their own interest? Will not they and their friends feel the effects of iniquitous measures? Does the representative remain in office for life? Does he transmit his title of representative to his son? Is he secured from the burden imposed on the community?

will be sufficiently energetic and operative in a small territory, will be feeble when extended over a wide-extended country. The gentleman tells us there are no checks in this plan. What has become of his enthusiastic eulogium on the American spirit? We should find a check and control, when oppressed from that source. In this country, there is no exclusive personal stock of interest. The interest of the commu

To procure their re-election, it will be necessary for them to confer with the people at large, and convince them, that the taxes laid are for their good. If I am able to judge on the sub-nity is blended and inseparably connected with ject, the power of taxation now before us is wisely conceded, and the representatives are wisely elected.

that of the individual. When he promotes his own, he promotes that of the community. When we consult the common good, we con

these, he will find them abundantly here. They are the best checks. What has become of his eulogium on the Virginia constitution? Do the checks in this plan appear less excellent than those of the constitution of Virginia? If the checks in the constitution be compared to the checks in the Virginia constitution, he will find the best security in the former.

The temple of liberty was complete, said he, when the people of England said to their king, that he was their servant. What are we to learn from this? Shall we embrace such a system as that? Is not liberty secure with us, where the people hold all powers in their own hands, and delegate them cautiously, for short periods, to their servants, who are accountable for the smallest mal-administration? Where is the nation that can boast greater security than we do? We want only a system like the paper before you, to strengthen and perpetuate this security.

The honorable gentleman said that a govern-sult our own. When he desires such checks as ment should ever depend on the affections of the people. It must be so. It is the best support it can have. This government merits the confidence of the people, and, I make no doubt, will have it. Then he informed us again of the disposition of Spain with respect to the Mississippi, and the conduct of the government with regard to it. To the debility of the confederation alone may justly be imputed every cause of complaint on this subject. Whenever gentlemen will bring forward their objections, I trust we can prove that no danger to the navigation of that river can arise from the adoption of this constitution. I beg those gentlemen that may be affected by it, to suspend their judgment till they hear it discussed. Will, says he, the adoption of this constitution pay our debts? It will compel the States to pay their quotas. Without this, Virginia will be unable to pay. Unless all the States pay, she cannot. Though the States will not coin money, (as we are told,) yet this government will bring The honorable gentleman has asked if there forth and proportion all the strength of the be any safety or freedom, when we give away Union. That economy and industry are essen- the sword and the purse. Shall the people at tial to our happiness, will be denied by no man. large hold the sword and the purse without the But the present government will not add to our interposition of their representatives? Can the industry. It takes away the incitements to in- whole aggregate community act personally? dustry, by rendering property insecure and un-I apprehend that every gentleman will see the protected. It is the paper on your table that will promote and encourage industry. New Hampshire and Rhode Island have rejected it, he tells us. New Hampshire, if my information be right, will certainly adopt it. The report spread in this country, of which I have heard, is, that the representatives of that State having, on meeting, found they were instructed to vote against it, returned to their constituents without determining the question, to convince them of their being mistaken, and of the propriety of adopting it.

impossibility of this. Must they, then, not trust them to others? To whom are they to trust them, but to their representatives, who are accountable for their conduct? He represents secrecy as unnecessary, and produces the British government as a proof of its inutility. Is there no secrecy there? When deliberating on the propriety of declaring war, or on military arrangements, do they deliberate in the open fields? No, sir. The British government affords secrecy when necessary, and so ought every government. In this plan, secrecy is The extent of the country is urged as another only used when it would be fatal and pernicious objection, as being too great for a republican to publish the schemes of government. We government. This objection has been handed are threatened with the loss of our liberties by from author to author, and has been certainly the possible abuse of power, notwithstanding misunderstood and misapplied. To what does the maxim, that those who give may take away. it owe its source? To observations and criti-It is the people that give power, and can take cisms on governments, where representation it back. What shall restrain them? They are did not exist. As to the legislative power, was the masters who give it, and of whom their it ever supposed inadequate to any extent? servants hold it. Extent of country may render it difficult to execute the laws, but not to legislate. Extent of country does not extend the power. What

He then argues against the system, because it does not resemble the British government in this that the same power that declares war has

be urged against it. Do they not hold out one lesson very useful to us? However unlike in other respects they resemble it in its total inefficacy. They warn us to shun their calamities, and place in our government those necessary powers, the want of which destroyed them. I hope we shall avail ourselves of their misfortunes, without experiencing them. There was something peculiar in one observation he made. He said that those who governed the cantons of Switzerland were purchased by foreign powers, which was the cause of their uneasiness and trouble. How does this apply to us? If we adopt such a government as theirs, will it not be subject to the same inconvenience? Will not the same cause produce the same effect? What shall protect us from it? What is our security?

