tains the dignity and the independence of a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the prince and assuming the character of a private individual; but this he cannot be presumed to do with respect to any portion of that armed force which upholds his crown, and the nation he is entrusted to go

vern.

The only applicable case cited by Bynkershoek is that of the Spanish ships of war seized in Flushing for a debt due from the king of Spain. In that case the states general interposed; and there is reason to believe, from the manner in which the transaction is stated, that either by the interference of government, or the decision of the court, the vessels were released.

This case of the Spanish vessels is, it is believed, the only case furnished by the history of the world, of an attempt made by an individual to assert a claim against a foreign prince by seizing the armed vessel of the nation. That this proceeding was once arrested by the government, in a nation which appears to have asserted the power of proceeding in the same manner against the private property of the prince, would seem a feeble argument in support of the universality of the opinion in favour of the exception claimed for ships of war. The distinction made in our own laws between publick and private ships would appear to proceed from the same opinion.

It seems then to the court to be a principle of publick law that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power, open for their reception, are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction.

Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction either by employing force, or subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals. But until such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of faith to exercise. Those general statutory provisions therefore which are descriptive of the ordinary jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals, which give an individual whose property has been wrested from him a right to claim that properᏞ

No. XIV.

ty in the court of the country in which it is found, ought not, in the opinion of this court, to be so construed as to give them jurisdiction in a case in which the sovereign power has impliedly consented to waive its jurisdiction.

The arguments in favour of this opinion which have been drawn from the general inability of the judicial power, to enforce its decisions in cases of this description, from the consideration that the sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions of policy than of law, that they are diplomatick rather than legal discussions, are of great weight and merit serious attention. But the argument has already been drawn to a length which forbids a particular examination of these points.

The principles which have been stated will now be applied to the case at bar.

In the present state of the evidence and proceedings, The Exchange must be considered as a vessel which was the property of the libellants, whose claim is repelled by the fact that she is now a national vessel commissioned by, and in the service of, the emperour of France. The evidence of this fact is not controverted. But it is contended that it constitutes no bar to an inquiry into the validity of the title by which the emperour holds this vessel. Every person, it is alledged, who is entitled to property brought within the jurisdiction of our courts, has a right to assert his title in these courts, unless there is some law taking his case out of the general rule It is therefore said to be the right and if it be the right, it is the duty of the court, to inquire whether this title has been extinguished by an act the validity of which is recognized by national and municipal law.

If the preceding reasoning be correct, The Exchange, being a publick armed ship in the service of a foreign sovereign with whom the government of the United States is at peace, and having entered an American port open for her reception on the terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly power, must be considered as having come into the American territory under an implied promise that while necessarily within and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.

If this opinion be correct, there seems to be a necessity for admitting, that the fact might be disclosed to the court by the suggestion of the attorney for the United States.

I am directed to deliver it, as the opinion of the court, that the sentence of the Circuit Court, reversing the sentence of the District Court in the case of The Exchange be reversed, and that of the District Court dismissing the libel be affirmed.

An Act to regulate Attachments in the State of Georgia.

Whereas, it is just and proper that provision should be made for the recovery of debts, where the same cannot be done by the ordinary process of law. Therefore,

Be it enacted, &c. That in case of nonresidence, or where both debtor and creditor shall reside without the limits of this state, it shall and may be lawful for such creditor, by himself, his agent, or attorney, to attach the property, both real and personal, which may be found in the state of such debtor, in the same manner, and under the same restrictions as are or shall be usual in the case, of absconding debtors, or where the debtor alone resides out of the state.

