inal suit in this court, and this is the only privilege, if the right be established, which the State of Pennsylvania can claim in the present case." * * * In regard to the facts it was said: "And this injury is of a character for which an action at law could afford no adequate redress. It is of daily occurrence, and would require numerous, if not daily, prosecutions for the wrong done; and from the nature of that wrong, the compensation could not be measured or ascertained with any degree of precision. The effect would be, if not to reduce the tolls on these lines of transportation, to prevent their increase with the increasing business of the country. In no case could a remedy be more hopeless than an action at common law. The structure complained of is permanent, and so are the public works sought to be protected. The injury, if there be one, is as permanent as the works from which it proceeds, and as are the works affected by it. And whatever injury there may now be, will become greater in proportion to the increase of population and the commercial development of the country. And in a country like this, where there would seem to be no limit to its progress, the injury complained of would be far greater in its effects than under less prosperous circumstances." The law upon the subject is learnedly and ably examined. The objections were overruled. Considerations of fact, of the same character with those adverted to, exist in the case before us, and the reasoning and conclusions there are alike applicable in both cases. Whatever might be our views upon the legal proposition, in the absence of this adjudication, we are, as we think, concluded by it. It is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently, as that it should be settled correctly. Its rules should be fixed deliberately and adhered to firmly, unless clearly erroneous. Vacillation is a serious evil Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incertum. This brings us to the examination of the merits of the case. ing to its provisions to engage in the coasting trade. Commerce includes navigation. The power toregulate commerce comprehends the crontrol, for that purpose and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1: Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C., 378. This necessarily includes the power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their navigation, interposed by the States or otherwise; to remove such obstructions when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil and for the punishment of offenders. For these purposes, Congress possesses all the powers which existed in the States before the adoption of the National Constitution, and which have always existed in the Parliament in England. It is for Congress to determine when its full power shall be brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanctions which shall be provided. U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M., 420,421; U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet., 72; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet., 102, 155. A license, under the Act of 1793, to engage in the coasting trade, carries with it right and authority. "Commerce among the States" does not stop at a state line. Coming from abroad it penetrates wherever it can find navigable waters reaching from without into the interior, and may follow them up as far as navigation is practicable. Wherever "commerce among the States" goes, the power of the nation, as represented in this court, goes with it to protect and enforce its rights. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1; Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow., 713. There can be no doubt that the coasting trade may be carried on beyond where the bridge in question is to be built. We will now turn our attention to the rights and powers of the States which are to be con The defendants assert that the Act of the Leg-sidered. islature, under which they are proceeding, justifies the building of the bridge. The complainants insist that such an obstruction to the navigation of the river is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, touching the subject of commerce. These provisions of the Constitution bear upon the subject: * "Congress shall have power * to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers." This Constitution, and the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, * shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding." * * "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The Act of the 18th of February. 1793, authorizes vessels enrolled and licensed accord The The National Government possesses no powers but such as have been delegated to it. States have all but such as they have surrendered. The power to authorize the building of bridges is not to be found in the Federal Constitution. It has not been taken from the States. It must reside somewhere. They had it before the Constitution was adopted, and they have it still. "When the Revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soil under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the General Government." Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet., 410. In Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How., 230, this court said: "The right of eminent domain over the shores and the soil under the navigable waters, for all municipal puposes, belongs exclusively to the States within their respective territorial jurisdictions; and they, and they only, have the constitutional power to exercise it. But in the hands of the States this power can never be used so as to affect the exercise * * * of any national right of eminent domain or In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 203, it is said: The power to regulate commerce covers a wide field, and embraces a great variety of subjects. Some of these subjects call for uniform rules and national legislation; others can be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different localities, and limited in their operation to such localities respectively. To this extent