484

1862.

NATIONAL ARMY AGAIN IN VIRGINIA

plied, re-enforced, and his communications with Richmond were re-established, McClellan's advance began to cross the Potomac, on a pontoona Oct. 26, bridge at Berlin," and on the 2d of November he announced that his whole army was once more in Virginia, prepared to move southward on the east side of the Blue Ridge, instead of pursuing Lee up the Shenandoah Valley, on its western side.

Meanwhile Stuart, with eighteen hundred cavalry, had recrossed the river at Williamsport, and made once again a complete circuit of the Army of the Potomac without loss. He pushed on as far as Chambersburg, in Pennsyl vania, where he destroyed a large amount of property,' and captured and paroled nearly three hundred sick and wounded soldiers found in the hospital there. Then he made a sweep around to the Potomac below McClellan's left, and recrossed into Virginia at White's Ford.

• Nov.

When the Army of the Potomac, now over one hundred thousand strong, was ready to cross the river, Pleasanton, with his cavalry, led the way at Berlin. Burnside followed, leading an immense wagon-train, and others followed him. Perceiving this movement, the Confederates began retreating up the Shenandoah Valley, followed by Generals Sedgwick and Hancock a short distance. By the 4th, the National army, re-enforced by the divisions of Generals Sigel and Sickles from Washington, occupied the whole region east of the Blue Ridge, with several of its gaps, from Harper's Ferry to Paris, on the road from Aldie to Winchester, and on the 6th McClellan's head-quarters were at Rectortown, near Front Royal. The Confederates, meanwhile, were falling back, and so, from the Potomac to Front Royal and Warrenton, the two great armies moved in parallel lines, with the lofty range of the Blue Ridge between them, and Richmond as the seeming objective.

That race was watched with the most intense anxiety. It was hoped that McClellan, with his superior force and equipment and ample supplies, might capture or disperse the army of his opponent by gaining its front, and striking it heavy blows on the flank through the mountain passes. But Lee was, as usual, too quick for his opponent. Anticipating this movement of

or fighting a safe operation, one is reminded of the famous letter of Napoleon to Marshal Augereau, on the 21st of February, 1814, which gives his idea of making war. The marshal had given excuses similar to those of McClellan for inaction. Napoleon said:

"What! Six hours after receiving the first troops from Spain you are not yet in the field! Six hours' rest is quite enough for them. I conquered at Nangis with a brigade of dragoons coming from Spain, who from Bayonne had not drawn rein. Do you say that the six battalions from Nimes want clothes and equipage, and are uninstructed? Augereau, what miserable excuses! I have destroyed $0,000 enemies with battalions of conscripts, scarcely clothed, and without cartridge-boxes. The National Guard are pitiful. I have here 4,000 from Angers and Bretagne, in round hats, without cartridge-boxes, but with good weapons; and I have made them tell. There is no money, do you say? But where do you expect to get money but from the pockets of the enemy? You have no teams? Seize them! You have no magazines? Tut, tut, that is too ridiculous! I order you to put yourself in the field twelve hours after you receive this letter. If you are still the Augereau of Castiglione, keep your command. If your sixty years are too much for you, relinquish it to the oldest of your general officers. The country is menaced and in danger. It can only be saved by daring and alacrity, and not by vain delays. You must have a nucleus of 6,000 picked troops. I have not so many; yet I have destroyed three armies, captured 40,000 prisoners, taken 200 pieces of artillery, and thrice saved the capital. The enemy are in full flight upon Troyes? Be before them. Act no longer as of late. Resume the method and spirit of '93. When Frenchmen see your plume waving in the van, and you, first of all, exposed to the enemy's fire, you will do with them whatever you will."

1 This consisted of a large quantity of military supplies, clothing, 5,000 muskets, the railway buildings, including station-house and machine-shops, and several trains of loaded cars.

? Lee reported his force then present at 86,553, of whom 78,554 were fit for auty. His entire ariny, present and absent, numbered 153,790.

BURNSIDE SUPERSEDES MCCLELLAN.

485

a Nov 3, 1862.

his foe, he had pushed Longstreet rapidly forward, and on the day after McClellan's army had crossed the river, that able general had crossed the Blue Ridge, and was at Culpepper Court-House" in heavy force, between the Army of the Potomac and Richmond, ready to dispute the advance of the latter in its direct line of march toward the Confederate capital. Nothing but a quick and vigorous movement, by which Lee's army might be severed and destroyed in detail, could now secure a substantial victory for the Nationals. Would it be done? Experience shook its head ominously. The faith of the Government and of the loyal people in McClellan's ability or disposition to achieve a victory by such movement was exhausted, and on the 5th of November an order was issued from the War Department relieving him of his command, and putting General Burnside in his place. This order, borne by General Buckingham, was received by McClellan late in the evening of the 7th, at which time Burnside was in the tent of the chief.

