But the

the good offices of friendship in every proper case. idea that our position is that of an involuntary military force, at the beck and call of every American state that may stand in need of it, and that we are to supply their deficiencies in men and in money, in order that they may conduct their controversies with European powers on a basis of equality in force and resources, is an idea that must be repugnant to the sense of every reflecting man.

We have not assumed to forbid European powers to settle their quarrels with American states by the use of force any more than we have hesitated to do so ourselves. In 1861 we admitted the right of France, Spain and Great Britain to proceed jointly by force against Mexico for the satisfaction of claims. Indeed, Mr. Seward, in an instruction to our minister to France of June 21, 1862, said:

France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have a right and interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican or anti-American government, or to maintain such a government there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we, besides reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable manner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not anticipate, a violation of them.

It was not till these assurances were violated, that Mr. Seward protested.

In 1842 and again in 1844, Great Britain blockaded the port of San Juan de Nicaragua. In 1851 the same power laid an embargo on traffic at the port of La Union, in Salvador, and blockaded the whole coast of that country. In 1862 and 1863 the same power seized Brazilian vessels in Brazilian waters in reprisal for the plundering of the bark Prince of Wales on the Brazilian coast. In 1838 France blockaded the ports of Mexico as an act of redress for unsatisfied demands. From 1865 till some scarcely defined date Spain was at war with the republics on the west coast of South America. The bombardment of Valparaiso by a Spanish fleet was a prominent incident of the conflict. It was in respect of this conflict that

Mr. Seward, in an instruction to Mr. Kilpatrick, our minister to Chili, of June 2, 1866, while declaring that we did not intervene in wars between European and American states "if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point," said:

Those who think that the United States could enter as an ally into every war in which a friendly republican state on this continent becomes involved, forget that peace is the constant interest and the unwavering policy of the United States. They forget the frequency and variety of wars in which our friends in this hemisphere engage themselves, entirely independent of all control or counsel of the United States. We have no armies for the purpose of aggressive war; no ambition for the character of a regulator. Our constitution is not an imperial one, and does not allow the executive government to engage in war except upon the well considered and deliberate decree of the Congress of the United States. . . . If there is any one characteristic of the United States which is more marked than any other, it is that they have from the time of Washington adhered to the principle of non-intervention, and have perseveringly declined to seek or contract entangling alliances, even with the most friendly states.1

In 1846 we ourselves went to war with Mexico. In 1854 the commander of one of our men-of-war, having failed to obtain from the town of Greytown an indemnity of $24,000 for the seizure and destruction of property, and an apology for an affront to the American minister by some of the inhabitants of the place, bombarded it, and afterwards, "in order to inculcate a lesson never to be forgotten," burned such buildings as were left standing. In 1859 we sent an expedition to obtain redress from Paraguay. In 1890, while the Pan-American Conference was in session, Congress passed an act to authorize the president to use force to collect a claim from Venezuela. In 1892 we sent an ultimatum to Chili, with which she had the wisdom to comply.

The suggestion has been made that it is a violation of the Monroe Doctrine for a European power to employ force against an American republic for the purpose of collecting a

1 Dip. Cor., 1866, part ii, p. 413.

debt or satisfying a pecuniary demand, whatever may have been its origin. As has been seen, there is nothing in President Monroe's declarations even remotely touching this subject; and the examples I have given of the employment of force by the United States as well as by other powers for such objects show that the American republics have not heretofore been supposed to enjoy so desirable an exemption.

But I think I can trace the idea to its origin. In Wharton's International Law Digest, under the section entitled "Monroe Doctrine,' there is the following sentence: "The government of the United States would regard with grave anxiety an attempt on the part of France to force by hostile pressure the payment by Venezuela of her debt to French citizens." The authorities cited for this statement are two alleged manuscript instructions of Mr. Blaine to our minister to France, of July 23 and December 16, 1881. The whole matter is, however, erroneously stated. Both the instructions are published in the volume of Foreign Relations for 1881. They refer, not to "hostile pressure," but to a rumored design on the part of France of "taking forcible possession of some of the harbors and a portion of the territory of Venezuela in compensation for debts due to citizens of the French republic." They nowhere express any "grave anxiety." They do not mention the Monroe Doctrine. They merely argue that such a proceeding as that reported to be in contemplation would be unjust to other creditors of Venezuela, including the United States, since it would deprive them of a part of their security. And they express the "solicitude" of the government of the United States "for the higher object of averting hostilities between two republics for each of which it feels the most sincere and enduring friendship." It is plain that this development of the Monroe Doctrine, based upon the erroneous passage in Wharton's Digest, has no actual foundation whatever.

In April last a great outcry was raised over an alleged violation of the Monroe Doctrine by certain proceedings at Corinto. The facts were that on August 16, 1894, the Nicaraguan commissioner at Bluefields, Señor Madriz, invited a number of

persons, including two citizens of the United States and twelve British subjects, one of whom was the British pro-consul, to call at his office. Each one of the persons so invited laid aside his business and proceeded to the commissioner's office. When they arrived there, they were ushered in, but not into the presence of the commissioner. On the contrary, they were arrested and forcibly deported from the country. No information as to the cause of their arrest was given them. They were denied all opportunity to arrange their business or to visit their families before their forcible expulsion. The two American citizens were in the following October permitted to return to the country under circumstances tending to soothe their feelings. Some of the British subjects were "pardoned," and permitted to return towards the close of December. Among those not "pardoned" was the British pro-consul, Mr. Hatch. For the violent treatment of her consular representative Great Britain exacted a fine of $75,000 as punitive damages or "smart money." The amount of the fine, though large, was not so large as to involve the independence of the country, and its payment did not entail so great a general loss, to say nothing of individual suffering, as would have resulted from the bombardment and destruction of a commercial town. The question of the private losses of her subjects Great Britain offered to leave to arbitration. It is obvious that these proceedings involved neither the Monroe Doctrine nor the Polk Doctrine.

JOHN BASSETT Moore.

THE FRENCH IN MEXICO AND THE MONROE

E

DOCTRINE.

VER since the Spanish yoke had been thrown off, in 1821, Mexico had been constantly subject to revolution and counter-revolution, generally led by some chief of either the Liberal or the Clerical party. In forty years there had been nearly forty revolutions, and over seventy different supreme executives. Government was hardly more than a name. Assaults and murders were frequent in the capital, guerilla warfare was common in the provinces, and banditti infested the highways. Even the British legation had been robbed of about $600,000 in coin. So insufferable had become the outrages upon foreigners that the French and English ministers had loudly protested, and President Buchanan, in his last annual message, had recommended intervention on the part of the United States to obtain indemnity. In 1861 the constitutional president was Benito Juarez. He was a full-blooded Indian, but a man of character, ability and extraordinary attainments. Although Miramon, the leader of the Church party, had been completely defeated and had fled from Mexico, leaving the party without organization, yet it did not cease to plot. Juarez and the Liberals about him had some honest and statesmanlike purposes, but they had not the power to conquer the disorders or to correct the grievances. England, France, Spain and the United States had claims against Mexico amounting to more than eighty million dollars. Mexican finances were in ruins. The annual governmental expenses alone exceeded the revenues by nearly a million dollars. In July, 1861, the Mexican Congress sought temporary relief by passing an act suspending for two years the payment of all foreign debts. This brought matters to a crisis.