigned. What remained of financial duty was consigned, on the twenty-eighth of May, seventeen hundred and eighty-four, to a new "Board of Treasury," a spectre which vanished with the Confederation. Yet, in despite of all this experience, there were those whose views clung to the "good, old, and venerable fabric."

Thus, the first question raised upon the bill organizing the Treasury, was, whether this great department should be intrusted to one or to several individuals? A motion was made to expunge the words "Secretary of the Treasury," and insert "three Superintendents" of the Treasury. In favor of a plural establishment, the early practice of the Congress of the Confederation was adduced; and a "Treasury Board" was strenuously urged by Gerry. But the advantages which had resulted from

* Jefferson to Adams, ii. 266.-Randolph's Jefferson.

VOL. IV.-2

the appointment of a single person to the superintendence of the Finances, left no doubts, in other minds, as to the policy which ought to prevail. Should the House decide in favor of one officer, an objection was raised by the same individual, who had been a member of that Board, which he deemed insuperable, " that the duties were too numerous and complicated to be discharged and executed by any one man in the United States." The House, nevertheless, resolved, that these important trusts should be confided to one person.

The next point discussed, and with much earnestness, arose upon a motion to expunge a clause, which made it "the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to digest and prepare plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, and for the support of public credit."

Colonel Page, of Virginia, deprecated zealously the undue influence which the exercise of this authority would give over the Legislature of the country. He was supported by Livermore, Hartley, and Gerry. It was denounced by the latter, as conferring upon an individual the power of originating money bills; and, as defeating that clause of the Constitution, which vested this sole right in the House of Representatives; "an alarming circumstance," he said, "which would raise a clamor among the people." The clause was sustained by Sedgwick, Boudinot, Lawrence, Ames. Madison closed the debate. "He could not conceive, where the danger lay, that some gentlemen apprehended. The words objected to are similar to those used in an ordinance passed by Congress, in seventeen hundred and seventy-eight. In a subsequent ordinance to establish a Treasury Board, the same powers are annexed to that Board, as belong to the office of Finance-so that this power now exists in the Treasury Board, so far as that has an existence.

There is a small probability, though it is but small, that the power may carry some influence; but let us compare this with the danger that will accrue from the want of this power. In my opinion, there is more danger of a bad administration, from the want of this power, than can result from all the influence which the Secretary can create. More has resulted from the want of this officer, than from all other causes. There will be a responsibility in point of reputation—a responsibility to the public opinion. The communications from the President will always be accompanied with allusions to revenue. If the doctrine is true, that, to make propositions is to originate, the President may be said to originate money bills. I am of opinion, that the duty should be particularly enjoined. I do not fear his influence; I am more afraid of our own ignorance-of our instability and misinformation. The advantage of a single man of abilities will be superior to that of having an hundred such men to perform the same duty. Upon the principle of the objection, we must shut our doors, and not accept even the reports of Committees."

The whole force of the argument was in favor of retaining this clause, and it was approved by a decisive vote. A similar jealousy of a single officer at the head of the Fiscal Department was also seen in the Senate, an unsuccessful proposition being offered, to substitute for a Secretary of the Treasury, three Superintendents of Finance. After some amendments to the other parts of this bill, it became a law.*

* His duties, instead of being such as "the President should assign" to him, were prescribed. He was to make report, and give information to either branch of the Legislature, in person, or in writing, respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate, or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office; and, generally, to perform all such services relative to the finances, as he shall be directed to perform.

When the act constituting the department of Foreign Affairs was reported; the expediency of a Home Department was suggested. This idea was relinquished; and a bill passed, near the end of the session, declaring, that the Department of Foreign Affairs should be denominated the Department of State; its principal officer to be called Secretary of State," to whom the additional duties were assigned, of recording, publishing, and authenticating the acts of Congress; and of affixing the seal to all Civil Commissions. It is stated, that, on motion of a member from Virginia, it was proposed that this officer should only be removable by the Senate.

66

Before the final disposition of this subject, the House had been engaged in a long-continued debate upon a Report as to the compensations of the Executive officers, and of the members of the Legislature. That of the President, after various sums had been proposed, was established at twenty-five thousand dollars. A question arose, whether the Vice-President should receive a daily allowance as President of the Senate, or a fixed compensation as an Executive officer. The former mode was first urged by a member from Virginia. Madison differed from his colleague-contending, that, as he was the apparent successor of the President, he must withdraw his attention from all other pursuits, and therefore should receive a permanent salary. The Report proposed the same rate of daily pay to the Senators, and to the Representatives. An amendment was offered, giving a larger sum to the Senators. This was warmly opposed by Jackson, Seney, and White, who contended that the members of both Houses were equally engaged in the service of their country, as Legislators; that, in the ancient Commonwealths, an artificial and political distinction existed between the

* White.