the power to regulate commerce may be exercised by the States. Whether the power in any given case is vested exclusively in the General Government depends upon the nature of the subject to be regulated. Pilot laws are regulations of commerce; but if a State enacts them in good faith, and not covertly for another purpose, they are not in conflict with the power to regulate commerce committed to Congress by the Constitution. Cooley v. The Wardens, etc., 12 How., 319. rolled and licensed under the laws of the United States, broke and injured the dam. The company brought an action of trespass against him in the Supreme Court of Delaware. The defendant pleaded that the place where the trespass was committed was "a public and common navigable creek, in the nature of a highway, in which the tides had always flowed and reflowed; and that all the citizens of the United States had a right, with sloops, and other vessels, to navigate and pass over the same at all times at their pleasure," &c., and therefore, &c. The plaintiffs demurred. The Supreme Court sustained the demurrer and gave judg ment in their favor. The Court of Appeals of that State affirmed the judgment. The case was brought into this court by a writ of error. In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Marshall said: "But the measure authorized by this Act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it; but this abridgment, unless it comes in conflict with the Constitution or a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens, of which this court can take no cognizance. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error insist that it comes in conflict with the power of the United States 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.'' He remarked that if "Congress had passed any law which bore upon the subject the court would not feel much difficulty in saying that a state law coming in conflict with such an Act, would be void;" and added, in conclusion: commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.' "But Congress has passed no such Act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with forIn The Wheeling Bridge case this court placed ein nations and among the several States; a its judgment upon the ground that "Congress power which has not been so exercised as to had acted upon the subject, and had regulated affect the question. We do not think that the commerce on the Ohio River, and had thereby Act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh secured to the public, by virtue of its authority, Company to place a dam across the creek can, the free and unobstructed use of the same, and under all the circumstances of the case, be conthat the erection of the bridge, so far as it inter-sidered as repugnant to the power to regulate fered with the enjoyment of this use, was inconsistent with and in violation of the Acts of Congress, and destructive of the right derived under them; and that, to the extent of this interference with the free navigation of the Ohio River, the Act of the Legislature of Virginia afforded no authority or justification. It was in conflict with the Acts of Congress, which were the paramount law. 18 How., 430. [59 U. S., XV, 437]. The most important authority in its application to the case before us, is Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet., 250. Black Bird Creek extends from the Delaware River into the interior of the State of Delaware. The Legislature of the State passed an Act whereby the company were "Authorized and empowered to make and construct a good and sufficient dam across said creek, at such place as the managers or a majority of them shall find to be most suitable for the purpose," &c. The company proceeded to erect a dam, whereby the navigation of the creek was obstructed. The defendant, being the owner of a sloop of nearly a hundred tons, regularly en This opinion came from the same "expounder of the Constitution” who delivered the earlier and more elaborate judgment in Gibbons v. Ogden. We are not aware that the soundness of the principle upon which the court proceeded has been questioned in any later case. We can see no difference in principle between that case and the one before us. Both streams are affluents of the same large river. Each is entirely within the State which authorized the obstruction. The dissimilarities are in facts which do not affect the legal question. Black Bird Creek is the less important water, but it had been navigable, and the obstruction was complete. If the Schuylkill is larger and its commerce greater, on the other hand, the obstruction will be only partial and the public convenience, to be promoted, is more imperative. In neither case is a law of Congress, forbidding the obstruction, an element to be considered. The point that the vessel was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade was relied upon in that case by the counsel for the defendant. The court was silent upon the subject. A distinct denial of its materiality would not have been more significant. It seems to have been deemed of too little consequence to require notice. Without overruling the authority of that adjudication, we cannot, by our judgment, annul the law of Pennsylvania. It must not be forgotten that bridges, which are connecting parts of turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are means of commercial transportation, as well as navigable waters, and that the commerce which passes over a bridge may be much greater than would ever be transported on the water it obstructs. It is for the municipal power to weigh the considerations which belong to the subject, and to decide which shall be preferred, and how far either shall be made subservient to the other. The States have always exercised this power, and from the nature and objects of the two systems of government, they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in all cases, to the paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the States shall be exerted within the sphere of the commercial power which belongs to the nation. The States may exercise concurrent or independent power in all cases but three: 1. Where the power is lodged exclusively in the Federal Constitution. 