HONDURAS

Relaciones exteriores. Memoria, 1903-5. 43 p. Ministerio de relaciones exteriores.

ITALY

Algeciras. Atto generale della conferenza internazionale di Algeciras. 1906. 39 p. Ministro delgi affari esteri. (Senato, doc. lxxii.)

Emigrazione. Relazione del commissariato dell'emigrazione sui servizi dell'emigrazione, 1905-6. 129 p. Ministro degli affari esteri. doc. lix.)

(Senato,

Emigrazione. Stati di previsione dell'entrata e della spesa del fondo per l'emigrazione per l'esercizio finanziario, 1906-7. Disegno di legge. 19 p. 1906. (doc. 432.) Senato.

Emigrazione e colonie. Raccolta di rapporti dei Rr. agenti diplomatici e consolari. 1906. v. 2. 284 p. Ministero degli affari esteri. Lire 2. Libreria Bocca, Rome.

MEXICO

Boletín oficial de la Secretaría de relaciones exteriores. Monthly. First issue, Nov. 1895. Subscription per year, local, $2.50; postal union, $3.00; single number, 25c. Archivo general y público de la Nación, Palacio Nacional, México.

Containing: Convención sobre giros postales entre México y El Salvador; Convención sobre giros postales entre México y la República Francesa; Tercera Conferencia internacional Americana. June.-Convención sanitaria internacional de Washington; Los sucesos Centro-América. August-Asuntos de Persia. Sept.-Informe presidencial; Tercera Conferencia internacional Americana. Oct. Tercera Conferencia internacional Americana, Acta general. Nov.La cuestión de Centro-America; Tratado general Centro-Americano de paz, amistad y comercio. Dec.

URUGUAY

Relaciones exteriores. Memoria, 1904-5. Montevideo, 1906. 2 v. Ministerio de relaciones exteriores.

PHILIP DEWITT PHAIR.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS INVOLVING QUESTIONS OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW1

A. C. DE BACA, ET AL., V. THE UNITED STATES AND THE NAVAJO INDIANS. 1901

36 Court of Claims Reports, 407

In this case claimants were suing under the act of congress giving the court of claims jurisdiction of claims of citizens of the United States on account of Indian depredations.

The case was submitted originally without argument and decided in favor of the claimants. The defendants then moved for a new trial on the jurisdictional question of the deceased claimant's citizenship at the time when the depredation was committed.

The facts show that the deceased claimant, Antonio Sandoval, was born a Mexican citizen, on Mexican territory. At the time of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo he was living in that part of Mexico lying on the east side of the Rio Grande river, it being a part of the Mexican department of New Mexico but claimed by the Republic of Texas as a part of its territory. The inhabitants of the territory in question had maintained their allegiance to Mexico, and Texas had been unable to exercise any of the powers of government therein. Sandoval became a citizen of the United States by virtue of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo which made the disputed territory a part of the United States.

The depredations for which damages are claimed were committed by Indians after the separation of Texas from Mexico and its admission into the Union but before the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.

The citizenship of the claimant was maintained on the ground that he was a citizen of Texas at the time of the admission of that state into the Union and therefore became a citizen of the United States upon the annexation of Texas.

On the part of the defendants it was denied that Sandoval was a citizen of Texas when it was admitted into the Union and, therefore, did not

'The lay reader is referred to the various volumes of the reports of the court of claims for wealth of decision and interpretation of the law of nations.

A subsequent number will contain a digest of the decisions of the court of claims upon the French spoliation claims.

become a citizen of the United States until he had elected to do so under the provisions of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.

Numerous reasons were advanced by the claimants to support their contention, and the court answered them seriatim, as follows:

The first reason assigned was that the constitution of Texas made all inhabitants citizens of the republic, and that the act of the Texas legislature of December 19, 1836, fixed the western boundary of the state at the Rio Grande. But the court said:

It is manifest that the state could not acquire territory by statute, and that it had no more legal right to declare a part of the Mexican province of New Mexico a part of Texas than it had a right to make a part of the state of Louisiana a part of Texas.

The next reason assigned was that by the treaty between the United States and Texas in 1836, the United States recognized the territory of Texas as extending westward to the sources of the Rio Grande. which the court replied:

Το

But Texas was then at war with Mexico, endeavoring to acquire a part of the territory within the Mexican province of New Mexico. The United States did not undertake to arbitrate between Mexico and Texas. All that the treaty did was to establish a boundary line between the territory possessed by Texas and the territory possessed by the United States, and to concede that if Texas should conquer this portion of Mexico the river should be the future boundary between Texas and the United States.

