against the will of their people, and who, to do it, departed from all the traditions of our country. This proposition the President takes pains to establish by extracts from his instructions to the commissioners, which he has refused to publish in full,-a singular use of public documents under a free government. From the opening sentence in the first quotation, "It is my wish," down to the statement, "Again on November 13 I instructed the commission," the responsibility is clear. It was the President who, to quote his own words, could "see but one plain path of duty, the acceptance of the archipelago." No emperor in the world could have exercised more absolute power than did the President in deciding to take the Philippines. It is true that the Senate had to ratify the treaty; but the President's influence was controlling, and was fully exerted to secure ratification.

But what did the treaty mean? Let me answer in the words of Senator Lodge spoken on January 24, 1899, while urging ratification: "The treaty cedes the Philippines to us. When that treaty is ratified, we have full power, and are absolutely free to do with those islands as we please. . . . Suppose we ratify the treaty. The islands pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without committing us to any policy." This was the position of the administration's friends. What the Senate meant by ratification was shown by the resolution of Mr. Bacon, from which I quote the following words: "That in demanding and in receiving the cession of the Philippine Islands it is not the purpose of the government of the United States to secure and maintain permanent dominion over the same as a part of the territory of the United States, or to permanently incorporate the inhabitants thereof as citizens of the United States, or to hold said inhabitants as vassals or subjects of this government; and the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands." The fact that upon this resolution the Senate stood equally divided must have informed the President that upon the question of how we should deal with the Philippines the country was not decided.

Who should determine the question of policy which the treaty left open ? The President himself gave the only answer, when a few days after it was ratified, in his speech to the Home Market Club in Boston on February 16, he said:

"The whole subject is now with Congress; and Congress is

the voice, the conscience, and the judgment of the American people. Upon their judgment and conscience can we not rely? ... Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the flag." And Secretary Long, who followed him, emphasized this answer when he said that the rejection of the treaty "would have taken out of the hands of the people and put into the hands of one man, the President, absolute authority over the Philippines, limited only to the indefinite scope of what is called the war power, wielded by a purely military arm holding a naked sword. Think of that for imperialism. It is a great credit to the President that, like Julius Cæsar and George Washington, he has refused this offer of a 'kingly crown.' On the contrary, the good old democratic plan has been adopted of putting the disposition of these islands into the hands of the American people, who will duly express their will through their representatives in Congress assembled. I have no doubt the President is delighted to have the elephant off his hands, and on theirs."

When these words were uttered, the war in the Philippines was in its first and most acute stage. General Otis had a few days before refused Aguinaldo's request for a truce. Spoken under these circumstances, these speeches meant that the President would undertake no policy of his own, but would let Congress deal with the question. Least of all would he assume "absolute authority over the Philippines, limited only to the indefinite scope of what is called the war power, wielded by a purely military arm holding a naked sword" which Secretary Long described as real "imperialism." Yet from the day when those words were spoken till now we have had exactly this, and nothing else. It is Secretary Long who says, "Think of that for imperialism."

"The voice, the conscience, and the judgment of the American people" has never been consulted. Congress was not called in extra session to decide the question upon which the Senate was equally divided or to make such a declaration of our purpose as might have ended the war. The President alone assumed "that Philippines" which Secretary Long praised him for refusing. Congress met in regular session on December 5, 1899. Did the President hasten to express his pleasure that "the elephant was off his hands, and on theirs"? This is what he said:

absolute authority over the

"It does not seem desirable that I should recommend at this

time a specific and final form of government for these islands. When peace shall be restored, it will be the duty of Congress to construct a plan of government which shall establish and maintain freedom and order and peace in the Philippines. The insurrection is still existing; and, when it terminates, further information will be required as to the actual condition of affairs before inaugurating a permanent scheme of civil government. . . . As long as the insurrection continues, the military arm must necessarily be supreme.' This was a distinct invitation to Congress to leave " the elephant on his hands, and the invitation was accepted. But it will be observed that the question of holding the islands - the question upon which the Senate divided equally, the question which the treaty left open was treated by the President as settled. His words are: islands lie under the shelter of our flag. They are ours by every title of law and equity. They cannot be abandoned."

