Davis were always in trouble, from which they were not relieved when the former was allowed by the latter to retire on sick leave. More than everything else the Rebellion lacked the element of harmony. Many, perhaps most, of its leaders, among whom was Joseph E. Johnston, seemed to place their own desires and personal fame above the success of the cause for which they fought.

CHAPTER XIV.

1862-WAR OF THE REBELLION-REBEL SUCCESSES IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY-MCCLELLAN ON THE "PENINSULA"-SEVEN PINES THE CHICKAHOMINY-SEVEN

DAYS' BATTLE.

ARLY in March Stonewall Jackson and Richard

EARL

S. Ewell, by instructions from Richmond, began a series of active operations in the Shenandoah Valley, with a view of diverting McDowell on the Rap-pahannock from his design of re-enforcing McClellan. After some reverses they were finally successful in gaining a decided advantage over General R. H. Milroy at a place called McDowell, on the 8th of May, and on the 25th of the same month, in defeating General N. P. Banks at Winchester, and forcing him to retreat from the State at Harper's Ferry. These untoward events threw the authorities at Washington into a state of excitement not justified by the ability or intentions of the rebels, who certainly had no hope of reaching the Capital. But the scare at Washington and throughout the North was all the same, and unfortunately resulted in the President's countermanding the order to McDowell to re-enforce McClellan. This, of course, greatly distressed the latter, who never ceased to direct at the President and Secretary of War his battery of com

plaints. One of the most obvious troubles in the imagination of McClellan was his strong desire to have in his army only officers in perfect agreement with him personally and politically, as well as in a military sense. If he had ever been in favor of organizing the army into corps, he showed great aversion to this arrangement soon after his arrival on the "Peninsula." On the 9th of May, in a very sharp letter to Mr. Stanton, he asserted that a thousand lives were lost at Williamsburg because of this division into corps; that he did not wish to be held responsible for such a state of affairs; that he must have permission to reorganize the corps; and must be allowed to drop incompetent corps commanders at once.

In reply to his dispatch Mr. Lincoln wrote this plain and characteristic letter from Fortress Monroe, where he had gone to see how matters were progressing:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, "FORT MONROE, VA., May 9, 1862. "Major-General MCCLELLAN:

"MY DEAR SIR,-I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing the part of a dispatch to you relating to army corps, which dispatch, of course, will have reached you long before this will. I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course, I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you

to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we can not entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes-the commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you; but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz John Porter, and, perhaps, General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just; but at all events, it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in any thing?

"When you relieved General Hamilton of his command, the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

"But to return. Are you strong enough-are you strong enough even with my help-to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question to you.

"The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN."

Nothing could check General McClellan's complaints, or his disposition to overestimate on one side or the other. On the 26th of May he wrote to the President:

"Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy, preparatory to the

last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster, and to secure my flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-morrow are very important, and, if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached."

Later on, the same day, in his dispatch concerning the detachment sent out, he, gushingly says:

"Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory; too much credit can not be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The rout of the rebels was complete; not a defeat, but a complete rout."

The President had often been misled in this way, and the following from his communication to McClellan, on the 28th of May, shows what stress he was beginning to place upon the General's glowing reports, promises, and pretensions :

"I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory; still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think, can not be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that fifteen thousand left Hanover