41. Hamilton's plea for an ade quate constitution, 1780 [137] It would not be difficult perhaps to form a new article of Confederation1... and a question may arise whether fellowship with any state that would refuse to admit it, can be satisfactory or safe.... The present state of things instead of inviting emigrants, deters all who have the means of information, and are capable of thinking. The settlement of our lands, and the introduction of manufactories and branches of trade yet unknown among us or requiring a force of capital, which are to make our country rich and powerful, are interrupted and suspended by our want of public credit and the numerous disorders of our government. "The Articles of Confederation," says Channing," were obsolete when signed by the members of Congress, and antiquated when the Maryland delegates gave the consent September 3, of that state to their ratification."2 To the wonderful genius of Alexander Hamilton we owe the most convincing account of the inadequacy of the Articles and the first clear call for a convention to frame a suitable Constitution for the United States. On September 3, 1780, six months before the Articles of Confederation went into effect even, Hamilton, then a young man of only twenty-three, wrote to James Duane, a member of Congress from New York: Liberty Pole, September 3, 1780 Dear Sir: Agreeably to your request, and my promise, I sit down to give you my ideas of the defects of our present system, and the changes necessary to save us from ruin. They may, perhaps, be the reveries of a projector, rather than the sober views of a politician. You will judge of them, and make what use you please of them. The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress. It is hardly worth while to show in what this consists, as it seems i Four months after Coxe read this paper the "new article of Confederation," the Constitution of the United States, was finished. 2 Channing, History of the United States, Vol. III, p. 463. to be universally acknowledged; or to point out how it has happened, as the only question is how to remedy it. It may, however, be said, that it has originated from three causes: an excess of the spirit of liberty, which has made the particular States show a jealousy of all power not in their own hands,--and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety, or necessity; a diffidence, in Congress, of their own powers, by which they have been timid and indecisive in their resolutions, constantly making concessions to the States, till they have scarcely left themselves the shadow of power; a want of sufficient means at their disposal to answer the public exigencies, and of vigor to draw forth those means, which have occasioned them to depend on the States individually to fulfil their engagements. . . . It may be pleaded that Congress never had any definite powers granted them, and of course could exercise none, could do nothing more than recommend. The manner in which Congress was appointed would warrant, and the public good required that they should have considered themselves as vested with full power to preserve the republic from harm.1 They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty, which were always cheerfully submitted to: The declaration of independence, the declaration of war, the levying of an army, creating a navy, emitting money, making alliances with foreign powers, appointing a dictator,2 etc. All these implications of a complete sovereignty were never disputed, and ought to have been a standard for the whole conduct of administration. ... But the Confederation itself is defective, and requires to be altered. It is neither fit for war nor peace. The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty in each State over its internal police will 1 The formula (ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat) by which the Roman Senate entrusted extraordinary powers to the consuls, or republican officers. 2 The dictator in the Roman state superseded all the constituted powers of the Republic. It is a gross exaggeration to use this term of Washington, who was appointed commander of the continental army simply, and who was subject to the hampering control of Congress constantly. defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our feeble and precarious. There are instances without nu where acts, necessary for the general good, and which ris of the powers given to Congress, must interfere with th ternal police of the States; and there are as many instan which the particular States, by arrangements of internal p F can effectually, though indirectly, counteract the arranger of Congress. The first step must be to give Congress powers comp to the public exigencies. This may happen in two ways by resuming and exercising the discretionary powers I su to have been originally vested in them for the safety States. . . the other, by calling immediately a Convent all the States, with full authority to conclude finally u General Confederation, stating to them beforehand, exp the evils arising from a want of power in Congress. Convention should assemble the first of November next sooner the better. Our disorders are too violent to adm common or lingering remedy. The reasons for which I r them [the delegates] to be vested with plenipotentiary au are that the business may suffer no delay in the executio may in reality, come to effect. A Convention may agre a Confederation; the States individually hardly ever will ... The Confederation, in my opinion, should give Co complete sovereignty, except as to that part of internal which relates to the rights of property and life among indi and to raising money by internal taxes. Congress have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, trade, finance; and to the management of foreign affai right of declaring war; of raising armies, officering, them, directing their motions in every respect; of eq fleets, and doing the same with them; of building fortif arsenals, magazines, etc.; of making peace on such co as they think proper; of regulating trade, determining wi countries it shall be carried on; . . . laying prohibition the articles of export or import; imposing duties; . . . in Admiralty Courts etc.; of coining money; establishing on such terms, and with such privileges as they think appropriating funds, and doing whatever else relates to the operations of finance; transacting everything with foreign nations; making alliances offensive and defensive, treaties of commerce, etc., etc. . . . The Confederation should provide certain perpetual revenues, productive and easy of collection; a land tax, poll tax, or the like1; which, together with the duties on trade, and the unlocated lands, would give Congress a substantial existence, and a stable foundation for their schemes of finance.2... The second step I would recommend is, that Congress should instantly appoint the following great officers of State: A Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a President of War, a President of Marine, a Financier, a President of Trade. Congress should choose for these offices men of the first abilities, property, and character in the Continent, and such as have had the best opportunities of being acquainted with the several branches.3 . . . 4 ... I have only skimmed the surface of the different subjects I have introduced. Should the plans recommended come into contemplation in earnest, I will endeavor to give them more form and particularity. I am persuaded a solid confederation, a permanent army, and a reasonable prospect of subsisting it, would give us treble consideration in Europe, and produce a peace this winter. . . . If a Convention is called, the minds of all the States and the people ought to be prepared to receive its determinations by 1 The Income Tax of 1913 is the first of such " perpetual revenues" to be provided by the Congress of the United States. 2 The student should compare these powers of Congress suggested by Hamilton in 1780 with those actually granted in the Constitution of 1787 (Art. I, Sect. VIII). 8 This suggestion of Hamilton's foreshadowed the efficient executive department of the government, established by the Constitution. However, Hamilton's letter bore fruit before 1787; for executive officers were appointed by Congress-John Jay for Foreign Affairs, Robert Morris for Finance, and others. Let the student compare the number and titles of the executive officers suggested by Hamilton with those of our actual cabinet. 4 The draught of Hamilton's plan for a constitution, drawn up in "form and particularity" in 1787 may be found in Max Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, Vol. III, pp. 617-630.. sensible and popular writings, which should conform to the views of Congress. I have not time even to correct and copy, but only enough to add that I am, very truly and affectionately, dear sir, Your most obedient servant, A. Hamilton 42. The constitutional convention, "A MORE PERFECT UNION" As a result of the commercial conventions held at Mount Vernon in 1785 and Annapolis in 1786, six states had May to Sep- already appointed delegates to a general convention for tember, 1787 the thoroughgoing revision of the Articles of Confederation, when Congress issued the formal summons, February 21, 1787:1 [142] Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress, it is expedient, that on the second Monday in May next, a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several states, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein, as shall when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the states, render the federal constitution adequate to the [exigencies of Government, and the preservation of the union. 1 Six weeks before this resolution of Congress, John Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Washington: "Would it not be better for Congress plainly and in strong terms to declare that the present Federal Government is inadequate to the purpose for which it was instituted . . . that in their opinion it would be expedient for the people of the States without delay to appoint State conventions . . . with the sole and express power of appointing deputies to a general convention, who . . . should take into consideration the Articles of Confederation, and make such alterations, amendments, and additions thereto as to them should appear necessary and proper? . . . No alterations in the government should, I think, be made, nor if attempted will easily take place, unless deducible from the only source of just authority- the People." — John Jay, Corre spondence etc., ed. H. P. Johnston, Vol. III, p. 229. |