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from the position they had so bravely held. The enemy immediately crossed the bridge in large numbers, and advanced against Gen. Jones, who held the crest with less than two thousand men. After a determined and brave resistance, he was forced to give way, and the enemy gained the summit.

Gen. A. P. Hill had arrived from Harper's Ferry, having left that place at half-past seven, A. M. He was now ordered to reinforce Gen. Jones. Hill's batteries were thrown forward, and united their fire with those of Gen. Jones. The progress of the enemy was immediately arrested, and his line began to waver. At this moment Gen. Jones ordered Toombs to charge the flank, while Archer, supported by Branch and Gregg, moved upon the front of the Federal line. The enemy made a brief resist ance, then broke, and retreated in confusion towards the Antietam, pursued by the troops of Hill and Jones, until he reached the protection of the batteries on the opposite side of the river.

It was now nearly dark, and the enemy had massed a number of bat teries to sweep the approaches to the Antietam, on the opposite side of which the corps of Gen. Porter, which had not been engaged, now appeared, to dispute our advance. Our troops were much exhausted, and greatly reduced in numbers by fatigue and the casualties of battle. Under these circumstances, it was deemed injudicious to push our advantage further, in the face of fresh troops of the enemy much exceeding the number of our own. They were accordingly recalled.

This repulse of the enemy ended the engagement. The sum of the day's work was, that every effort of the enemy to dislodge us from our position had been defeated with severe loss. The conflict had been protracted and sanguinary. The spoils of the victory were not great. A few prisoners and guns were taken. As for our loss, it had indeed been heavy, amounting to not less than two thousand killed and six thousand wounded; including among the former, two general officers, Gens. Branch and Starke. The Federals, having been the assailants, their loss was yet more severe, reaching the terrible aggregate of twelve thousand dead or disabled men. Their sacrifice of officers had been serious. Gens. Mansfield and Reno were killed, and twelve other Generals were among the wounded.

Gen. Lee had especial reasons for not renewing the battle the next day. The arduous service in which his troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches, without shoes, over mountain roads, had greatly reduced their ranks before the action began; and they had been seriously diminished in the terrible action they had just fought. Although too weak to assume the offensive, Gen. Lee awaited without apprehension a renewal of the attack. The day passed without any demonstration on the part of the enemy, who, from the reports received, was expecting the arrival of reinforcements. As Gen. Lee could

not look for a material increase of strength, and the enemy's numbers could be largely and rapidly augmented, it was not thought to be prudent to wait until he should be ready again to offer battle. During the night of the 18th September, his army was accordingly withdrawn to the south side of the Potomac, crossing near Shepherdstown without loss or molestation.

It is curious to observe by what successive steps the North constructed the pretence of a victory at Sharpsburg. McClellan never claimed a victory until assured of Lee's retreat into Virginia. On the 19th, he telegraphed to Washington: "I do not know if the enemy is falling back to an interiour position, or recrossing the river. We may safely claim the victory as ours." He did not assert this until more than thirty hours had elapsed subsequent to the engagement at Sharpsburg! Some few hours after the above telegram, he consoled the authorities at Washington by saying: "Our victory is complete! The enemy is driven back into Virginia. Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe!"