2. It shall and may be lawful for the judges of the Superior, or justices of the Inferior Court, or any one of them, and also for any justice of the peace, upon complaint made on oath, that his debtor resides out of this state, or is actually removing without the limits of this state, or any county, or absconds, or conceals himself, or stands in defiance of a peace-officer, so that the ordinary process of law cannot be served on him, to grant an attachment against the estate of such debtor, or so much thereof as shall be of sufficient value to satisfy the plaintiff's demand, and costs-which attachment shall be directed to and served by the sheriff of the county where the property may be found, or his deputy, or any constable; and it shall be the duty of such sheriff, his deputy or constable, to serve and levy the same upon the estate, both real and personal, of such debtor, wherever the same may be found, either

in the hands of any person indebted to, or having effects of such debtor, and summon such person or persons to appear at the next court to be held for said county, and to which the said attachment may be returnable, there to answer on oath what he is indebted to, or what effects of such party he hath in hand, or had at the time of levying such attachment-which being returned executed, the court may, by order, compel such person to appear and answer as aforesaid. And where any person, in whose hands any debt or effects may be attached, shall deny owing any money to, or having in his hands any effects of such debtor, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff to traverse such denial, and thereupon an issue shall be made up and the same be tried by a jury—and if found against such garnishee, he, she, or they, shall be subject to pay the plaintiff such sum as shall be so found, and the court shall order judgment to be entered thereof against such garnishee, as in other cases. Provided, that the said judge, justice of the Inferior Court, or justice of the peace, before granting such attachment, shall take bona and security of the party for whom the same may be granted, in double the sum to be attached, payable to the defendant, for satisfying and paying all costs which may be incurred by the defendant, in case the plaintiff suing out such attachment shall discontinue or be cast in his suit; and also, all damages which may be incurred against the said plaintiff for suing out the same, which bond shall be returned to the court to which such attachment may be made returnable, on or before the last day of the term; and the party entitled to such cost and damages, may bring suit and recover thereon-and every attachment issued without such bond taken, or where no bond shall be returned as aforesaid, is hereby declared to be illegal and shall be dismissed with costs. Provided always, that every attachment which may be issued as aforesaid shall be attested by the judge of the Superior or justice of the Inferior Court, or justice of the peace issuing the same, and be by the sheriff or person authorised to serve the same publicly advertised at the court-house of the said county, at least thirty days before the sitting of the court, and if any attachment shall be issued within thirty days of the sitting of the next court, such attachment shall be made returnable to the court next after the expiration of the said thirty days, and not otherwise; and all attachments issued and returned in any other manner than

is herein before directed, shall be and the same are declared to be null and void-and all goods, chattels, lands and tenements, subject to such attachment, shall be repleviable by appearance and putting in special bail, or by the defendant's giving bond with good and sufficient security to the sheriff or other officer serving the same, which bond he is hereby empowered to take, compelling the defendants to appear at the court to which attachments, shall be returnable, and to abide by and perform the order and judgment of such court-Provided always, that all goods and effects attached and not replevied as aforesaid, whenever the same shall appear to be of a perishable nature, on motion of the plaintiff or his attorney, the court, or if not in term time, the judge of the Superior, or any two or more of the justices of the Inferior Court, may and are hereby authorized and required to order a sale of such perishable property, and the monies arising from such sales shall be deposited in the clerk's office, by the sheriff or other officer selling the same, to answer the demands of the plaintiff, if established, and the balance, if any, after satisfying such demands and costs, shall, by order of said court, be returned to the defendant or his attorney.

3. If any attachment shall be returned executed, and the property attached shall not be replevied as aforesaid, the subsequent proceedings shall be the same as an original process against the body of the defendant, where there is a default of appearance, and all such goods and chattels, lands and tenements, not replevied, shall, after the plaintiff has established his demand, be, by order of the court, sold and disposed of for and towards the satisfaction of the plaintiff's judgment, in like manner as if the same had been taken under execution; and where any attachments be returned served, in the hands of a third person, it shall be lawful upon his appearance and examination in the manner heretofore directed, to enter up judgment as against the original debtor, and award execution against such third person, for the monies due by him to the absent debtor, and against such property or effects as may be in his hands or keeping, belonging to such debtor, or so much thereof as will be of value sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs thereon.

4. Where an absent debtor has property lying in different counties, the same shall be liable to attachment, and an original