perceive, is Pig Point, upon which the rebels have erected batteries, which they are striving now to finish, mounting seven guns, thirty-twos and forty-fours. If we were in possession of Pig Point, the James and Nansemond would be both under our control, and the services of our blockading vessels might be dispensed with, which are now required to prevent water communication between Richmond and Williamsburgh, and between Norfolk and Suffolk. My proposition is, therefore, to make a combined land and naval attack upon Pig Point, and endeavor to carry the batteries, both by turning them, and by direct attack upon the naval force. If we succeed, then to intrench ourselves there with what speed we may, and re-establish the battery. But, at the same time, to push on, with the same flotilla of boats with which we landed, up the Nansemond, which is navigable for boats, and, I believe, lightdraight steamers, to Suffolk, a distance of twelve miles. When once there, the commanding general's familiarity with the country" (his native region), "or a glance at the map, will show that we are in possession of all the railroad communication between Richmond, Petersburgh and Norfolk, and also of the great shore line connecting Virginia with North Carolina, via Weldon, by which the guns taken at the navy yard will be sent south, whenever operations in that direction demand.

"By going eight and a half miles further by the Jericho Canal, we enter Drummond Lake, a sheet of water some six miles by four. From this lake the feeders of the Dismal Swamp Canal may be cut, and that means of transport cut off. Once at Suffolk, with three lines of the enemy's communication cut off, Norfolk must fall with her own weight. Starvation, to be brought on simply by gathering up the provisions of Princess Anne County, will make her batteries and the theft of the navy yard guns substantially valueless, and will save many lives which would be otherwise spent in their reduction.

"I am not insensible to the disadvantages and difficulties of the project, the advantages of which I may have painted with too much couleur de rose.

"I do not recognize as among the most formidable the reduction of Pig Point battery, as there is plenty of depth of water within point-blank range, to float the Cumberland; but the battery once reduced, there must be a pretty active march on Suffolk to prevent

troublesome fortifications there, which I believe have not yet been undertaken

"If I am right in the importance which I attach to this position, then I must expect all the force of the rebels, both from Norfolk and Richmond, brought thither by railroad, to be precipitated upon me, and be prepared to meet it in the open field. Could they do otherwise? Norfolk would be hemmed in. Am I able to withstand such an attack, between two forces which may act in conjunction, with the necessary drafts from my forces to keep open the line of communication by the Nansemond with Newport News, which would then be the right flank of my base of operations? All these questions, much more readily comprehended by the general-in-chief than by myself, with the thousand suggestions that will at once present themselves to his mind, are most respectfully submitted.

"May I ask for full and explicit instructions upon the matter?" This was the scheme. It meant, Begin the war HERE. Strike at Richmond from this point. Sever Virginia from the South, by darting hence upon her railroad centers. Make war where your navy can co-operate. Use the means which God and nature have given you, and which Colonel Dimmick preserved. DON'T sit there in Washington, puttering upon forts and defenses, listening anxiously to the roar from the North, "On to Richmond;" but give the enemy something to do elsewhere, far away from your capital and your sacred things, yet made near to you by your command of the

sea.

General Butler's plans might not have been completely successful; but if they had been adopted we should have had no Bull Run; and, perhaps, no Merrimac-the true cause of the failure of the peninsular campaign. Other disasters we might have suffered, but surely nothing so bad as Bull Run and the Merrimac, the most costly calamities that ever befell a country.

The reply to General Butler's eager dispatches present to us a curious study. The reader must make what he can of it. Date, June 10th:

"Sir,-Your letters of the 1st and 6th instant are received. The general-in-chief desires me to say in reply, that he highly commends your zeal and activity, which oblige the enemy to strengther. his camps and posts in your vicinity, and hold him constantly on

the alert. The principal value of your movement upon Suffolk is, that it would be the easiest route to the Gosport Navy Yard, and the objects (including many ships of war) which our people on the former occasion left undestroyed. The possession of Norfolk in itself is of no importance whilst we blockade Hampton Roads; but the destruction of the railroads leading from that city, as far as you may find it practicable, would be a valuable coercive measure. The naval commander should aid you in the collection of boats, and the secretary of war has said that he would cause some eighty horses to be bought and shipped to you for a light battery."