2. Where it is given to the United States and prohibited to the States. 3. Where, from the nature and subjects of the power, it must necessarily be exercised by the National Government exclusively. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat., 49. The power here in question does not, in our judgment, fall within either of these exceptions. "It is no objection to distinct substantive powers, that they may be exercised upon the same subject." It is not possible to fix definitely their respective boundaries. In some, instances their action becomes blended; in some the action of the State limits or displaces the action of the nation; in others, the action of the State is void, because it seeks to reach objects beyond the limits of state authority. A state law, requiring an importer to pay for and take out a license before he should be permitted to sell a bale of imported goods is void (Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419), and a state law, which requires the master of a vessel engaged in foreign commerce, to pay a certain sum to a state officer on account of each passenger brought from a foreign country into the State, is also void. Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283. But, a State, in the exercise of its police power, may forbid spirituous liquor imported from abroad, or from another State, to be sold by retail, or to be sold at all, without a license; and it may visit the violation of the prohibition with such punishment as it may deem proper. License Cases, 5 How., 504. Under quarantine laws, a vessel registered, or enrolled and licensed, may be stopped before entering her port of destination, or be after wards removed and detained elsewhere, for an indefinite period; and a bale of goods, upon which the duties have or have not been paid, laden with infection, may be seized under "health laws," and if it cannot be purged of its poison, may be committed to the flames. The inconsistency between the powers of the States and the Nation, as thus exhibited, is quite as great as in the case before us; but it does not necessarily involve collision or any other evil. None has hitherto been found to ensue. The public good is the end and aim of both. If it be objected, that the conclusion we have reached will arm the States with authority potent for evil, and liable to be abused, there are several answers worthy of consideration. The possible abuse of any power is no proof that it does not exist. Many abuses may arise in the legislation of the States which are wholly beyond the reach of the government of the Nation. The safeguard and remedy are to be found in the virtue and intelligence of the people. They can make and unmake constitutions and laws; and from that tribunal there is no appeal. If a State exercise unwisely the power here in question, the evil consequences will fall chiefly upon her own citizens. They have more at stake than the citizens of any other State. Hence, there is as little danger of the abuse of this power as of any other reserved to the States. Whenever it shall be exercised openly or covertly for a purpose in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States, it will be within the power, and it will be the duty of this court to interpose with a vigor adequate to the correction of the evil. In the Pilot case, the dissenting judge drew an alarming picture of the evils to rush in at the breach made, as he alleged, in the Constitution. None have appeared. The stream of events has since flowed on without a ripple due to the influence of that adjudication. Lastly, Congress may interpose, whenever it shall be deemed necessary, by general or special laws. It may regulate all bridges over navigable waters, remove offending bridges, and punish those who shall thereafter erect them. Within the sphere of their authority both the legislative and judicial power of the Nation are supreme. A different doctrine find no warrant in the Constitution, and is abnormal and revolutionary. Since the adoption of the Constitution there has been but one instance of such legislative interposition; that was to save, and not to destroy. The Wheeling bridge was legalized, and a decree of this court was, in effect, annulled by an Act of Congress. The validity of the Act, under the power to regulate commerce," was distinctly recognized by this court in that case. This is, also, the only instance, occurring within the same period, in which the case has been deemed a proper one for the exercise, by this court, of its remedial power. The defendants are proceeding in no wanton or aggressive spirit. The authority upon which they rely was given, and afterwards deliberately renewed, by the State. The case stands before us as if the parties were the State of Pennsylvania and the United States. The river, being wholly within her limits, we cannot say the State has exceeded the bounds of her authority. Until the dormant power of the Constitution is awakened and made effective, by appropriate legislation, the reserved power of the State is plenary, and its exercise in good faith cannot be made the subject of review by this court. It is not denied that the defendants are justified if the law is valid. We find nothing in the record which would warrant us in disturbing the decree of the Circuit | charge that it will hinder and obstruct licenses Court, which is, therefore, affirmed, with costs. Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting: granted under the Enrollment Act; and that it will hinder and obstruct the subjects of foreign countries in the exercise of their rights of com. merce and navigation; and that it will interrupt, diminish, and greatly tend to destroy the trade, commerce and business of the citizens upon the river, to the great damage and common nuisance of all the citizens of the United States, and their irreparable injury. I concur in many of the views expressed by the majority of the court in the introductory part of the opinion which has just been read; and if the decree of the court had been such as the propositions there laid down would seem to demand, I might have felt justified in remaining silent as to certain other propositions advanced in the concluding part of the opinion, which appear to be of an inconsistent charac-izens of the United States in the construction ter, and to which I can never assent. Such, however, is not the fact. On the contrary, the order of the court is, that the decree entered in the court below, dismissing the bill of complaint, be affirmed; and it must be understood that the majority of the court, in directing that decree, adopt the views expressed in the concluding part of the opinion, else they never could have agreed to that result. Regarding the matter in that light, it seems to be an obvious duty that I should express my dissent from the decree of the court, and briefly assign the reasons why I cannot concur in the conclusion to which the majority of the court have come. 1. Complainants are the owners of a valuable wharf property situated upon the River Schuylkill, within the Port of Philadelphia, which is a port of entry established by an Act of Congress, passed at a very early period in the history of the country. 1 Stat. at Large, 632. They claim that the River Schuylkill is an ancient public river and common highway, and that it is navigable for ships and vessels of the largest description, from above their wharf property to the sea; that many of the ships and vessels navigating the river are duly enrolled and licensed at the Port of Philadelphia and other port of entry of the United States, under and by virtue of the Acts of Congress in that behalf provided; and that foreign vessels, entitled to certain rights of commerce and navigation, have long been accustomed to, and are of right entitled to navigate that river, with cargoes bound to the Port of Philadelphia; and that such vessels, in pursuance of that right, have been accustomed to enter their cargoes at the port, and to discharge the same at the wharves of the port bordering on the river, and to load with return cargoes at the said wharves, and clear direct to foreign ports. Injury alleged is, that the respondents have collected materials, employed workmen, and are now engaged in erecting and constructing a bridge across the channel of the river at Chestnut Street, in the City of Philadelphia, below the place where the wharf property of the complainants is situated. Bridge about to be erected is, as alleged, and as the plan shows, without any draw, and with but a single pier, and at an elevation of only thirty-three feet above the ordinary water surface of the river. Substance of the charge, as contained in the bill of complaint is, that the erecting and keeping the bridge over and across the channel of the river, in the manner as proposed and threatened, will impede and obstruct the navigation of the river, and will hinder and interrupt the citizens in their lawful use of the same as a common and public highway; and they also Statement of complainants is, that many millions of dollars have been expended by the citof works of public improvement, terminating at the head of tide water navigation on that river, which depend, in a great measure, for their prosperity, usefulness and value upon a free and unobstructed use of the river; and in this connection they charge that the bridge will greatly injure and lessen the value of theiwharf property upon the river, and will diverr commerce and trade therefrom, and will theret by dimish the tolls, revenue and profits of their wharves, and will, in fact, destroy the trade and commerce to and from their wharves, to their great damage and irreparable injury. Allegation of the bill of complaint also is, that the Schuylkill River, being a navigable river, and having a good tide water navigation, extending to and beyond the wharf property of the complainants, and for about seven miles from its mouth, and being a branch of the River Delaware-which river passes by and between the States of New Jersey and Delaware-the citizens of all the States are lawfully entitled to its free navigation, and to carry on their lawful commerce without hindrance or obstruction by the respondents; under the pretense of state authority, or any pretense whatever. Respondents justify, under an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Pennsylvania, authorizing them to build the bridge described in the bill of complaint. 2. Complainants insist that the bridge is a public nuisance, and pray that it may be abated, and for such other and further relief in the premises as the nature of the case and equity and good conscience may require. Propositions of the complainants are, that the River Schuylkill is a public navigable river, subject to the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, as conferred by the Constitution; and that Congress has exercised that power, and regulated the navigation of that river within the meaning of the Constitution, and has thereby secured to the citizens of the several States, by virtue of their authority so conferred by the Constitution, the free and unobstructed use of the river as a paramount right, for all the purposes of commerce and navigation. Congress, as the complainants say, has exercised the power and regulated the navigation of the river; and their next proposition is, that the bridge as contructed, or threatened to be constructed, interferes with the enjoyment of that use, and is inconsistent with, and in violation of the Acts of Congress regulating the navigation, and destructive of the rights derived under them, and that to the extent of that interference with the free navigation of the river, the Act of the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania affords to the respondents no au thority or justification, because it is in conflict | bridge, if it is a public nuisance, and an obwith the Acts of Congress, which are the para- struction to that paramount right. mount law. Argument to show that the ground assumed by the complainants is exactly the same as that on which the case of The Wheeling Bridge proceeded and was