The next reason assigned was that the United States recognized the territory claimed by Texas, and that the courts of the United States must follow the action of the political branches of the government. The court answered:

But the joint resolution for annexing Texas, March 1, 1845 (5 Stat. L., 797), does not sustain the reason. On the contrary, congress seems to have carefully avoided doing so, and to have recognized the principle that Texas could not cede what it did not possess. All that the resolution says is "the territory properly included within and rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas may be erected into a new state to be called the state of Texas." The question now presented to the court is whether this portion of New Mexico was, in 1845, "territory properly included within and rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas." The joint resolution admitting the state to the Union, twenty-ninth December, 1845 (9 Stat. L., 108), reiterates the above language and designates no boundary. The act to extend the laws of the United States over the state of Texas, twenth-ninth December, 1845 (ib., p. 1), is equally silent as to boundaries.

The next reason assigned was that the United States asserted, after the annexation, that the Rio Grande, and not the Neuces, was the boundary of Texas, and declared war to maintain that right. But the court said:

The intent of the United States did not necessarily extend beyond that portion of Texas which was then actually inhabited and possessed by Americans between the Neuces and the Rio Grande and which had been "properly included within and rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas," and, by virtue of those terms, ceded to the United States.

The next reason assigned was that by the act of March 3, 1847 (9 Stat. L., 188, 194), a post route was established by congress from a point within the United States (Independence, Mo.) to the town of Santa Fé, in New Mexico, to which the court answered:

But New Mexico was then held by conquest, and had been for six months, and civil government had been established by the commanding officer of the United States, General Kearny, with the approval of the secretary of war. It was necessary that the United States should have mail communication within the territory, which it then possessed by right of conquest, and this conquest was subsequently made permanent, by the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.

Moreover, the establishment of such a post route means nothing as a declaration that Santa Fé was in Texas, for the act third March, 1851 (9 Stat. L., 637, 2), confers upon the postmaster-general power "to make suitable arrangements for transporting through any foreign country the mails of the United States, running from and to any point in the United States." In other words, it authorizes a post route through a foreign country.

The final reason assigned was that the United States by the act of May 9, 1850 (9 Stat. L., 446), paid to Texas $10,000,000 in consideration of the cession of all territory claimed by the state. But the court answered this contention in the following language:

At that time the United States had acquired title to all of New Mexico by virtue of its right of conquest and the affirmance thereof by the treaty with Mexico. The United States and Texas were, therefore, asserting adverse titles against each other. The fact that the United States paid money to quiet title and to acquire a quit claim from the state of Texas of lands to which Texas asserted a title can not possibly affect, directly or indirectly, the prior citizenship of a person living within the disputed territory. The statue concedes nothing and declares nothing which the judicial branch of the government can recognize as in any way affecting the question now in controversy.

The defendants' motion for a new trial was allowed and a new trial granted.

CHAUNCEY THOMAS V. THE UNITED STATES. 1903

39 Court of Claims Reports, 1

This was a case which involved the question as to whether or not war existed in the Philippines after the ratification of the treaty with Spain but before the suppression of the Filipino insurrection.

The question was raised under the following state of facts:

An American naval officer was assigned, from July 11, 1899, until August 15, 1899, to duties of a higher character than those ordinarily imposed on an officer of his rank, and brought this suit to recover the difference in pay for the period in question. The provisions of the statute, under which he sued, authorizing such pay, were only applicable for services rendered "in time of war. The war with Spain ceased with the ratification of the treaty on April 11, 1899, before the rendition of the services claimed for, but the insurrection had not ended.

Numerous rulings of the war department were cited holding that a state of war did exist in the Philippines after the ratification of the treaty with Spain and during the insurrection.

The court held that

"while the question is not free from doubt because of the absence of a war technically, or in an international sense," still "the insurrection which resulted in a condition of war in the Philippine Islands was such as to bring the claimant's services within the terms of the statute as having been rendered 'in time of war.'"

THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (LIMITED) V. THE UNITED STATES.

1904

39 Court of Claims Reports, 225

This was an action for the recovery of rent for the use and occupation of certain buildings and a tramway in the Philippine Islands. The property was owned by the order of Dominican friars, who made a contract for its sale to one Richard Henry Andrews, a British subject, now deceased. Andrews acquired title August 8, 1898, and transferred his interest to the plaintiff company, which was incorporated in January, 1900. The authorities of the United States came into the possession of the premises after the insurgents (who had previously taken forcible possession), and occupied and used the parcels set forth in the findings. No compensation or rental was paid for the use, but at no time has any claim of title or equity been asserted by the United States. Claims for rent of the property were recognized as just, but doubts as to the true ownership having been suggested by various military and civil officers of the government, compensation had been withheld until the doubt as to the title could be determined.

Under these circumstances there was no express contract for the government to pay, but the court held that a promise would be implied to pay a reasonable rent to the true owner.