in the hospitals, and you can help them. You can help them. Help them just as you would if there were only one of them, by giving your sympathy, your blessing, your loud praise, and your large contributions to the Children's Aid Society.

LEGISLATIVE.

The two speeches afford a sharp contrast, for No. I is the relentless attack of a party leader upon his opponent; No. II is the broadminded appeal of a statesman in behalf of those who have been his opponents in peace and his enemies in war. Lord Salisbury's speech is famous for its scathing sarcasm. Mr. Schurz's speech is noteworthy for its steady, skilful meeting, direct and indirect, of the two ideas most in the minds of those opposing him—that he is urging generosity where punishment is due, and that the generosity urged implies censure of the negro.

I.

LORD SALISBURY.

Egypt and the Soudan.

House of Lords, February 26, 1885.

["It was in the year 1880 that the movements of a Mahommedan dervish, named Mahomed Ahmed, first began to attract the attention of the Egyptian officials. He had quarrelled with and repudiated the authority of the head of his religious order, because he tolerated such 5 frivolous practices as dancing and singing. Many earnest and energetic Mahommedans flocked to him, and among these was the present Khalifa Abdullah. To his instigation was probably due not merely the assumption of [the title Mahdi] by Mahommed Ahmed, but the addition of a worldly policy to what was to have been a strictly religious 10 propaganda. By New Year's Day, 1884, the power of the Mahdi was triumphantly established over the whole extent of the Soudan, from the Equator to Souakim, with the exception of Khartoum, the middle course of the Nile from that place to Dongola, [and] some outlying garrisons. The principal Egyptian force remaining was the body 15 of four thousand so-called troops, left behind at Khartoum, under Colonel de Coetlogon, by Hicks Pasha, when he set out on his unfortunate expedition, [destroyed at Shekan, November 4, 1883]. The motives which induced Mr. Gladstone's government to send General Gordon to the Soudan in January, 1884, were the selfish desire to appease 20 public opinion, and to shirk in the easiest possible manner a great responsibility. They had no policy at all, [yet] hope was indulged that, under his exceptional reputation, the evacuation of the Soudan might not only be successfully carried out, but that his success might induce the public and the world to accept that abnegation of policy as the acme 25 of wisdom. They had evidently persuaded themselves that their policy was Gordon's policy; and before he was in Khartoum a week he not merely points out that the evacuation policy is not his but theirs, and that although he thinks its execution is still possible, the true policy is, 'if Egypt is to be quiet, that the Mahdi must be smashed up.' The 30 hopes that had been based on Gordon's supposed complaisance in the post of representative on the Nile of the Government policy were thus dispelled, and it became evident that Gordon, instead of being a tool, was resolved to be master, so far as the mode of carrying out the

evacuation policy with full regard for the dictates of honour was to be decided. Nor was this all, or the worst of the revelations made to the Government in the first few weeks after his arrival at Khartoum. While expressing his willingness and intention to discharge the chief part of his task, viz. the withdrawal of the garrisons, which was all the 5 Government cared about, he also descanted on the moral duty and the inevitable necessity of setting up a provisional government that should avert anarchy and impose some barrier to the Mahdi's progress. All this was trying to those who only wished to be rid of the whole matter, but Gordon did not spare their feelings, and phrase by phrase he re- 10 vealed what his own policy would be and what his inner wishes really were. . . . Gordon made several specific demands in the first six weeks of his stay at Khartoum, [he entered it February 18, 1884]— that is, in the short period before communication was cut off. To these requests not one favorable answer was given. . . . When it was revealed that he 15 had strong views and clear plans, not at all in harmony with those who sent him, it was thought, by the Ministers who had not the courage to recall him, very inconsiderate and insubordinate of him to remain at his post and to refuse all the hints given him, that he ought to resign unless he would execute a sauve qui peut sort of retreat to the frontier. 20 Very harsh things have been said of Mr. Gladstone and his Cabinet on this point, but considering their views and declarations, it is not so very surprising that Gordon's boldness and originality alarmed and displeased them. Their radical fault in these early stages of the question was not that they were indifferent to Gordon's demands, but that they 25 had absolutely no policy. They could not even come to the decision, as Gordon wrote, ' to abandon altogether and not care what happens.' [The troops of the Mahdi besieged Khartoum from March, 1884, to January 25, 1885, when it fell.] The result of the early representations of the Duke of Devonshire, and the definite suggestion of Lord Wolseley, 30 was that the Government gave in when the public anxiety became so great at the continued silence of Khartoum, and acquiesced in the dispatch of an expedition to relieve General Gordon. The sum of ten millions was devoted to the work of rescuing Gordon by the very persons who had rejected his demands for the hundredth part of that 35 total," but so slow was the progress of the expedition that it arrived just too late. Condensed from pp. 98-157 of Life of Gordon, D. C. Boulger. T. F. Unwin, London.

"On February 19, 1885 about a fortnight after the news of the fall of Khartoum and the death of our betrayed hero, Gordon, had reached 40 this country, Parliament assembled. In the course of the next fortnight a motion of censure on the Government was proposed by Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords, and carried by 169 against 68 votes;