finally decided, is unnecessary, because the proposition stands forever affirmed by the authority of this court, in an opinion pronounced by one of the justices who decided the cause, and who still holds a seat on this bench. The Wheeling Bridge, 18 How., 430 (59 U. S., XV.,437). Referring to that opinion, it will be seen that the judge who delivered it first stated the grounds assumed in the bill of complaint, and then said: "Such being the view of the case taken by a majority of the court, they found no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the obstruction of the navigation of the river by the bridge was a violation of the right secured to the public by the Constitution and laws of Congress, nor in applying the appropriate remedy in behalf of the plaintiff." None of these propositions are denied in the introductory part of the opinion of the majority of the court. On the contrary, the opinion just read repeats the views expressed by Mr. Justice Nelson in the case already referred to, and im pliedly indorses those views as a correct expo sition of the power of Congress over public navigable rivers emptying into the sea, and of the right of this court to redress private injuries resulting from unlawful obstructions in the same, to the paramount right of navigation. 3. Conceding the correctness of those views as applied in the case in which they were expressed, the opinion of the majority of the court, as just read, sets up a distinction be tween that case and the case under consideration, and maintains that those views are not applicable to the present case. Stripped of all circumlocution, the supposed distinction, as maintained in the opinion of the majority of the court is, that in the case at bar it does not appear that Congress has passed any Act regulating the navigation of the river described in the bill of complaint. Power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, as well as with foreign nations, is fully admitted, and the concession is at least impliedly from the course of the argument-that this court would have jurisdiction in the case, and that the complainants would be entitled to relief, if it appeared that Congress had exercised the power as conferred, and had regulated the nav igation of the river within the meaning of the Constitution. Precise doctrine advanced, as I understand the opinion, is, that Congress has not passed any Act regulating the navigation of the river, and that inasmuch as there is no federal regulation upon the subject, the law of of the State Legislature, authorizing the erection of the bridge, is a valid law, even if the bridge is an obstruction to navigation, because the state law is not in conflict with any Act of Congress giving protection to the other wise paramount navigation. Implied admission is, that if there is an Act of Congress regulating the navigation of the river, then the right of navigation is a paramount right, and the conclusion must be that, in that event, no law of the State could afford any justification to the respondents in erecting the Atty Gen. v. Burridge, 10 Price, 350; Same v. Parmeter, 10 Price, 378; Parmeter v. AttyGen., 10 Price, 412. 4. Dissenting from the opinion of the majority of the court on this point, I hold that Congress has regulated the navigation of this river within the meaning of the Constitution, and that the law of the State, pleaded in justification of the acts of the respondents, so far as it authorizes an obstruction to the free navigation of the river, is an invalid law. Commerce, it is admitted, includes navigation; and it is well settled, on the authority of this court, that in regulating commerce with foreign nations, or among the States, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. Express decision of this court is, that commerce with foreign nations is that of the whole United States, and that the power of Congress to regulate it may be exercised in the States wherever the foreign voyage may commence or terminate: and that the commerce among the States cannot be stopped at the exterior boundary of the State, but may be introduced into the interior. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 194. 5. Right of intercourse between State and State was a common law privilege, and as such was fully recognized and respected before the Constitution was formed. Those who framed the instrument found it an existing right, and regarding the right as one of high national interest, they gave to Congress the power to regulate it. Such were the views of Marshall, Ch. J., as expressed more than forty years ago; and he added, that in the exercise of this power Congress has passed an Act for enrolling or licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same. Respondents contended that the Enrollment Act did not give the right to sail from port to port, but confined itself to regulating a pre-existing right so far only as to confer certain privileges on enrolled and licensed vessels in its exercise; but the court promptly rejected the proposition, and held that where the Legislature attaches certain privileges and exemptions to the exercise of a right over which its control is absolute, the law must imply a power to exercise the right. Direct adjudication was, that it would be contrary to all reason, and to the course of human affairs, to say that a State is unable to strip a vessel of the particular privileges attendant on the exercise of a right, and yet may annul the right itself. License, as the word is used in that Act of Congress, means, say the court, permission or authority; and the court held that a license to do any particular thing is a permission or authority to do that thing, and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. Adopting the language of the court in that case, it certainly transfers to him all the right, which the grantor can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the license. Ships and vessels enrolled and licensed under the Acts of Congress, and no others, are deemed ships and vessels of the United States entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed |