authorities in Washington. Toward the end of the war, on the assurance of a favorable reception from President Lincoln, a third commission was appointed by President Davis, consisting of Vice President Stephens, Judge Campbell, and Senator Hunter, to discuss the possibilities of peace. Stephens tells the story of their embassy as follows:

The interview took place in the Saloon of the steamer on board of which were Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward, and which lay at anchor near Fortress Monroe. The Commissioners were conducted into the Saloon first. Soon after, Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward entered. After usual salutations on the part of those who were previously acquainted, and introductions of the others who had never met before, conversation was immediately opened by the revival of reminiscences and associations of former days.

This was commenced by myself addressing Mr. Lincoln, and alluding to some of the incidents of our Congressional acquaintance especially the part we had acted together in effecting the election of General Taylor in 1848. To my remarks he responded in a cheerful and cordial manner, as if the remembrance of those times, and our connection with the incidents referred to, had awakened in him an agreeable train of reflections. ... With this introduction I said in substance: "Well, Mr. President, is there no way of putting an end to the present trouble, and bringing about a restoration of the general good feeling and harmony then existing between the different States and Sections of the country? . . .”

Mr. Lincoln in reply said in substance that there was but one way that he knew of, and that was, for those who were resisting the laws of the Union to cease that resistance. All the trouble came from an armed resistance against the National Authority.

"But,” said I, "is there no other question that might divert the attention of both Parties for a time from the questions involved in their present strife, until the passions on both sides might cool.... I allude, of course to Mexico, and what is called the

Monroe Doctrine — the principles of which are directly involved in the contest now waging there." 1

Mr. Lincoln replied with considerable earnestness, that he could entertain no proposition for ceasing active military operations, which was not based upon a pledge first given, for the ultimate restoration of the Union. . . . These pointed and emphatic responses seemed to put an end to the Conference on the subject contemplated in our Mission, as we had no authority to give any such pledge, even if we had been inclined to do so, nor was it expected that any such would really be required to be given.2. . .

Judge Campbell then inquired in what way the settlement for a restoration of the Union was to be made. Supposing the Confederate States should consent to the general terms as stated by Mr. Lincoln, how would the re-establishment of the National Authority take place? . . .

Mr. Lincoln replied: "By disbanding their armies and permitting the National Authorities to resume their functions.”

Mr. Seward interposed and said, that Mr. Lincoln could not express himself more clearly or forcibly in reference to this question, than he had done in his message to Congress in December before, and referred specially to . . . these words: "In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that war will cease on the part of the government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.”3 . . .

1 On Emperor Napoleon III's attempt to establish a French empire in Mexico during our Civil War see Muzzey, An American History, P. 395. Francis P. Blair, Senior, had visited his personal friend, President Davis, in Richmond, shortly before the Hampton Roads Conference, and made this suggestion of utilizing the Mexican situation to sink the hostility between North and South. President Lincoln, however, had explicitly refused to authorize such a suggestion.

2 In his instruction to the commissioners Davis spoke of "securing peace to the two countries," while Lincoln insisted on dealing with "our common country." "Had not the desire of the commissioners been so strong as to induce them to strain their instructions . . . and had not Lincoln waived form for substance, Davis' quibble about words would have prevented the meeting."- Rhodes, History of the United States, 1850-1877, Vol. V, p. 68.

8 See Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, PP. 254-255.

...

I asked Mr. Lincoln what would be the status of that portion of the Slave population in the Confederate States which had not then become free under his Proclamation. . . . Mr. Lincoln said that was a judicial question. How the courts would decide it he did not know, and could give no answer. His own opinion was, that as the Proclamation was a war measure, and would have effect only from its being an exercise of the war power, as soon as the war ceased it would be inoperative for the future. It would be held to apply only to such slaves as had come under its operation while it was in active exercise. This was his individual opinion, but the courts might decide the other way, and hold that it effectually emancipated all the Slaves in the States to which it applied at the time. So far as he was concerned, he should leave it to the courts to decide. He never would change or modify the terms of the Proclamation in the slightest particular. . . .

