cause or evil its purpose. Little General Johnston would not even engage in the battle of Manassas until he had first settled the matter of rank between himself and Beauregard; and a part of Beauregard's report was so offensive to Mr. Davis that he asked for its modification, and this not being done he made a counter statement; and the rebel "Congress" at Richmond struck the whole thing from the report. If more than this should have been expected from the leaders of a bad and hopeless rebellion, how much more should have been expected from the patriotic defenders of the Republic?

It has been said that the rebel generalship on the field was, perhaps, superior; but this is not a clear proposition. The rebel commander was unduly interested in guarding his right on Bull Run, where McDowell never meditated an attack. Although Johnston criticises McDowell's neglect as to his reserve corps, his own arrangement in this respect was equally wanting; the large reserve force he might have well utilized, he left idle miles down Bull Run and at Manassas Junction; and for failing to bring these troops up and throwing them, at the proper moment, on the disconcerted Federals, Johnston subsequently censured himself. The rebel generalship in this first battle was wavering and uncertain, with all its advantages, and wanting in that decision and rapidity which often distinguished it at a later date. So unbroken and strong was the Union army that Johnston considered himself unable to pursue it, and so equal appeared the fighting qualities of the com

batants that this trial greatly changed the erroneous current of public opinion, and decided the fact that the contest was destined to be long and sharp. It should also have been the last battle, as when the equality of fighting capacity, man for man, had been demonstrated, leaders of ordinary wisdom and calmness, knowing where was the great preponderance of numbers and resources, should have seen the end. The certainty of the ultimate failure of the Rebellion. was never more apparent than it was after the first battle of Bull Run, although this was not fully realized by the defenders of the Union, while, perhaps, no loyal man ever, even in the darkest hour, lost his faith in this result.

CHAPTER II.

1861-WAR OF THE REBELLION-"THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS"-EXTRA SESSION-MR. LINCOLN'S FIRST

A

MESSAGE - PERSONAL LIBERTY — HABEAS

CORPUS-RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

T noon on the 4th of July, 1861, Congress assembled under the President's proclamation of April 15th. The Senate was now found to have forty-nine members, thirty-one being Republicans, thirteen Democrats, and five were called Unionists. John W. Forney, of Philadelphia, who four years previously had been anxious to fill a place in the Cabinet of Mr. Buchanan, was chosen clerk of this branch.

The House had one hundred and seventy-eight members, one hundred and six being Republicans, forty-two Democrats, twenty-six Unionists, and four vacancies. Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, was elected Speaker of the House, and Emerson Etheridge, of Tennessee, clerk. Of the border Slave States, Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky were fully represented; Missouri and Virginia partially, and Tennessee had Andrew Johnson in the Senate, and Horace Maynard in the Lower House. On the next day President Lincoln's first message was received by Congress.

FIRST MESSAGE.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

Having been convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the Constitution, your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of legislation.

At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago, the functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally suspended within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of the Post-office Department.

Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, custom-houses, and the like, including the movable and stationary property in and about them, had been seized, and were held in open hostility to this Government, excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor, and Jefferson, on and near the Florida coast, and Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. The forts thus seized had been put in improved condition; new ones had been built, and armed forces had been organized, and were organizing, all avowedly with the same hostile purpose.

The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in and near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by well-protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the best of its own, and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one. A disproportionate share of the Federal muskets and rifles had somehow found their way into these States, and had been seized to be used against the Government. Accumulations of the public revenue, lying within them, had been seized for the same object. The navy was scattered in distant seas, leaving but a very small part of it within the immediate reach of the Government. Officers of the Federal army and navy had resigned in great numbers; and of those resigning, a large proportion had taken up arms against the Government. Simultaneously, and in connection with all this, the purpose to sever the Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance with this purpose, an ordinance had been adopted in each of these States, declaring the States, respectively, to be

separated from the National Union. A formula for instituting a combined government of these States had been promulgated; and this illegal organization, in the character of Confederate States, was already invoking recognition, aid, and intervention from foreign powers.

Finding this condition of things, and believing it to be an imperative duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent, if possible, the consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of means to that end became indispensable." This choice was made, and was declared in the Inaugural Address. The policy chosen looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures, before a resort to any stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the Government, and to collect the revenue; relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails, at Government expense, to the very people who were resisting the Government; and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the people, or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might Constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was forborne, without which, it was believed possible to keep the Government on foot.

On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February, and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was, by that Department, placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer, that re-enforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thou sand good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the army and the navy, and, at the end of four days, came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion