and social—as well as to the moral and religious affections of human nature.

But it is notorious-that the change which, in the meantime, has actually occurred, has been the reverse of this-that the improved modes of thought on political subjects have degenerated, or been by some cause or other perverted into extravagancies which the most vulgar imaginations only could have admitted-and that religious belief, instead of being more accommodated to the essential beauty and simplicity of the grounds on which it rests, has reverted into channels, in which it has gathered, with augmented pollution, the most offensive and vulgar of the ideas which prevailed during the most enlightened ages.

This is one of those unexpected turns which human affairs sometimes take, and which, though they do not ultimately affect the movement which is actually in progress, yet often exceedingly perplex the calculations of the wise, and seem to delay for an indefinite period the good that was anticipated.

But there is nothing healthy, or natural, or enduring, in such adverse occurrences—they are not in the prescribed course which the great stream of events is destined to pursue they are therefore properly to be viewed as but side currents, which

will eventually find their way into the grand and progressive movement—and which, indeed, only intimate, that some great reaction will, sooner or later, take place, by the occurrence of which human affairs will be only more forcibly impelled in their just and natural direction.

In proceeding, then, in our character, not of political reformers—but of moralists or speculative reasoners on the progressive destinies of the human family-to state what we consider as changes that are really to be desired for the good, more especially, of the more enlightened and civilized societies of mankind—the great principle which we shall endeavour to carry along with us in our investigations, is, that hitherto mankind have been far more attentive to the mere frame-work of their institutions or to the scaffolding on which their edifices of policy or of belief were to be reared, than to the true materials of the structure itself—that is—to the spirit and meaning, and really useful application of the systems of policy or of thought they have adopted—but to whose improvement and continuance they have often so injudiciously applied themselves.

Not that we would by any means undervalue these frame-works, or assert that they deserve no

care on the part of those who are sincerely interested in the welfare of their species-what we assert is merely, that too exclusive a regard has been paid to these out-works---and that it is desirable that mankind should henceforth learn to consider these things as the mere supports of their systems—and of far less value, consequently, than the principles themselves in their character and applicationswhich they are employed to defend. This general principle we shall accordingly apply to the successive subjects of politics-religion-philosophyliterature-manners-and morals—or at least to so many of them as may be sufficient to shew the meaning and the value of the different style of thought and of conduct we are disposed to recommend-and which we think desirable to be adopted.

Politics. The following is a short statementalmost without illustration-of the principles which we think it desirable that mankind should adopt on this subject.

1. In the first place, that the mere frame-work of government is of far less importance to the welfare and general happiness of a community than has generally been supposed--the very best theoretical system being liable to be deprived of its advantages unless administered in a wise and en

lightened manner-and systems theoretically liable to many objections, having often been found, under the administration of wise and good men, to be productive of all the best blessings which society can desire.

The maxim of the poetical moralist, "whate'er is best administered is best," is so far at least justified by experience and observation—and though we by no means intend to assert that mere forms of government are without their influence on the condition of a community-or are altogether undeserving of their attention-we are yet satisfied that the old contest which has come down to us from ancient times, respecting the best form which society can assume, and which is the first perhaps to be agitated in all times, when the minds of men become bent on bettering their political condition, is less deserving of their care than they have long been disposed to believe, and, at any rate, that their attempts to undo forms to which they have long been accustomed, is one of the most unwise, though it is commonly one of the first of the attempts to which they devote themselves, whenever they are actuated by the desire of giving a better turn to their affairs-or it may be, of relieving themselves of difficulties which they feel to press on them, as members of a community.

More particularly we hold it to be desirable that it should be well understood, that any attempt to give to the great body of the people a direct or generally influential operation on public affairs, must be attended with the most detrimen-tal consequences—and that the more enlightened and liberal and wise the principles entertained by those who have the management of affairs actually are, and the more sincerely they are bent on giving to the community the full advantage of their principles, the more anxiously should they avoid any intermixture of popular prejudices or passions with their designs-the effect of which will assuredly be, either entirely to subvert the principles they support or to give to them a dangerous and altogether unjustifiable character of extravagance and absurdity.

In a word, we consider it desirable that it should be understood, that the influence-the legitimate and useful influence of the people on government -is rather a restraining than a moving influence-and that if, besides this, they are entitled to have some degree of direct influence, it is of infinite moment that measures should be taken to keep that influence within its just limits—and to subject it to such restraints as may render it salutary, and incapable of running into the extravagan