If McClellan was under the impression that he had won a victory, he showed but little disposition to improve it, or to gather its fruits. He attempted no pursuit; and when, some days later, a force he had thrown across the Potomac was dislodged by an attack of A. P. Hill's division, he wrote to Washington asking for reinforcements; and on the 27th September renewed the application, stating his purpose to be to hold the army where it was, and to attack Lee, should he attempt to recross into Maryland. Meanwhile the Confederate army moved leisurely towards Martinsburg, and remained in the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Winchester, to recruit after a campaign which has few parallels in history for active operation and brilliant results.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE WESTERN THEATRE OF THE WAR.-VALLEY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.-EVACUATION OF CORINTH.-IMPORTANT OBJECTS OF THE MOVEMENT.-ITS SUCCESS. THE HALLECK-POPK DISPATCH. AN ENORMOUS FALSEHOOD.-GEN. BEAUREGARD'S COMMENTS ON IT.-CAPTURE OF MEMPHIS.-AN UNEQUAL FIGHT ON THE RIVER.—BOMBARDMENT OF VICKSBURG.— GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS POINT.-PREPARATIONS FOR ITS DEFENCE BY VAN DORN.THE IRON-CLAD ARKANSAS. SHE RUNS THE GAUNTLET OF THE ENEMY'S FLEET.-THRILLING SCENE OF THE ADVENTURE.-FAILURE OF THE FIRST ATTEMPT OF THE ENEMY UPON VICKSBURG.-ENGAGEMENT AT BATON ROUGE.-SUCCESS OF BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK.-HE WAITS FOR THE IRON-CLAD ARKANSAS.-SHE BECOMES UNMANAGEABLE AND IS FIRED BY HER CREW.-WITHDRAWAL OF BRECKINRIDGE FROM BATON ROUGE.-CONFEDERATE OCCUPATION OF PORT HUDSON.-THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN.-GEN. BRAGG IN COMMAND OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY IN THE WEST.-HOW GEN. BEAUREGARD WAS RETIRED.— BRAGG'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS AGAINST KENTUCKY.-MORGAN'S RAID.-DISPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL FORCES WEST OF THE ALLEGHANY MOUNTAINS.-CO-OPERATION OF KIRBY SMITH WITH BRAGG'S COLUMN.—BATTLE OF RICHMOND.-KIRBY SMITH IN A POSITION TO THREATEN BOTH CINCINNATI AND LOUISVILLE.-BRAGG'S MOVEMENT TO INTERCEPT BUELL. THE LATTER CONCENTRATING At Bowling GREEN.-GREAT SUCCESS OF BRAGG'S MOVEMENT SO FAR-HIS BOASTFUL DISPATCH TO RICHMOND.-HIS POLITICAL OBJECT IN INVADING KENTUCKY.-HIS PROCLAMATION AT GLASGOW.-SURRENDER OF THE FEDERAL GARRISON AT MUMFORDSVILLE.—BRAGG'S WHOLE ARMY BETWEEN NASHVILLE AND LOUISVILLE. HIS SPLENDID OPPORTUNITY.-HE DOES NOT USE IT.-HR PERMITS BUELL TO PASS TO LOUISVILLE WITHOUT A BATTLE.-HIS WEAK EXCUSE FOR A FATAL ERROUR.—THE FEDERALS NOW ABLE TO RESUME THE OFFENSIVE IN KENTUCKY. -BRAGG'S UNCERTAIN MOVEMENTS.-HIS DISARRANGED PLAN OF BATTLE.-GEN. POLK'S DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS.-BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE.—BRAGG'S UNFORTUNATE DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES.-MISAPPREHENSION OF KIRBY SMITH.-WITHERS' DIVISION NOT IN THE FIGHT.-THE ENEMY DRIVEN.-ARRIVAL OF ANOTHER OF HIS CORPS UPON THE FIELD. BRAGG RETIRES UPON BRYANTSVILLE.-HE DETERMINES TO EVACUATE KENTUCKY. -RETREAT THROUGH CUMBERLAND GAP.-DISAPPOINTMENT AT RICHMOND.-ERROURS OF THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN.-HOW FAR IT WAS A CONFEDERATE SUCCESS.-ITS LARGE CAPTURES.-NORTH ALABAMA AND MIDDLE TENNESSEE REDEEMED.—BRAGG IN FRONT OF NASHVILLE.-OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST.-BATTLE OF CORINTH.-MOVEMENTS OF VAN DORN AND PRICE. THE AFFAIR OF IUKA. VAN DORN'S REASONS FOR ATTACKING CORINTH.-GALLANT AND IMPETUOUS CHARGE OF PRICE'S TROOPS. THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT.-MISMANAGEMENT OF THE ATTACK ON THE ENEMY'S WORKS.—TERRIBLE

SLAUGHTER AT COLLEGE HILL.-THE CONFEDERATES REPULSED.-AFFAIR ON THE HATCHIE RIVER. VAN DORN'S RETREAT.-REVIEW OF THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN CAMPAIGNS OF 1862.-GLORY OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMS.-REFLECTION OF THE LONDON TIMES ON THE

66 NEW NATIONALITY."

WHILE the events we have related in the two preceding chapters were taking place in Virginia and on its borders, an important campaign was occurring in the country west of the Alleghany Mountains, and in the valley of the Mississippi River; and while Lee entered Maryland, Bragg invaded Kentucky, threatening the line of the Ohio, thus in every direction bringing the front of the war to the enemy's own territory. But before reaching that period wherein the Confederate arms in the West were carried to the frontier, as by a parallel movement with the operations in Virginia, it is necessary to recount a number of preceding events in the Western theatres of the war, in which the lights of victory and shadows of defeat were strangely mingled.

EVACUATION OF CORINTH.