Twice before, the command of that army had been offered to Burnside, who came from North Carolina with the prestige of a successful leader. He had modestly declined it, because he felt himself incompetent for the station. That modest estimate of his ability now made him shrink from the honor and the grave responsibilities; but duty at that critical moment, and the peremptory orders of his Government, compelled him to take both, and with the spirit of the assurance, "I'll try," he assumed the command on the 10th of November.'

Burnside's sense of the magnitude of his trust made him exceedingly cautious, and instead of going forward to the point of a great battle, to which McClellan's movements seemed tending, with promises of success," he occupied about ten days getting the army, now one hundred and twenty thousand strong, well in mind and hand, and in reorganizing it. He also adopted a new plan of operations, by which the capture of Richmond rather than the immediate destruction of Lee's army was made the objective. The National army was moving rapidly away from its base of supplies into an enemy's country, at a season when inclement weather might be expected; while the Confederate Army was continually nearing its base of supplies. Burnside therefore determined, with the acquiescence of the General-in-Chief, to make Aquia Creek, connected by railroad with Fredericksburg, his base, and to operate from that point by a nearer route to Richmond than Gor

At that time the Army of the Potomac was massed near Warrenton, as follows:-"The First. Second, and Fifth Corps, reserve artillery, and general head-quarters, at Warrenton; Ninth Corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the Sixth Corps at New Baltimore; the Eleventh Corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and Thoroughfare Gap; Sickles's division of the Third Corps, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junction; Pleasanton across the Rappahannock at Amisville, Jefferson, &c., with his pickets at Hazel River, facing Longstreet, six miles from Culpepper Court-House; and Bayard at Rappahannock Station."-See McClellan's Report, page 237.

At that time Lee's army was in a perilous position. A great part of it, as we have observed, was under Longstreet, in the vicinity of the Rapid Anna; while Jackson, with a heavy force, was in the Shenandoah Valley, near Chester and Thornton's Gaps. A vigorous movement forward at this time must have fatally severed the two forces. To effect that object seems to have been McClellan's design. "I doubt," he said, "whether, during the whole period that I had the honor to command the Army of the Potomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle."

He consolidated the six corps of the army into three grand divisions of two corps each. The Right Grand Division, commanded by General Sumner, was composed of the Second Corps, General Couch, and the Ninth Corps, General Wilcox. The Center Grand Division, under General Hooker, was composed of the Third Corps, General Stoneman, and the Fifth Corps, General Butterfield. The Left Grand Division, under General Franklin, was composed of the First Corps, under General Reynolds, and the Sixth Corps, under General W. F. Smith.

486

a

• Nov., 1862.

BURNSIDE BEFORE FREDERICKSBURG.

donsville. In accordance with this resolution, his forces began to move toward Fredericksburg on the 16th. Meanwhile Jackson had been making some demonstration north and west of Winchester, for the purpose of detaching a part of Burnside's force in that direction, but failed; while Lee, with the great body of his troops, had retired to Gordonsville.

Sumner led the movement' down the left bank of the Rappahannock, toward Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, with the expectation of crossing the river at once, and taking possession of the city

& Nov. 15.

and the commanding heights in its rear. A feint was made toward Gordonsville, to mask this movement, but Lee penetrated it, and put in motion a countervailing force down the right bank of the river. The head of Sumner's column arrived at Falmouth on the 17th, and was assailed by a light battery already planted on the heights back of Fredericksburg. This was soon silenced by Petitt's battery, planted on the highest hill back of Falmouth, in the mansion on the summit of which, on his arrival toward evening, General Sumner made his quarters. He was anxious to cross over and seize those heights. The bridges were destroyed, but the stream was fordable just above Falmouth. The town was occupied by a regi ment of Virginia cavalry and Barksdale's Mississippi brigade of sharp-shooters, their leader making his quarters where McDowell had made his, in the fine brick building of the Farmers' Bank, corner of George and Princess Streets. The city and those heights might then have been easily taken, but Burnside thought it best not to do so

e Nov. 21.

demanded the surrender of

the city. The authorities replied, that while it should not be

1 Without a shadow of truth, General Lee encouraged his troops and the deceived people by solemnly declaring in his official report that "the advance of General Sumner reached Falmouth on the afternoon of the 17th, and attempted to cross the Rappahannock, but was driven back by Colonel Ball with the Fifteenth Vir ginia cavalry, four companies of Mississippi infantry, and Lewis's light battery."