He then proceeded to say, the causes of war are removed from us; that we are separated by the sea from the powers of Europe, and need not be alarmed. Sir, the sea makes them neighbors to us. Though an immense ocean divides us, we may speedily see them with us. What dangers may we not apprehend to our

not the means of carrying it on. Are the people | reasons which applied against them, could not of England more secure, if the Commons have no voice in declaring war? or are we less secure by having the Senate joined with the President? It is an absurdity, says the worthy member, that the same man should obey two masters, that the same collector should gather taxes for the general government and the State legislature. Are they not both the servants of the people? Are not Congress and the State legislature the agents of the people, and are they not to consult the good of the people? May not this be effected by giving the same officer the collection of both taxes? He tells you that it is an absurdity to adopt before you amend. Is the object of your adoption to amend solely? The objects of your adoption are union, safety against foreign enemies, and protection against faction-against what has been the destruction of all republics. These impel you to its adoption. If you adopt it, what shall restrain you from amending it, if, in trying it, amendments shall be found necessary? The government is not supported by force, but depending on our free will. When experience shall show us any inconveniences, we can then correct it. But until we have experience on the subject, amend-commerce! Does not our naval weakness inments as well as the constitution itself, are to try. Let us try it, and keep our hands free to change it when necessary. If it be necessary to change government, let us change that government which has been found to be defective. The difficulty we find in amending the confederation will not be found in amending this constitution. Any amendments, in the system before you, will not go to a radical change; a plain way is pointed out for the purpose. Áll will be interested to change it, and therefore all exert themselves in getting the change. There is such a diversity of sentiment in human minds, that it is impossible we shall ever concur in one system till we try it. The power given to the general government over the time, place, and manner of election, is also strongly objected to. When we come to that clause, we can prove it is highly necessary, and not dangerous. The worthy member has concluded his observations by many eulogiums on the British constitution. It matters not to us whether it be a wise one or not. I think that, for America at least, the government on your table is very much superior to it. I ask you if your House of Representatives would be better than it is, if a hundredth part of the people were to elect a majority of them. If your Senators were for life, would they be more agreeable to you? If your President were not accountable to you for his conduct,—if it were a constitu- | tional maxim, that he could do no wrong,would you be safer than you are now? If you can answer, Yes, to these questions, then adopt the British constitution. If not, then, good as that government may be, this is better. The worthy gentleman who was last up, said the confederacies of ancient and modern times were not similar to ours, and that consequently

vite an attack on our commerce? May not the Algerines seize our vessels? Cannot they and every other predatory or maritime nation, pillage our ships and destroy our commerce, without subjecting themselves to any inconvenience? He would, he said, give the general government all necessary powers. If any thing be necessary, it must be so to call forth the strength of the Union when we may be attacked, or when the general purposes of America require it. The worthy gentleman then proceeded to show that our present exigencies are greater than they will ever be again.

Who can penetrate into futurity? How can any man pretend to say that our future exigencies will be less than our present? The exigencies of nations have been generally commensurate to their resources. It would be the utmost impolicy to trust to a mere possibility of not being attacked, or obliged to exert the strength of the community. He then spoke of a selection of particular objects by Congress, which he says must necessarily be oppressive; that Congress, for instance, might select taxes, and that all but landholders would escape. Cannot Congress regulate the taxes so as to be equal on all parts of the community? Where is the absurdity of having thirteen revenues? Will they clash with, or injure, each other? If not, why cannot Congress make thirteen distinct laws, and impose the taxes on the general objects of taxation in each State, so as that all persons of the society shall pay equally, as they ought?

He then told you that your continental government will call forth the virtue and talents of America. This being the case, will they encroach on the power of the State governments? Will our most virtuous and able citi

zens wantonly attempt to destroy the liberty of the people? Will the most virtuous act the most wickedly? I differ in opinion from the worthy gentleman. I think the virtue and talents of the members of the general govern-dependent in their office, will never countement will tend to the security, instead of the destruction, of our liberty. I think that the power of direct taxation is essential to the existence of the general government, and that it is safe to grant it. If this power be not necessary, and as safe from abuse as any delegated power can possibly be, then I say that the plan before you is unnecessary; for it imports not what system we have, unless it have the power of protecting us in time of peace and war.

mined. If some of these suits be carried to | cases. The contrary is well known to you, Mr. other courts, will it be wrong? They will still | Chairman, to be the case in this commonwealth. have business enough. Then there is no danger that particular subjects, small in proportion, being taken out of the jurisdiction of the State judiciaries, will render them useless and of no effect. Does the gentleman think that the State courts will have no cognizance of cases not mentioned here? Are there any words in this constitution which exclude the courts of the States from those cases which they now possess? Does the gentleman imagine this to be the case? Will any gentleman believe it? Are not controversies respecting lands, claimed under the grants of different States, the only controversies between citizens of the same State, which the federal judiciary can take cognizance of? The case is so clear, that to prove it would be an useless waste of time. The State courts will not lose the jurisdiction of the causes they now decide. They have a concurrence of jurisdiction with the federal courts in those cases in which the latter have cognizance.

How disgraceful is it that the State courts cannot be trusted, says the honorable gentleman. What is the language of the constitution? Does it take away their jurisdiction? Is it not necessary that the federal courts should have cognizance of cases arising under the constitution and the laws of the United States? What is the service or purpose of a judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable, orderly manner, without shedding blood, or creating a contest, or availing yourselves of force? If this be the case, where can its jurisdiction be more necessary than here?

With respect to mills, roads, and other cases, appeals lie from the inferior to the superior court, as to fact, as well as law. Is it clear that there can be no case in common law, in which an appeal as to fact might be proper and necessary? Can you not conceive a case where it would be productive of advantages to the people at large, to submit to that tribunal the final determination, involving facts as well as law? Suppose it should be deemed for the convenience of the citizens, that those things which concerned foreign ministers, should be tried in the inferior courts: if justice should be done, the decision would satisfy all. But if an appeal in matters of fact could not be carried to the superior court, then it would result, that such cases could not be tried before the inferior courts, for fear of injurious and partial decisions.

But, sir, where is the necessity of discriminating between the three cases of chancery, admiralty, and common law? Why not leave it to Congress? Will it enlarge their powers? Is it necessary for them wantonly to infringe your rights? Have you any thing to apprehend, when they can, in no case, abuse their power without rendering themselves hateful to the people at large? When this is the case, something may be left to the legislature, freely chosen by ourselves, from among ourselves, who are to share the burdens imposed upon the community, and who can be changed at our pleasure. Where power may be trusted, and there is no motive to abuse it, it seems to me to be as well to leave it undetermined, as to fix it in the constitution.

To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the constitution, if you will not give the power to the judiciary? With respect to disputes between a State and There is no other body that can afford such a the citizens of another State, its jurisdiction has protection. But the honorable member objects been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope to it, because, says he, the officers of the gov- no gentleman will think that a State will be ernment will be screened from merited punish- | called at the bar of the federal court. Is there ment by the federal judiciary. The federal no such case at present? Are there not many sheriff, says he, will go into a poor man's house cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a and beat him, or abuse his family, and the fed-party, and yet the State is not sued? It is not eral court will protect him. Does any gentle-rational to suppose, that the sovereign power man believe this? Is it necessary that the shall be dragged before a court. The intent is, officers will commit a trespass on the property to enable States to recover claims of individuals or persons of those with whom they are to residing in other States. I contend this contransact business? Will such great insults on struction is warranted by the words. But, say the people of this country be allowable? Were they, there will be partiality in it, if a State a law made to authorize them, it would be void. cannot be defendant—if an individual cannot The injured man would trust to a tribunal in proceed to obtain judgment against a State, his neighborhood. To such a tribunal he would though he may be sued by a State. It is necesapply for redress, and get it. There is no rea- sary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a son to fear that he would not meet that justice difficulty in making a State defendant, which there, which his country will be ever willing does not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be to maintain. But on appeal, says the honorable only what cannot be avoided, why object to the gentleman, what chance is there to obtain jus-system on that account? If an individual has tice? This is founded on an idea, that they will not be impartial. There is no clause in the constitution, which bars the individual member injured, from applying to the State courts to give him redress. He says, that there is no instance of appeals as to fact in common law VOL. II.-2

a just claim against any particular State, is it to be presumed, that on application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction? But how could a State recover any claim from a citizen of another State, without the establishment of these tribunals.

