and which were too often not justified by the facts. That the general of an army had the least right to conceal his designs and movements from the President, is too utterly foolish to deserve ridicule. That Mr. Lincoln was always a good judge of the character of a military project may well be doubted. Where is the soldier or civilian whose judgment has always been above criticism? Where Mr. Lincoln's confidence was fixed he seldom or never obtruded his opinion, never out of place; although many of his letters to McClellan on the Peninsula had in them an air of taunting, which must have been vexatious, and were, it seems, at this distance, entirely uncalled for and reprehensible. That Mr. Lincoln was always right as to his methods and views can not be maintained; and the same may be true as to his dealings with McClellan. As to General Halleck it may hardly be necessary to speak. His magisterial habits were notable; some of his theories and orders were inexplicable; and it could hardly, be claimed that while he had many causes of complaint against McClellan, the latter had none against him.

The following little letter will show Mr. Lincoln's general method of dealing:

"WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862, 4.10 P. M.

"Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General HalA. LINCOLN.

leck, aided by your counsels.

"Major-General MCCLELLAN."

Nothing can more forcibly and truly display Mr. Lincoln's general way of smoothing difficulties, and his excessive charity towards others and lack of it for himself than the following brief and remarkable speech made at a Union meeting in Washington on the sixth day of August, 1862:

"FELLOW-CITIZENS,-I believe there is no precedent for my appearing before you on this occasion, but it is also true that there is no precedent for your being here yourselves; and I offer, in justification of myself and of you, that, upon examination, I have found nothing in the Constitution against it. I, however, have an impression that there are younger gentlemen who will entertain you better, and better address your understanding than I will or could, and therefore I propose but to detain you a moment longer.

"I am very little inclined on any occasion to say anything unless I hope to produce some good by it. The only thing I think of just now not likely to be better said by some one else, is a matter in which we have heard some other persons blamed for what I did myself. There has been a very wide-spread attempt to have a quarrel between General McClellan and the Secretary of War. Now, I occupy a position that enables me to observe, that these two gentlemen are not nearly so deep in the quarrel as some pretending to be their friends. General McClellan's attitude is such that, in the very selfishness of his nature, he can not but wish to be successful, and I hope he will-and the Secretary of War is in precisely the same situation. If the military commanders in the field can not be successful, not only the Secretary of War, but myself, for the time being the master of them both, can not but be failures. I know General McClellan wishes to be successful, and I know he does not wish it

any more than the Secretary of War for him, and both of them together no more than I wish it. Sometimes we have a dispute about how many men General McClellan has had, and those who would disparage him say that he has had a very large number, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War insist that General McClellan has had a very small number. The basis for this is, there is always a wide difference, and on this occasion, perhaps, a wider one than usual, between the grand total on McClellan's rolls and the men actually fit for duty; and those who would disparage him talk of the grand total on paper, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War talk of those at present fit for duty. General McClellan has sometimes asked for things that the Secretary of War did not give him. General McClellan is not to blame for asking for what he wanted and needed, and the Secretary of War is not to blame for not giving when he had none to give. And I say here, as far as I know, the Secretary of War has withheld no one thing at any time in my power to give him. I have no accusation against him. I believe he is a brave and able man, and I stand here, as justice requires me to do, to take upon myself what has been charged on the Secretary of War, as withholding from him.

"I have talked longer than I expected to do, and now I avail myself of my privilege of saying no more."

The story of General McClellan, the troubles of the Administration in dealing with him, and the effect in the progress of events, constitute one of the most remarkable chapters of American history. Thus believing, I have given the subject that prominence it appeared to deserve, risking as much as possible under the restraints of brevity. Without the remotest care or preference as to General McClellan's politics, and but the most necessary and

scanty concern about doing him or anybody else either justice or wrong, I have written what I have purely with reference to stating as nearly as may be the truths of history, and making the most available inferences therefrom. And I now confess to leaving the subject with a peculiar sense of relief, freed from another burden and incubus, and landing beyond another difficult passage in the long journey whose end I am every day more and more anxious to reach.

CHAPTER XVII.

1863-WAR OF THE REBELLION - GENERAL BURNSIDE_ FREDERICKSBURG-GENERAL HOOKER TRIED-CHANCELLORSVILLE-STONEWALL JACKSON-WHERE NOW STOOD THE "GOD OF BATTLES?"-GENERAL MEADE AT THE HEAD OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC— GETTYSBURG-LEE OUTGENERALED.

N the 8th of November, 1862, without alacrity

ON

or confidence, General Burnside assumed command of the Army of the Potomac. The outlook was discouraging enough. The mode of McClellan's departure had placed the army on the verge of political organization, and none but a bold and foolhardy man could have undertaken to lead it, in full view of Pope's experience, without fear of calamitous consequences. But Burnside was a man of action, and was able to place obedience to orders, and duty, above personal considerations or consequences. He selected Fredericksburg as the best point for operations in the direct route to Richmond, and at once set about moving the army down the Rappahannock. Under all the discouragements of the situation he went to work in an energetic and manly way; in the first place organizing his entire force of over a hundred thousand men into three grand divisions under Hooker, Franklin, and Sumner. The selection of these leaders with the exception of the last was,