DANGERS POINTED OUT.

a Oct. 1861.

133

thousand men of all arms were assembled and maneuvered. It was the largest military force ever gathered on the American Continent, and gave the loyal people assurance of the safety of the Republic. And to these troops, regiment after regiment, at the rate of two thousand men each day, and battery after battery, was continually added from the teeming population and immense resources of the Free-labor States. A little later, there was another imposing review. It was of artillery and cavalry alone; when six thousand horsemen, and one hundred and twelve heavy guns, appeared before President Lincoln, the Secretary of State, Prince de Joinville, and other distinguished men. Their evolutions were conducted over an area of about two hundred acres: the cavalry under the direction of General Palmer, and the artillery under the command of General Barry. The whole review was conducted by General Stoneman.

But drills, parades, and reviews were not the only exhibitions of war near the Potomac during these earlier days of autumn. There was some real though not heavy fighting between

the opposing forces there. The audacity of the Confederates was amazing. Soon after the Battle of Bull's Run, General Johnston had advanced his outposts from Centreville and Fairfax Court House to Munson's Hill, only six miles in an air-line from Washington City, where the Confederate flag was flaunted for weeks, in full view of the National Capitol. At other points above the city, his scouts pressed up almost to the Potomac, and he was at the same time taking measures for erecting batteries at points below the Occoquan Creek, for the purpose of obstructing the passage of supplies up that river, for the National army around Washington. The probability of such a movement had been perceived at an early day by vigilant and expert men.

So early as June, the Navy Department had called the attention of the Secretary of War (Mr. Cameron) to the importance, in view of the possible danger, of seizing and holding Matthias Point, in order to secure the navigation of the river. At different times afterward, the attention of the President, General Scott, and General McClellan was called to the matter by the same Department, but nothing was done until toward the close of September, when Confederate batteries were actually planted there." Then it was proposed to send a land force down the Maryland side of the river, and crossing in boats, covered by the Potomac flotilla, take possession of the shore just above Matthias Point. The Secretary of the Navy, having

1 This is a view of one of the most frequently mentioned buildings in the records of the Civil War. It is from a sketch made by the author in 1866. It gives the name to the village around it, which is the shiretown of the county. The village was much injured during the war.

July 1st, August 20th, and August 31st.

It appears by an autograph letter before me, written by Colonel Wade Hampton, at Freestone Point, between Occoquan and Dumfries, and dated September 24th, 1861, that a battery was completed at that place, and

134

THE POTOMAC RIVER BLOCKADED.

use for the Potomac flotilla elsewhere, was anxious that the movement should take place at once.' Preparations were accordingly made to send four thousand of Hooker's division for the purpose. The Navy Department furnished transportation, and Captain Craven, the commander of the flotilla, gathered his vessels in the vicinity of Matthias Point, to co-operate in an attack on the batteries there. In the mean time the chief engineer (Major Barnard) reported adversely, and the project was abandoned.

On the assurance of sufficient aid from the Navy Department, it was agreed that a land force should march down the right bank of the Potomac, capture all batteries found there, and take permanent possession of that region. This project was also abandoned, because McClellan believed that the movement might bring on a general engagement, for which he did not feel prepared. No attempt was afterward made to interfere with the Confederates in their mischievous work, and early in October Captain Craven officially announced that the navigation of the Potomac was closed, and the National capital blockaded in that important direction. Craven was so mortified because of the anticipated reproach of the public for the supposed inefficiency of his command, that he made a request to be assigned to duty elsewhere. The President, who had warmly seconded the Navy Department in urging McClellan to take measures for keeping the navigation of the river open, was exceedingly annoyed; whilst the nation at large, unable to understand the cause of this new disaster, and feeling deeply mortified and humiliated, severely censured the Government. That blockade, so disgraceful to the Government, was continued until the Confederates voluntarily evacuated their position in front of Washington, in March following.

was ready for action at that date. His letter was addressed to Colonel Thomas Jordan, Beauregard's Assistant Adjutant-General. He says the works were constructed under Captain Lee, whose battery and a long 82-pounder rifled gun were there. The latter had been sent there by General Trimble, a Maryland traitor, then in the Confederate army. He reported that he had every thing in readiness to open fire the previous evening. A fringe of trees had been left standing on the point, to conceal the troops while erecting the works. These were cut down on the night of the 23d.