He objects, in the next place, to its jurisdiction in controversies between a State and a foreign state. Suppose, says he, in such a suit, a foreign state is cast, will she be bound by the decision? If a foreign state brought a suit against the commonwealth of Virginia, would she not be barred from the claim if the federal judiciary thought it unjust? The previous consent of the parties is necessary; and, as a federal judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce. It will be the means of preventing disputes with foreign nations. On an attentive consideration of these courts, I trust every part will appear satisfactory to the committee.

The honorable member objects to suits being | justice. But the court of chancery grants instituted in the federal courts by the citizens relief. Would it not be so in the federal court? of one State against the citizens of another Would not depositions be taken to prove the State. Were I to contend, that this was neces- payments, and if proved, would not the decision sary in all cases, and that the government with- of the court be accordingly? out it would be defective, I should not use my own judgment. But are not the objections to it carried too far? Though it may not in general, be absolutely necessary, a case may happen, as has been observed, in which a citizen of one State ought to be able to recur to this tribunal, to recover a claim from the citizen of another State. What is the evil which this can produce? Will he get more than justice there? The independence of the judges forbids it. What has he to get? Justice. Shall we object to this, because the citizen of another State can obtain justice without applying to our State courts? It may be necessary with respect to the laws and regulations of commerce, which Congress may make. It may be necessary in cases of debt, and some other controversies. In claims for land it is not necessary, but it is not dangerous. In the court of which State will it be instituted said the honorable gentleman. It will be instituted in the court of the State where the defendant resides, where the law can come at him, and nowhere else. By the laws of which State will it be determined-said he. By the laws of the State where the contract was made. According to those laws, and those only, can it be decided. Is this a novelty? No, it is a principle in the jurisprudence of this commonwealth. If a man contracted a debt in the East Indies, and it was sued for here, the decision must be consonant to the laws of that country. Suppose a contract made in Maryland, where the annual interest is at six per centum, and a suit instituted for it in Virginia, what interest would be given now, without any federal aid? The interest of Maryland, most certainly, and if the contract had been made in Virginia, and suit brought in Maryland, the interest of Virginia must be given without doubt. It is now to be governed by the laws of that State where the contract was made. The laws which governed the contract at its formation, govern it in its decision. To preserve the peace of the Union only, its jurisdiction in this case ought to be recurred to. Let us consider, that when citizens of one State carry on trade in another State, much must be due to the one from the other, as the case between North Carolina and Virginia. Would not the refusal of justice to our citizens, from the courts of North Carolina, produce disputes between the States? Would the federal judiciary swerve from their duty, in order to give partial and unjust decisions?

The objection respecting the assignment of a bond to a citizen of another State, has been fully answered. But suppose it were to be tried as he says, what would be given more than was actually due in the case he mentioned? It is possible, in our courts as they now stand, to obtain a judgment for more than

The exclusion of trial by jury in this case, he urged, would prostrate our rights. Does the word court only mean the judges? Does not the determination of a jury, necessarily lead to the judgment of the court? Is there any thing here which gives the judges exclusive jurisdiction of matters of fact? What is the object of a jury trial? To inform the court of the facts. When a court has cognizance of facts, does it not follow, that they can make inquiry by a jury? It is impossible to be otherwise. I hope that in this country, where impartiality is so much admired, the laws will direct facts to be ascertained by a jury. But, says the honorable gentleman, the juries in the ten miles square will be mere tools of parties, with which he would not trust his person or property, which, he says, he would rather leave to the court. Because the government may have a district ten miles square, will no man stay there but the tools and officers of the government? Will nobody else be found there? Is it so in any other part of the world, where a government has legislative power? Are there none but officers and tools of the government of Virginia in Richmond? Will there not be independent merchants, and respectable gentlemen of fortune, within the ten miles square? Will there not be worthy farmers and mechanics? Will not a good jury be found there as well as any where else? Will the officers of the government become improper to be on a jury? What is it to the government, whether this man or that man succeeds? It is all one thing. Does the constitution say, that juries shall consist of officers, or that the supreme court shall be held in the ten miles square? It was acknowledged by the honorable member, that it was secure in England. What makes it secure there? Is it their constitution? What part of their constitution is there, that the parliament cannot change? As the preservation of this right is in the hands of parliament, and it has ever been held sacred by them, will the government of America be less honest than that of Great Britain? Here a restriction is to be found. The jury is not to be brought out of