but vague and uncertain glimpses-and the description of the moralist, is thus still felt to be beautifully and strictly true, that man is, in all his relations, a being "darkly wise."

The question, then, which next offers itself for our consideration, relates to the wisdom of this appointment ;—and the answer to this question will be found to evolve a very beautiful and instructive view of the plan of Providence.

The answer commonly given to the question is, simply, that a knowledge of futurity, or of the relation in which man stands to the great order of nature around him, instead of being favourable to his happiness or good conduct, would, on the contrary, be attended with very mischievous effects—but this answer, though involving considerations which are strikingly just, must, however, be felt to be but a partial solution of the difficulty, or at least not to point to the exact source of perplexity and doubt.

The true and satisfactory answer, then, is not merely that the desired knowledge would be hurtful, but that it is inconsistent with the progressive condition in which man, as well as all the other parts of nature, are by their very constitution placed that the supposition, in fact, involves a palpable absurdity-or that it supposes the cotem

poraneous existence of two states of mind which are destructive of each other, and altogether inconsis

tent.

The great consideration to be kept in mind is, that as man, and all the parts of nature, are progressive, his condition at any subsequent period of his existence depends essentially, not on his foresight of that condition, but on his due fulfilment of the duties prescribed to him by the circumstances in which he finds himself at the moment which is passing. The affections—the duties—and the comforts of all his relations as a progressive being would thus be destroyed by a clear foresight of what is to come forth-for these affections-and duties-and comforts, are dependent on the very uncertainty of which he sometimes is disposed to complain--and human life, and the whole nature of things, must be changed, if effect were to be given to the presumptuous wish which the folly of man sometimes prompts him to entertain, that the book of fate had been opened for his perusal, and that he could have foreseen the mingled scene of good and of evil which was to make up his portion in life.

Take, for example, the domestic or family relation, which is the foundation of all the others that constitute the beautiful scheme of the moral world. Every person is aware that there are affections-and duties

and comforts, appropriated to that relation, as to all others in which men find themselves-and that these are among the most important and influential which characterize their condition. But how could the affections of that relation have been maintained— affections which depend not simply on instinct, but on the operations of imagination, and of hope darting into the long futurity which opens itself to the mind of the parent, if the vice-and waywardness—and cruelty, or even the bright qualities and happy fates of his offspring, were previously made known to him, and not encompassed with the uncertainty in which they are at present shrouded? On the one hand, all good will towards those who were to try sorely his heart, would be crushed by such knowledge; and, on the other, the pride which would be felt in the coming fates of the good, would give to natural affection a character of extravagance—and would altogether destroy the healthful and useful state in which, by the actual arrangements of Providence, it is commonly found to exist. And then, as to the duties of that relation, how could the watchfulness and care, and the discipline and restraint, which now proceed upon the supposition of the darkness that involves the future fates of the young, have been exercised, if it had been made manifest before hand, that in the

case of some all that care would prove unavailingand, in other cases, that it would be unnecessary, from the bright course which the infant mind was yet to pursue. And, lastly, what comfort would there have been in that relation-if not only the guilt and the shame, but the disease and death had been made apparent, which were, on the one hand, to cover the fates of the disobedient-and, on the other, to scatter the fairest hopes, which, from the beauty of the opening blossoms of life, the parent heart had been disposed to promise to itself and instead of the enjoyment of which, it was doomed to mourn only over early worth prematurely taken away—or lingering disease making home a continued scene of lamentation and mourning.

We may extend the same style of observation to all the other relations which characterise the progressive condition of man in this world-and the remark will force itself with increasing evidence on our minds from all such extension of our view -that any more precise knowledge of the order of nature than man actually possesses would be inconsistent with his very nature, and with the place which he occupies in the Divine scheme-and that the wisdom and beneficence of Providence are nowhere more conspicuously and beautifully manifested, than in the actual arrangements by which the dis

F

tinct view of man is limited to the objects which lie immediately before him—and by his due management of which—but not by his knowledge of what is to come forth-his future condition of happiness and prosperity must be determined.

It will further be made apparent from such consideration of the actual arrangements of Providence, that the error into which man is apt to fall in this respect, originates in his supposing himself to be a stationary being-merely looking at nature and providence as they proceed around him— and not himself a part of that very order—and that in all such misapprehensions, therefore, he commits the grievous error of supposing that, in a scheme which is essentially progressive, one portion of that scheme may become merely a passive spectator of the rest.

And finally, the supposition involves an utter absurdity and impossibility-inasmuch as it supposes the co-existence of two states of mind which are essentially destructive of each other and altogether inconsistent—namely, a clear knowledge of what is to come-with the operation of those cares and labours and affections-which essentially pre-suppose the uncertainty of the result at which they are aiming.

The same train of observation, which we have