1 At that time (late in September) there were in the Potomac the Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Seminole, three heavily armed vessels, and the R. B. Forbes, with two very formidable guns on board. These vessels had been detailed to go with Dupont's expedition to Port Royal, and it was urged by the Navy Department that they should first be employed in destroying the Confederate batteries on the river, and assisting the Army of the Potomac in taking possession of their positions.

2 He referred to the fact that High Point, Freestone Point, and Cock-pit Point, and thence down to Chapawausic Creek, opposite Hooker's quarters at Budd's Ferry, were eligible places for batteries, and considered it unwise to attempt the capture of any already completed, unless a campaign was about to be opened in that direction. He concluded that the best way to prevent the erection of batteries, and to keep open navigation, was to have a sufficient naval force patrolling the Potomac. See McClellan's Report, page 50. In a review of the Peninsula Campaign, Major (then General) Barnard, alluding to this project, says (page 16), if it had been attempted "a Ball's Bluff affair, ten times intensified, would have been the certain result.”

• General McClellan, in his report to the Secretary of War of the operations of the Army of the Potomac while under his command, made in August, 1863 (nearly two years after the events here recorded), attributed the failure to keep the navigation of the Potomac open, at this time, to the remissness of the Navy Department in not furnishing a sufficient number of armed vessels for the purpose. G. V. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (i, page 239), attributes that failure partly to the remissness of the War Department, under the management of Cameron, but chiefly to the failure of General McClellan to furnish a force from his immense army in time to have taken and held possession of the Virginia shore of the river. The Committee on the Conduct of the War, in their summary of the testimony of both Mr. Fox and General McClellan, says: "After repeated efforts, General McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready, at a time named, to proceed down the river. The Navy Department provided the necessary transports for the troops, and Captain Craven, commanding the Potomac flotilla, upon being notified to that effect, collected at Matthias Point all the boats of his flotilla at the time named. The troops did not arrive, and the Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan why the troops had not been sent, according to agreement, was informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he had concluded not to send them. Captain Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Depart

HOSTILE MOVEMENTS ON THE POTOMAC.

135

As the Army of the Potomac rapidly increased in numbers and equipment in Virginia in front of Washington, it required more space than the narrow strip between the river and the advance posts of the Confederates, and early in September it was determined to acquire that space by pushing back the intruders. Already there had been several little skirmishes between the pickets and the outposts of the confronting contestants. On the 5th of August, a detachment of the Twenty-eighth New York, under Captain Brush, mostly firemen, attacked a squad of Confederate cavalry in Virginia, opposite the Point of Rocks, killing and wounding eight men, and capturing nine prisoners and twenty horses; and on the 12th a detachment of the Tenth New York, under Captain Kennedy, crossed the Potomac from Sandy Hook, and attacked and routed some Virginia cavalry at Lovettsville. On the 12th of September, a reconnoissance was made toward Lewinsville, four or five miles from Camp Advance, at the Chain Bridge, by about two thousand men, under the command of General William F. Smith,' in charge of a brigade at that post. They had accomplished a topographical survey, for which purpose they were chiefly sent, and were returning, when they were attacked by a body of Virginians, under the command of Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, afterward the famous general leader of cavalry in the Confederate army. Stuart opened heavily with his cannon, which at first disconcerted the National troops. The latter were kept steady until Griffin's Battery was placed in position, when its guns soon silenced those of the Virginians, and scattered their cavalry. Then the National troops, having accomplished their object, returned to their post near the Chain Bridge "in perfect order and excellent spirits," with a loss of two killed and ten wounded.3

a 1861.