These were the "full and explicit instructions" for which General Butler had written. He must have been puzzled to decide whether the letter was designed to sanction or discourage his enterprise. Nor was it easy to see what the naval commander could do in the way of providing the requisite number of boats. If, however, the words of the commander-in-chief were equivocal, his conduct was not. No horses were sent, nor battery of field artillery, nor vehicles, nor cavalry, nor boats. No objection to the railroad, the artesian well, the bake-house, the intrenched camps; but whatever was needful for an advance beyond half a day's march was withheld. Such was the scarcity of horses that the troops were constantly seen drawing wagon loads of supplies. A reporter writes: "A picture in the drama of the camp has this moment passed my quarters. It is a gang of the Massachusetts boys hauling a huge military wagon, loaded. They have struck up 'The Red, White and Blue.' They believe in it, and consequently render it with true patriotic inspiration. They pause and give three rousing cheers; and now they dash off like firemen, which they are, shouting and thundering along at a pace that makes the drowsy horses they pass prick up their ears." To supply the most pressing occasions, General Butler had nine horses of his own brought from Lowell, and these were all he had for the public service for more than two months. Another reporter writes, June 28th: "Among the passengers on board the steamer to the fortress was Colonel Butler, brother of the general, who went to Washington last week to get orders for. the purchase of horses, without which not a single step can be made in advance, simply because the forces here are entirely destitute of the means of transportation. He got orders and succeeded in buying one hundred and thirty-five very good horses, mainly in Baltimore,

whereupon the government immediately sent up and took one hundred of them for the artillery service at Washington. This was pretty sharp practice, and gives rise to comment on the inability of the authorities at the capital to see anything but Washington worthy of a moment's thought in connection with the present war." The state of things certainly gave rise to comment, as the replies of official persons in Washington to General Butler's solicitations, abundantly show. One gentleman, who was necessarily acquainted with all that was going on at the seat of government, expressed himself with remarkable freedom in a letter to our general.

June 8th, "I received your letter and dispatch, and, contrary to your orders, I read both to the president, under the seal of confidence, however. I have told him that would never let you

have any troops to make any great blow, and I read the dispatch to show that I understood my man. He intended to treat you as he did, and as he has always treated those whom he knew would be effective if he gave them the means, retaining everything in his own power and under his own immediate control, so as to monopolize all the reputation to be made.

"I have been a little afraid lest you might attempt more than your means justified, under the impression that you would otherwise disappoint the country. But I am pleased to see that you have not made this mistake. You must work on patiently till you feel yourself able to do the work you attempt, and not play into your enemies' hands, or those of the miserable do-nothings here, by attempting more than in your cool judgment the force you have can effect. You will gradually get the means, and then you may make an effective blow. Unfortunately, indeed, the difficulties increase as your force increases, if not more rapidly. We have forty thousand men, I believe, and provisions and transportation enough to take them to Richmond any day, and yet our lines do not extend five miles into Virginia, where there are not, in my opinion, men enough to oppose the march of half the number to Richmond. Old with 20,000 men, and is moving as cautiously toward the Potomac as if the banks were commanded by an army of Bonaparte's best legions, instead of a mob, composed for the most part of men who only wait for an opportunity to desert a flag they detest. This war will last for ever if something does not happen to unseat old in the West, with 60,000 men under

is at

canvas, has not made a movement except let a few regiments march up the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, at the urgent solicitations of the people. So we go. Congress will probably catch us without our having performed any service worthy of the great force we have under pay."

"I grumble this way all the time, and to every body, in the hope that I may contribute to push on the column. I am very much in hopes we shall be pushed into action by the indignation of the people, if not by our own sense of what is due to the cause we have taken in hand."

CHAPTER VII.

GREAT BETHEL.

WHEN this letter reached the fortress, General Butler was immersed in the last details of a movement, the result of which was to show him, and show the country, that sitting in an office arranging a masterly plan of action is one thing, and the successful execution of the same is another. His correspondent read the answer to his letter in the newspapers; first with exultation, then with bewilderment, lastly with dismay. For the news of Great Bethel came to us as so much of the news of the war has come; first, in enormous flattering lies; secondly, in exaggerated contradictory rumors of disaster; finally, and gradually, in a dim resemblance to the truth.

"Severe engagement near Fortress Monroe-Two hours' fight at Big Bethel-Terrible mistake of the Seventh and Third regiments-Masked batteries of Rifled Cannon open on our troopsTwenty-five killed, and one hundred wounded-Withdrawal from the Field-Renewal of the Battle by General Butler-The Rebel Batteries Captured, and One Thousand Prisoners taken." Thus was the disaster first Heralded. Then came news, that our unfortunate regiments had been hurled upon a battery armed with thirty pieces of rifled cannon, protected in front by an impassable creek, from which, after standing "a terrific fire" for an hour and a half, they had recoued, with a loss, variously stated, from twenty