Mr. Seward said that there were only about 200,000 slaves who, up to that time, had come under the actual operation of the Proclamation, and who were then in the enjoyment of their freedom under it. . . . Mr. Seward also said that it might be proper to state to us that Congress, a day or two before, had proposed a Constitutional Amendment [the XIIIth] for the immediate abolition of Slavery throughout the United States, which he produced and read to us from a newspaper. He said this was done as a war measure. If the war were then to cease it would probably not be adopted by a number of States sufficient to make it part of the Constitution. . . . The whole number of States being thirty-six, any ten of them could defeat the proposed amendment.

...

I inquired how this matter could be adjusted, without some understanding as to what position the Confederate States would occupy towards the others, if they were then to abandon the war. Would they be admitted to representation in Congress?

Mr. Lincoln very promptly replied, that his own individual opinion was, that they ought to be. He also thought they would be; but he could not enter into any stipulation on the subject. His own opinion was, that when the resistance ceased, and the National Authority was recognized, the States would be

immediately restored to their practical relations to the Union ... he persisted in asserting that he could not enter into any agreement upon this subject, or upon any other matters of that sort, with parties in arms against the Government.

Mr. Hunter interposed, and in illustration of the propriety of the Executive entering into agreements with persons in arms against the acknowledged rightful public authority, referred to repeated instances of this character between Charles I of England and the people in arms against him.

Mr. Lincoln in reply to this said: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I will turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I, is, that he lost his head in the end. . . .”

After pausing for some time, his head rather bent down, as if in deep reflection, while all were silent, he rose up and used these words, almost, if not quite, identical:

९९

Stephens, if I were in Georgia, and entertained the sentiments I do though I suppose I should not be permitted to stay there long with them; but if I resided in Georgia, with my present sentiments, I'll tell you what I would do, if I were in your place: I would go home and get the Governor of the State to call the Legislature together, and get them to recall all the State troops from the war; elect Senators and Members to Congress, and ratify this Constitutional Amendment prospectively, so as to take effect—say in five years. Such a ratification would be valid in my opinion. . . . Whatever may have been the views of your people before the war, they must be convinced now that Slavery is doomed. It cannot last long in any event, and the best course, it seems to me, for your public men to pursue, would be to adopt such a policy as will avoid, as far as possible, the evils of immediate emancipation. This would be my course, if I were in your place. . . ."

...

Mr. Lincoln said that so far as the Confiscation Acts, and other penal acts, were concerned, their enforcement was left entirely with him, and on that point he was perfectly willing to be full and explicit, and on his assurance perfect reliance might be placed. He should exercise the power of the Executive with the utmost liberality. He went on to say that he would be

98. The surrender at

willing to be taxed to remunerate the Southern people for their slaves. He believed the people of the North were as responsible for slavery as the people of the South, and if the war should then cease, with the voluntary abolition of Slavery by the States, he should be in favor, individually, of the Government paying a fair indemnity for the loss to the owners. He said he believed this feeling had an extensive existence at the North. He knew some who were in favor of an appropriation as high as $400,000,000 for this purpose. . . .

Mr. Seward said that the Northern people were weary of the war. They desired peace and a restoration of harmony, and he believed they would be willing to pay as an indemnity for the slaves, what would be required to continue the war, but stated no amount. . . .

I then said: "I wish, Mr. President, you would re-consider the subject of an Armistice on the basis which has been suggested. Great questions, as well as vast interests, are involved in it. If upon so doing, you shall change your mind, you can make it known through the Military."

'Well," said he, as he was taking my hand for a farewell leave, and with a peculiar manner very characteristic of him: Well, Stephens, I will re-consider it, but I do not think my mind will change, but I will re-consider."

The two parties then took formal and friendly leave of each other, Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward withdrawing first from the Saloon together. Col. Babcock, our escort, soon came in to conduct us back to the steamer on which we came.

In his report to Secretary of War Stanton, dated at Appomattox, Washington, July 22, 1865, General Grant included the April 9, 1865 following correspondence between himself and General Lee [370] regarding the surrender of the army of Virginia. After the fall of Petersburg had made the surrender of Richmond inevitable, Lee, rejecting the advice of some of his officers to take to the mountains in western Virginia and wage guerrilla warfare, was surrounded by the Union cavalry at Appomattox. His correspondence with Grant follows: