well for Lee that night soon put an end to the bloody strife at Malvern Hill.

But this was not the end of the retreat. Early on the morning of the 1st, McClellan went on a boat down to Harrison's Landing, and did not return until long after noon, and then even chose to remain on the boat until an urgent demand was sent for his presence at Malvern Hill, where he remained until night. A great storm set in, but this did not deter McClellan, and before midnight the Union army was groping along the one narrow, muddy road to Harrison's Landing which was reached by noon on Wednesday, July 2d, by the greater part of the force though the whole immense train did not arrive until late on the 3d. The retreat over the seven miles from Malvern to Harrison's Landing was that of an unorganized body of a hundred thousand men, which could have been diverted by the presence of a disciplined foe into an uncontrollable and ruined mass of soldiery.

The march was that of a beaten and leaderless

army, instead of the well-controlled and spirited victors of Malvern Hill. Fortunately they were left undisturbed, the rebels having been too badly disorganized and beaten on the 1st to offer even a feeble pursuit on McClellan's "home-stretch." Lee now made little further effort against this army.

W. H. Taylor, in his "Four Years with General Lee," says:

Without attempting an account of any one of the seven engagements embraced in the seven days' battles, so fully

described in General Lee's official report, I can not forbear mention of a maladroit performance just before their termination, but for which I have always thought that McClellan's army would have been further driven, even 'to the wall,' and made to surrender-a trifling matter in itself apparently, and yet worthy of thoughtful consideration. General McClellan had retreated to Harrison's Landing; his army, supply, and baggage trains were scattered in much confusion in and about Westover plantation; our army was moving down upon him, its progress much retarded by natural and artificial obstacles; General Stuart was in advance, in command of the cavalry. In rear of and around Westover there is a range of hills or elevated ground, completely commanding the plains below. Stuart, glorious Stuart! always at the front and full of fight, gained these hills. Below him, as a panorama, appeared the camps and trains of the enemy, within easy range of his artillery. The temptation was too strong to be resisted; he commanded some of his guns to open fire. The consternation caused thereby was immediate and positive. It frightened the enemy, but it enlightened him.

"Those heights in our possession, the enemy's position was altogether untenable, and he was at our mercy; unless they could be recaptured his capitulation was inevitable. Half a dozen shells from Stuart's battery quickly demonstrated this. The enemy, not slow in comprehending his danger, soon advanced his infantry in force, to dislodge our cavalry and repossess the heights. This was accomplished; the hills were fortified, and became the Federal line of defense, protected at each flank by a bold creek, which emptied into James River, and by the heavy batteries of the fleet anchored opposite. Had the infantry been up, General Lee would have made sure of this naturally strong line, fortified it well, maintained it against assault, and dictated to General McClellan terms of surrender; and had the attention of the enemy not been so

precipitately directed to his danger by the shots from the little howitzers, it is reasonable to presume that the infantry would have been up in time to secure the plateau."

This is an over-fair picture of the case. The whole army was in truth huddled in a narrow space along the river, and no orders for occupying this ridge commanding the position were given the first day; nor were the troops put in a condition for making any resistance in the plain below. Not until on the third day of July did McClellan begin to take possession of and fortify the hills. General Casey testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that twenty thousand of the rebels on the ridge surrounding the Landing could have taken the whole army, excepting the small part of it which could have got off in the boats. The opinion of Mr. Taylor given here was general among Federal officers, and the grounds that gave rise to it should, at least, have given the Army of the Potomac a new commander, about the only re-enforcement it needed to enable it to resume successfully its march to Richmond. But, as it was, the celebrated "Peninsular Campaign" was substantially at an end.

CHAPTER XV.

1862-WAR OF THE REBELLION-MCCLELLAN AT HARRISON'S LANDING - EVACUATION OF THE PENINSULA-LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN-AN INDEFENSIBLE CAREER-THE GREAT GENERAL NOT YET FOUND.

IN

N the week's fighting and running from Mechanicsville to Harrison's Landing General McClellan lost, according to his own report, one thousand five hundred and eighty-two killed, seven thousand seven hundred and nine wounded, five thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight missing, in all fifteen thousand two hundred and forty-nine men. This was, in all probability, a low estimate, and probably did not include the sick left behind in the hospitals. There is, perhaps, no indubitable evidence that the rebels did not suffer a loss even greater, although the facts were mainly concealed. On the 3d of July McClellan reported to the Secretary of War that he supposed he had not then left with their colors over fifty thousand soldiers of all the invincible host landed with him on the Peninsula. This was startling, and the strange discrepancies it suggested, as well as other considerations, induced President Lincoln to go all the way to Harrison's Landing to see for himself the condition of the army. And only four days after McClellan had made this frightful

report it was found that there were about eightyeight thousand soldiers present at the Landing. Thus an enormous gap was filled. But on the 20th of June there were about one hundred and fifteen thousand men present for duty on the Chickahominy. Then, if fifteen or even twenty thousand were lost in the "seven days' battles" and retreat, there would still remain a discrepancy of from seven to fifteen thousand men, and no clew to these can readily be found, unless it is in the amazing supposition that they had been sent off on furlough on the very eve of the battles and retreat. Even after Mr. Lincoln's visit, there was some dispute about McClellan's strength, which gave rise to the following letter:

"MY DEAR SIR,-I am told that over one hundred and sixty thousand men have gone with your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day, we made out eighty-six thousand remaining, leaving seventy-three thousand five hundred to be accounted for. I believe three thousand five hundred will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing, in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving fifty thousand who have left otherwise. Not more than five thousand of these have died, leaving forty-five thousand of your army still alive, and not with it. I believe half or two-thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers in the future? "ABRAHAM LINCOLN."