been for each of such years in excess of the sum of $2,000,000 United States gold.

The accounts of the general receiver must be rendered monthly to the contaduria general of the Dominican Republic and to the state department for examination and approval by the appropriate officials of the two governments.

The distinctive feature of the new convention as compared with the original agreement is thus, that the United States does not undertake to adjust or determine the Dominican debt, but merely to administer the customs of the republic for the service of a new loan, the proceeds of which are to be devoted to the discharge of all recognized debts and claims, reduced to a basis acceptable both to the republic and the creditors. Even this responsibility is limited to a period of fifty years and may, with the prior amortization of the loan, be terminated at an earlier date. During this period the Dominican Republic is not to increase its public debt nor to modify its import duties save in agreement with the United States.

To the Dominican Republic this extension of the United States' good offices means that debts and claims aggregating some $32,000,000 will be discharged for about $17,000,000, that the republic's credit is at once established on a very high plane, that onerous concessions and monopolies are to be redeemed and important works of internal improvement undertaken, that civil quiet and adequate revenues for the maintenance of government are assured, and that imminent danger of foreign intervention is removed-and all this without loss of territorial integrity nor infringement of independent sovereignty.

From whatever point of view regarded, the new convention is a wise, sane and workable solution that pledges the United States to nothing beyond the specific and immediate problem at hand. Once put into operation we shall speedily see a West Indian people who have never had a fair chance, developing into a decent, prosperous peasantry. A country that has been alternately torn in civil anarchy and overridden by blood-stained dictatorships, will settle into tranquil and orderly administration, where representative institutions will prevail, at least to the extent possible in Latin-American countries. Public credit will be reëstablished, and debts will be discharged to the amount not of their nominal value, but of their equitable worth. Finally,

a serious menace to international peace will be removed, and the traditional policy of the United States will be sanctioned and confirmed.

If, on the other hand, we had refused to do that which we were besought to do, and had continued to pursue a course of opportunism and drift, we should have consigned the government of San Domingo to political and civil chaos; we should have permitted her people to relapse, slowly but surely, into social and moral barbarism, and we should have allowed the land itself to become an international derelict. JACOB H. HOLLANDER.

NOTES ON SOVEREIGNTY IN A STATE1

SECOND PAPER

In Part First of these notes the nature of sovereignty was discussed and its manifestations in a single state and a federal state considered. It is now proposed to carry the investigation further, and to see the effect of viewing sovereignty from standpoints internal and external to the state. Having completed this examination, the subjects of independence, civil liberty, state liberty, constitutions, and law in their relation to sovereignty will be briefly treated.

The sovereignty of a state may be looked at from without and from within; from without, as the independence of a particular state in relation to others ***; from within, to the legislative power of the body politic. (Bluntschli, p. 501.)

Sovereignty is the supreme power by which a state is governed. The supreme power may be exercised either internally or externally. Internal sovereignty is that which is inherent in a people of any state, or vested in its ruler by its municipal constitution or fundamental laws. External sovereignty consists in the independence of one political society in respect to all other political societies. (Wheaton: International Law, p. 29.2)

The above quotations are given to show that the subject of this note is not novel; and, although the statements and deductions here made may not accord in detail with these extracts, the general idea will be the

1Second paper. The following works, referred to by author rather than title are: Bluntschli: Theory of the State, 3d ed. Lawrence: Principles of International Law. Burgess: Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 2 vols. Maine: Early History of Institutions. Lawrence: Principles of International Law. Austin: Principles of Jurisprudence, 5th ed., revised and edited by Robert Campbell, London, 1885.

"We have seen what is meant by a state. If we add to the marks already given in our definition of it, the further mark that the body or individual who receives the habitual obedience of the community does not render the like obedience to any earthly superior, we are at the conception of a sovereign or independent state, which possesses not only internal sovereignty, or the power of dealing with domestic affairs, but external sovereignty also, the power of dealing with foreign affairs. (Lawrence, p. 56.)

same. To elaborate this idea in harmony with the theory of the previous notes it may be well to formulate a new statement rather than adopt either of those quoted. Assuming that the Bluntschli assertion is correct, that the sovereignty in a state may be looked at from two points of view, namely, from within and from without the state, it should be added that, though the actuality of the sovereignty does not change, its precise location may be general or specific according as the point of observation is external or internal. This statement needs further illustration to be entirely clear. To the individuals who are within a state the actual location of the sovereignty, both real and artificial, is of the highest importance, for upon its proper exercise depend the character of political institutions and the guaranty of the public and private rights of individuals. To those who are without a state, on the other hand, the exact location in a state of the sovereignty is not a matter of concern or inquiry. For all practical purposes in the external relations of a state the established government is accepted as the properly constituted agent of that sovereign.

Viewed from within, the sovereign power may be in a small body of individuals, or in a large body of individuals, but never in all the members of a state. Viewed from without, it is sufficient that such power is possessed in the state and not outside of it From this broader, external point of view a state may be reasonably, as it commonly is, termed "sovereign and independent," though from the narrower, internal point of view it can never be properly so characterized. No matter how often the location of the sovereignty may change within a state, no matter whether the real or the artificial sovereign creates and controls the government, the state in its relation to other states has somewhere within itself the possessor of the sovereignty, of which the existing government is presumably the authorized agent. Further than to establish this fact it is unnecessary, and indeed improper, for another state to inquire. These are the conditions which exist in times of domestic peace and in times of foreign

war.

When, however, a state of civil war exists, there may be established in a state two distinct governments, each of which claims to be the true and sole agent of the sovereign and is supported in its claim by

numbers of the individuals composing the state, who employ their physical force in its behalf. In these circumstances it becomes necessary for other states to decide which of these rival governments is right in its claim; or, in case such decision is for the time being impossible because the superior physical strength of the real sovereign has not manifested which government it favors, a foreign sovereign or the government of such sovereign may declare its uncertainty by recognizing the legal right of the government, which prior to the war represented the sovereign, and the belligerent right of the other, which denies the authority of the older government to act for the sovereign, and is attempting by force to disprove such authority. By this course a foreign sovereign or government remains non-committal, neutral, until the real sovereign by exercising superior physical might manifests which of the rival governments is its true agent.

But even under such conditions it is not for those outside of the state to determine where in the state the sovereignty is actually located; that is exclusively a domestic question to be decided by the individuals composing the state. So far as foreign sovereigns and governments are concerned (to emphasize what has already been said by repetition) the sovereignty is within the state, and the established government is presumptively the properly authorized agent of the possessor of the sovereignty until such government is completely overthrown. For this reason, when a revolution takes place in a state and the real sovereign establishes a new government, the obligations incurred by the former government in its dealings with those outside the state are binding upon the new agent of the sovereign. The revolution from the external point of view is not a change in sovereigns but a change in agents of the sovereign. In the case of the transference of colonial possessions, however, there is an actual change of sovereigns, and the obligations being those of the sovereign follow the original possessor of the colonies.

Sovereignty which thus presents different characteristics, when it is viewed from without or from within the state, has also two corresponding spheres of activity as indicated in the language of Wheaton, quoted at the beginning of this note. One of these spheres embraces all without the state; the other, all within, both political and territorial. It should be borne in mind that the high seas are not within the limits