THE CONFEDERATES AT FREDERICKSBURG.

487

used for offensive operations against the National army, any attempt of that army to occupy it would be stoutly resisted. Expecting an immediate assault in response to this refusal, a greater portion of the inhabitants fled, and Barksdale's sharp-shooters were distributed throughout the town in ambush behind buildings.

Immediately after the arrival of the National army before Fredericksburg, a large force was detailed to repair the railway between that city and Aquia Creek, its base of supplies. The Confederates had destroyed all of the bridges and much of the track, but it was soon put in sufficient order for temporary purposes. The bridges were rebuilt rudely but strongly of wood, the most notable speci

men of which was that

over the Potomac Creek, that traversed a deep ravine. It was four hundred feet in length, and its top was ninety feet above the water.'

a 1862.

Before this line of communication was established, the Confederates had made the seizure of Fredericksburg and the heights behind it impossible without a severe battle. Lee's army, eighty thousand strong, had pushed forward toward the Rappahannock as rapidly as possible, and at the close of November it lay in a semicircle around Fredericksburg, each wing resting on the river; its right at Port Royal, below the city, and its left six miles above the city. Lee's engineers had been very busy, and had constructed two lines of fortifications along two concentric ridges a mile apart, extending from the river, a mile and a half above the city, to the Fredericksburg and Richmond railway, three miles below the town. These had grown without the possible interference of the Nationals, for not until the second week in December were pontoons, which had been ordered, ready for constructing bridges to cross the river. So formidable were their works then, that a direct attack in front, with Lee's main force behind them, would be almost like madness.

Arrangements were made to cross the river at Skenker's Neck, twelve miles below Falmouth, and turn the Confederate right. This was discovered, and Lee sent so heavy a force in that direction that the enterprise was abandoned. Yet those preparations had so engaged Lee's attention, that he kept a large force down the river to prevent such movement; and Burnside felt satisfied that he might successfully make a sudden crossing, and attack Lee's

The picture shows the appearance of that structure. The two stone piers were the remains of the old bridge. A writer of the day said: "It is a precarious thing in appearance, the track simply propped up on trestle-work of round logs, and as the trains creep over the abyss, the impressions of the spectators are not, in the aggregate, comfortable."

488

PERILOUS BRIDGE-BUILDING.

front and fatally penetrate it, while his army was thus divided. Preparations for forcing the passage of the Rappahannock were made accordingly. The topgraphy of the river shores favored the enterprise, for Stafford Heights, where the Nationals lay, were close to its banks, and commanded the plain on which the city stands, while the heights on which Lee's batteries were planted were from three-fourths of a mile to a mile and a half from the banks. Such being the case, there seemed to be nothing to oppose the construction of the bridges but the Mississippi sharp-shooters in the city.

Every thing was in readiness on the 10th of December. During that night Stafford Heights, under the direction of General Hunt, chief of artil lery, were dotted by twenty-nine batteries containing one hundred and fortyseven guns, so arranged that they commanded the space between the town and the heights back of it, and might protect the crossing of the troops. Burnside's head-quarters were at the house of Mr. Phillips, on the heights, a mile from the river, from which he could survey the whole field of operations. The Grand Divisions of Sumner and Hooker, sixty thousand strong, lay in front of the city, and that of Franklin, forty thousand strong, two miles below. It was arranged to throw five pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock for the passage of these troops-three of them opposite the city, and two where Franklin was to cross.

Before daylight on the morning of the 11th the engineers were quietly but vigorously at work making the bridges, covered by the Fifty-seventh

and houses on the city side of the stream. At the same time a signal-gun was fired to call the Confederate hosts to arms, for General Lee had expected this movement, and was prepared for an attack. The fire was so severe that the engineers were driven away. Several attempts to renew the work were foiled by the sharp-shooters. Nothing could be done while these remained in the town, and only artillery might effect their expulsion. So, at about ten o'clock in the morning, Burnside ordered the batteries on Stafford Heights to open upon the city, and batter it down, if necessary. The response to that order was terrific. More than a hundred guns fired fifty rounds each before the cannonade ceased, when the city was awfully shattered, and on fire in several places. Under cover of this cannonade a fresh attempt

1 This is a view of the Phillips House in flames, taken by the photographic process by Mr. Gardiner, of Washington City, while it was burning.