ment had charge; that they had provided the necessary means to accomplish the landing successfully; that no inquiry had been made of them in regard to that matter, and no notification that the troops were not to be sent. It was then agreed that the troops should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the arrival of the troops; but no troops were sent down at that time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the Committee, as to what reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as he could ascertain, was that General McClellan feared that it might bring on a general engagement. The President, who had united with the Navy Department in urging its proposition, first upon General Scott and then upon General McClellan, manifested great disappointment when he learned that the plan had failed in consequence of the troops not being sent. And Captain Craven threw up his command on the Potomac, and applied to be sent to sea, saying that, by remaining here and doing nothing, he was but losing his own reputation, as the blame for permitting the Potomac to be blockaded would be imputed to him and the flotilla under his command." As the reports of the Committee may be frequently referred to in this work, it is proper to say that it was a joint committee of both Houses of Congress, appointed in December, 1861, consisting of three members of the Senate and four members of the House of Representatives, with instructions to inquire into the conduct of the war. The Committee consisted of B. F. Wade, Z. Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, of the Senate, and D. W. Gooch, John Covode, G. W. Julian, and M. F. Odell, of the House of Representatives. They constituted a permanent court of inquiry, with power to send for persons and papers. When Senator Johnson was appointed Military Governor of Tennessee, his place on the Committee was supplied by Joseph A. Wright, of Indiana.

1 These troops consisted of the Seventy-ninth (Highlanders) New York Militia; battalions of Vermont and Indiana Volunteers, and of the First United States Chasseurs; a Cavalry company, and Griffin's West Point Battery.

These were the Thirteenth Virginia Volunteers, Rosser's Battery of the Washington Artillery, and a detachment of cavalry.

3 Reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler and Adjutant Ireland, and dispatch of General McClellan, all dated September 11th, 1961. General McClellan joined the column at the close of the affair. Colonel Stuart (Confederate) gave a glowing account of the confusion into which the Nationals were thrown by his first attack, and gave the affair the aspect of a great victory for himself. He reported “fearful havoc in the ranks of the enemy." Our loss," he said, "was not a scratch to man or horse."-Stuart's Report, Sept. 11, 1861.

Stuart appears to have been accused of rashness on this occasion, in exposing his cannon to the danger of capture. In an autograph letter before me, dated at Munson's Hill, September 14th, and addressed to General Longstreet, he repels the accusation, and declares that at no time was a piece of his cannon "in a position that it

136

Sept. 15, 1861.

b Oct. 9. e Oct. 16.

d Oct. 17.

AN INGENIOUS DECEPTION.

b

Three days after the affair near Lewinsville, the pickets on the right of the command of Colonel John W. Geary, of the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, stationed three miles above Darnestown, in Maryland, were attacked by four hundred and fifty Virginians, who had boldly crossed the Potomac. A spirited skirmish for about two hours ensued, resulting in a loss to the assailants of eight or ten killed, and several wounded, and their utter repulse. Geary's loss was one killed; and his gain was great animation for the troops under his command, who were charged with holding the country opposite Harper's Ferry. A little later, National troops permanently occupied Lewinsville, Vienna, and Fairfax Court House, the Confederates falling back to Centreville without firing a shot. They had evacuated Munson's Hill on the 28th of September, when the position was formally taken possession of by the Nationals, who had been for some time looking upon it from Bailey's Crossroads with much respect, because of its apparently formidable works and heavy armament. These had been reconnoitered with great caution, and pronounced to be alarmingly strong, when the fort was really a slight earthwork, running irregularly around about four acres on the brow of the hill, without ditch or glacis, "in every respect a squirming piece of work," as an eye-witness wrote. Its armament consisted of one stove-pipe and two logs, the latter with a black disc painted on the middle of the sawed end of each, giving them the appearance, at a distance, of the muzzles of 100-pound Par

