swallow him at a single gulp. He was within four miles of Richmond and might have taken it at any time early in the campaign, and even ginning of the "seven days' battles." seven days' battles." after the be But he chose to give up what he had gained, and his generals conducted the fighting and retreating as best they could. The campaign had no mitigating circumstances. It was a national calamity. Perhaps no soldier bearing the title of General could have done worse, and certainly no other could have so wearied, fretted, and tried the patience of an all-forgiving and charitable President and people. With the termination of this sad, worthless campaign, should have ended General McClellan's military career. And to say this much is a stretch of historic charity, if there can be such. Before finally leaving this "Peninsular Campaign" a few words should, perhaps, be written touching the wisdom of withdrawing the Army of the Potomac from the position it occupied on the James River, but without the desire to discuss this point in its various aspects. Especially after reaching the Peninsula, General McClellan always held that Washington could be as well defended from that remote locality as from the position he so long and quietly occupied on the Potomac in its front; and that at or near Richmond was the place to fight and end the Rebellion. Before the army was taken down to the Peninsula, the Administration was right and General McClellan was wrong about the way to Richmond and the force it represented. As Mr. Lincoln said, if the great battles had to be fought there it was as well certainly to avoid the time and the vast expense of transferring the army by water to the sickly tide-water region of Virginia, and move directly on by Manassas, as it had begun to do where its vast materials were collected, and where there would be no division of its strength for the protection of the Capital. Thus far Mr. Lincoln was the better General, but after he had placed McClellan on the Peninsula, the recall of his army to Washington was of a doubtful propriety, no matter what the emergency should be. With an able and energetic commander the Army of the Potomac then at Harrison's Landing, without re-enforcements, could, on the three last days of July, have taken Richmond, and utterly destroyed every reliable source of supplies for the rebel army. With this force of ninety thousand men in its rear and fifty thousand in its front, there could have been no doubt about the destiny of General Lee's army, by the 1st of September. The army on the Peninsula only wanted a good general. If it had had a daring and able leader at Malvern Hill, the destruction of the rebel force in Virginia and the capture of Richmond would have been reasonably certain. And General John B. Magruder said that if such an attack as it was capable of had been made on the rebel force south of the Chickahominy on the 26th of June, there was nothing to hinder it taking Richmond and turning, from the works there, upon the rear of an army always weaker than itself. From several other favorable points this subject might be viewed; and, at all events, while the grounds of unanimity of opinion for the substitution of a new commander may be undisputed, the propriety of removing the army from the Peninsula may well remain a matter of doubt. CHAPTER XVI. 1862-WAR OF THE REBELLION-GENERAL POPE-CEDAR MOUNTAIN-GAINESVILLE-SECOND BULL RUN-CHAN TILLY-MCCLELLAN'S HAND-THREE HUNDRED THOU- MOUNTAIN-ANTIETAM-LINCOLN AND Mc ATE in June, 1862, General John Pope was brought from the Mississippi Valley, where he had characterized himself as a daring and able officer, and placed in command of the force in the field in front of Washington. This force consisted mainly of the three armies under Irwin McDowell, N. P. Banks, and Franz Sigel, the latter having taken the position recently resigned by General Fremont. From the outset Pope exhibited a degree of activity which was unusual on the Potomac, and in this spirit he never flagged throughout his brief and tragic career in Virginia; although it is, perhaps, true that on assuming the command there was an air of bluster and brag about his proceedings hardly becoming a soldier or a man of discretion. At all events, a general order or address issued by him. after assuming the command, on the 14th of July, was quite offensive to some of the Eastern Generals, and especially to George B. McClellan, who had yet been distinguished for little else than inactivity. This address was not issued by General Pope until he had spent two weeks in studying the condition and character of the Army of Virginia, as the command was designated. As he had passed among officers and men he had been startled by many expressions, such as "lines of retreat," "bases of supplies," strategic points," "strong positions for defense," etc., to which he had been unused in the West. He took occasion to note these things in the address, and criticising them sharply, requested that they be dropped from the thoughts, as they certainly should be from the operations, of the army in the future. McClellan considered himself mainly affected by this thrust, although it was a long way over the shoulders of Banks and McDowell, and in this supposed hurt of McClellan's began the misfortunes which led to the utter failure of Pope's efforts, of his defeat, and sudden resignation of the command. Pope, at once, favored a policy that would divert a part of the rebel force from McClellan, and wrote to the latter that he was ready and anxious to co-operate with him, but the answer he got was not cheering to Pope; and then, too, McClellan was at that very time retreating to Harrison's Landing, and putting co-operation out of the question. Pope began now to see difficulties which he could not overcome, and believing that the case demanded it, desired to be relieved of the command. But this not being granted he entered with remarkable activity upon the work before him. |