"The

Who settled this question? Not a Congress which had never considered it. Not the Senate which was divided. It was the President who on December 21, 1898, weeks before the treaty was ratified, before it was even submitted to the Senate, and, therefore, before he had a shadow of authority beyond "the city, harbor, and bay of Manila," as he himself admitted at Pittsburg, issued the proclamation which announced to the Filipinos that "the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands" had been "ceded to the United States," and proceeded, “In fulfilment of the right of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands become immediately necessary; and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila, is to be extended with all possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory. . . . All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the government of the United States,... will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed with firmness, if need be, but without severity so far as may be possible."

When we remember that there was an organized government in Luzon recognized in the other principal islands, and that the army of this government, till then acting in alliance with us, lay just outside our lines; when we remember also that this army had been

raised to win the independence of the islands, and that this government had proclaimed this independence, -- it is clear that the President's proclamation was a declaration of war. It ignored the established government, and proposed to occupy its territory by military force. General Otis admits that he thought it unsafe to publish it, and that he modified it in essential respects; but General Miller published it unchanged. It was the President, in the exercise of the war power, who from that day till now has wielded all the power of the United States in the Philippines. He has appointed two commissions; but Congress has never been asked to authorize either, to define their duties or to fix their salaries. They are the representatives of the President, responsible to him, and paid out of public funds such sums as he sees fit. He has instructed them "to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal government, in which the natives of the islands . . . shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable"; that is, of which these commissioners think them capable.

This commission is to report when it is "of the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands is such that the central administration may safely be transferred from military to civil control"... "with their recommendations as to the form of central government to be established for the purpose of taking over the control."

"Beginning with the first day of September, 1900, the authority to exercise subject to my control through the Secretary of War that part of the power of government in the Philippine Islands which is of a legislative nature is to be transferred from the military governor of the islands to this commission, to be thereafter exercised by them in the place and stead of the military governor . . . until the establishment of the central civil government for the islands contemplated in the last foregoing paragraph or until Congress shall otherwise provide."

Not content with "absolute authority" during war, the President is thus proposing by his own decree, through commissioners not created by law, to establish a civil government in the islands, to fix its terms, to make his commissioners the legislature, and, finally, to ask a compliant Congress to ratify his acts. As he says in his letter, "I directed that upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines must be imposed these inviolable rules," enumerating certain of the constitutional safeguards of

freedom, and thus arrogating to himself authority without consulting Congress to determine what provisions of our Constitution should extend to subjects of the United States and which should not,— which of "our priceless principles should undergo no change under a tropical sun" and which should wither.

To an old-fashioned American the idea that the President can give or withhold constitutional rights is novel. This review makes it clear that at every step in this unhappy business, from the framing of the treaty till this hour, the President has exercised almost absolute authority. At no step has Secretary Long's "good old democratic plan been adopted of putting the disposition of these islands into the hands of the American people." If that was "the good old democratic plan," how shall we characterize the plan that has been followed? What authority has the President refused to exercise, what responsibility has he laid upon Congress? Is not this exercise of absolute power over millions of people properly called imperial?

How does the President excuse his course. In his instructions to the peace commissioners, as quoted in his letter, he said: "We took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfilment of high public and moral obligations. We had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest." A little later, in announcing his decision to take the whole archipelago, he told the commissioners that "he has been influenced by the single consideration of duty and humanity." And later still he said: “The trade and commercial side, as well as indemnity for the cost of the war, are questions we might yield. They might be waived or compromised, but the questions of duty and humanity appeal to the President so strongly that he can find no appropriate answer but the one he has here marked out."

"On the

"The single consideration of duty and humanity." 12th of August," says the President, "hostilities were suspended, and a protocol was signed with a view to arranging terms of peace between the two governments." On the very next day Secretary Long sent the following telegram to Admiral Dewey: “The President desires to receive from you any important evidence you may have of the Philippines; the desirability of the several islands; the character of their population; coal and other mineral deposits; their harbor and commercial advantages; and, in a naval and commercial sense, which would be the most advantageous." Some very