rott guns. These "Quaker Guns," like similar ones at Manassas a few months later, had, for six weeks, defied the Army of the Potomac. In a house near the fort (which was soon made into a strong regular work), Brigadier-General James Wadsworth, who was placed in command, there made his head-quarters; and on the roof he caused a signal-station to be erected, from which there was an interchange of intelligence with another station on the dome of the capitol at Washington. There the writer visited General Wadsworth, late in November, 1861, and found that ardent and devoted patriot, who had left all the ease and enjoyments which great wealth and a charming domestic circle bestow, and for the sake of his endangered country was enduring all the privations incident to an arduous camp life. His quarters were humble, and in no respect did his arrangements for comfort differ from those of his brother officers.

On the day of the grand review of the cavalry and artillery of the Army

could not have safely retreated from before an army of 10,000 advancing at the double-quick." Longstreet sent Stuart's letter to General Johnson, with an indorsement, testifying to the judicious disposition of the cannon in the engagement.

1 This is from a photograph by Gardner, of Washington City, and represents one of the logs in the form of a cannon, and painted black, that was found in an embrasure at Manassas, after the Confederates withdrew from that post, in the spring of 1862.

HOSTILITIES AT HARPER'S FERRY.

The

137

a Oct. 8,

1861.

of the Potomac,' there was an important movement in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, which led to a still more important one a week later. On that day, Major J. P. Gould, of the Thirteenth Massachusetts, was sent across the river to some mills a short distance above Harper's Ferry, to seize some wheat there belonging to the Confederates. movement was made known to General Evans, commanding in the vicinity, and quite a heavy force was sent to oppose them. Geary was called upon for re-enforcements. He promptly responded by crossing the river with about six hundred men and four pieces of cannon, the latter under the respective commands of Captain Tompkins of the Rhode Island Battery, and Lieutenant Martin of the Ninth New York Battery. The wheat was secured and made into flour; and Geary was about to recross the river with his booty, on the morning

of the 16th, when his pickets, on Bolivar Heights, two and a half miles west of Harper's Ferry, and extending from the Potomac to the Shenandoah, were attacked by Confederates in three columns, consisting of infantry and cavalry, and supported by artillery. The pickets were driven

6

into the town of Bolivar. Geary, who, with his main body, was on Camp Heights, an eminence around the foot of which nestles the village of Harper's Ferry, rallied them, and a general fight ensued. In his front, on Bolivar Heights, were a large body of troops and three heavy guns, and suddenly there appeared on Loudon Heights on his left, across the Shenandoah River, another large body of men, with four pieces of cannon, which with plunging shot might terribly smite the little National force, and command the ferry on the Potomac.

Geary sent a company of the Thirteenth Massachusetts, under Captain Schriber, to guard the fords of the Shenandoah, and prevent troops crossing there and joining those on Bolivar Heights. He then had only four hundred and fifty men left to fight his foe on his front. With these he repelled three

I See page 132.

? His force consisted of three companies of the Third Wisconsin, and a section of Captain Tompkins's Rhode Island Battery.

This was Colonel Evans, who commanded the extreme left of the Confederates at the stone bridge, at the opening of the battle of Bull's Run, on the morning of the 21st July, 1861. See page 590, volume I.

This force consisted of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Mississippi, Eighth Virginia, Ashby's Virginia Regiment of cavalry, and Rogers's Richmond Battery of six pieces, the whole commanded by General Evans in person.

The remainder of Geary's force consisted of four companies of the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania and three of the Third Wisconsin.

Geary's quarters were at the large Government house on Camp Heights, delineated in the engraving, in which Generals Kenley, Banks, and Miles were afterward quartered. It was in a terribly dilapidated condition when the writer visited and sketched it, early in October, 1866, its outer walls scarred by shot and shell, and its interior almost a ruin. On the left of the picture is seen the western slope of Loudon Heights, across the Shenandoah.