At the last point of our narrative of operations in the West, Gen. Beauregard was holding Corinth; an important strategic position, protecting his communications by the two railroads intersecting there. The trans-Mississippi campaign being considered closed for some time, Price and Van Dorn, with a division of Missourians and some Arkansas troops, had crossed the Mississippi and joined Beauregard, with a view of operating on the east bank of the river. It was soon ascertained that the immense forces of Grant and Buell, combined under command of Halleck, were slowly advancing. The movement of the enemy threatened Beauregard's left, along the Mobile and Ohio railroad, while he had already pushed along the Memphis and Charleston road, camping about three miles from Corinth. To foil the design of the enemy; to protect his most important line of Southern communication; to obtain a better position to fortify; and to secure the health of his troops, Gen. Beauregard decided to evacuate Corinth. The objects of the movement were all important. Our main railroad communication with Richmond via Chattanooga, was in the enemy's possession, and the only line of communication we now had with the Confederate capital was the devious one, by way of Mobile, Alabama, and Georgia. Corinth was indefensible. It was a wretched site for a camp, utterly destitute of water, good or bad, and what little could be obtained, was scooped up from the sand, or from pools fed by occasional rains.

The evacuation was commenced on the 30th of May. Remaining in

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rear of the Tuscumbia and its affluents, some six miles from Corinth, long enough to collect stragglers, Gen. Beauregard resumed his march, con centrating his main forces at Baldwin. On the 7th of June he left Baldwin, it offering no advantages of a defensive character, and assembled the main body of his forces at Tupelo. The position selected was an excellent one to protect the south branches of the Mobile and New Orleans railroads. The movement of Gen. Beauregard was a surprise to the enemy, and a decided success. His effective force did not exceed forty-seven thousand men of all arms, and he had skilfully avoided attack from an enemy superiour in numbers. By holding Corinth, he had gained time, and held the enemy in check without a battle; and by retreating when he did, he out-generaled Halleck, rendered him powerless to move, and saved Mississippi from the inroad of a large army, which would have followed him into the interiour at an earlier season of the year, but was now unable to do so, from weakened forces and the great heats.*

Gen. Halleck attempted to break the news of his discomfiture by a flaming official despatch to Washington, in which he was assisted by Gen. John Pope, then acting under him, to one of the most monstrous falsehoods of the war. This false despatch is so characteristic of the Federal method in dealing with the facts of the war, that it may be copied here for a general lesson to the reader:

The correspondent of a Northern journal thus betrays the disappointment of the enemy, and he damage to his expectations and plans in Beauregard's evacuation of Corinth :

"I went all over the tented field of the enemy-all over the fortifications-all over the towntalked with the frank druggist and the sturdy Irishman that had worked upon the railroad. And so do I write what I saw in grief, mortification, chagrin, and shame. I said yesterday: 'I'll write no more; others may; I can't. Patriotism will not let me write what I have seen, and can swear to.' When I write such words as I am sometimes compelled to, if I write at all, I am afraid lest, in exposing military imbecility, I shall wound and damage our beautiful commonwealth, that struggles so tremendously for existence and perpetuity.

"But I do religiously believe that it is best now for the commonwealth to hear and heed what is bitter, undisputed fact-the Confederate strategy since the battle of Shiloh has been as successful as it has been superiour. Taking the enemy's stand-point, and writing when and where I do, I cannot possibly imagine how it could have been more eminent for perfection and success. Taking our stand-point-the stand-point of the Union's hopes and Halleck's fame-I cannot possibly imagine how it could have been more mortifyingly disastrous. If the attack at Shiloh was a surprise to Gen. Grant, the evacuation of Corinth was no less a surprise to Gen. Halleck. If the one ruined Grant, the other has laid out in pallid death the military name and fame of Major-Gen. Halleck.

"The druggist says he was two weeks getting away. But aside from such testimony, could the army of Beauregard be removed so cleanly, and completely, and noiselessly, during a night, or day and night, or two days and two nights? Did it require the tremendous concussion of the magazine explosion to get into our ears-what we could not get into our eyes-the evacuation? Why, that was the last act of the mortifying drama. On Friday morning we went in. The prisoners that we captured amounted to about four hundred. Four hundred! Even the beggarly picket regiments and light artillery that fought us so boldly, got away. Those that we caught declare that they were kept in ignorance of the movements at Corinth, and were as much surprised at the evacuation as ourselves. Corinth has been searched in vain for a spiked or disabled gun. Shame on us, what a clean piece of evacuation it was."