every point, occupied the low and broken ravine or valley along Young's Creek. Many of the rebels had been put to flight, and it was subsequently held by some military wiseacres that had McDowell continued after them to Manassas depot and abandoned his advance up the hill in the face of the well-posted force, the whole would have been turned into a rout, and the victory have been easy. Up to this time the rebel army had not been well handled, and, perhaps, this would have been so, as the generals on that side evidently considered their prospects very doubtful when they began to take position on the plateau above Young's Creek, and the rebel fugitives at the railroad declared unanimously that they were already totally defeated. Subsequent events did not sustain the appearances. But McDowell overlooked the true position of affairs in his favor in this direction, and prepared to gain possession of the plateau, where the rebels soon massed a force equal to his own. Several desperate attempts were now made to accomplish his purpose with varying success, the national troops driving the rebels before them, and then in return being driven back on the broken ascent, and although the Ellsworth Zouaves had been knocked out of existence as an organization by mistaking an Alabama regiment for one of the Union, one of those singular accidents which often befall armies in the heat of conflict, and several other similar occurrences, the general outlook was still, perhaps, favorable to the Government. The demoralization was, however, quite apparent, and it was very evident that any unforeseen event might instantly decide the day adversely. At the critical juncture this event was not wanting. E. Kirby Smith with the remainder of Johnston's troops from Winchester now appeared on the ground, and, with a shout, rushed against the right flank of the Union army. This unexpected assault sent through McDowell's lines the cry that Johnston had come from the Shenandoah. Other rebel troops were thrown into the conflict at this moment, when the Union forces choosing to consider the attack irresistible, fled from the field, and the first great battle for the perpetuation of human slavery was ended. McDowell covered the retreat as best he could with his small force of regulars, and that night abandoned the determination of making a stand at Centerville. The rebels made little or no pursuit, and McDowell leisurely returned to the neighborhood of Washington. The loss on the side of the Government was 481 killed, 1,011 wounded, and 1,460 prisoners, many of whom were wounded; on the rebel side 387 were killed and 1,582 wounded and a few prisoners were taken. Twenty-five or twentyeight of McDowell's forty-nine guns fell into the hands of the rebels, chiefly on the retreat to Centerville, where they had to be abandoned by reason of the obstruction of the road by the army wagons, and considerable quantities of army stores, small arms and baggage. General McDowell deemed it advisable to leave his own dead to be buried by the rebels, a task not performed by them for several days. The excitement caused throughout the entire country by this defeat of the national army was indescribably intense, but, of course, of entirely dissimilar character in the loyal and rebellious sections. Universal surprise, dismay, and sadness were felt among the loyal in the North, while shouts of exul tation and triumph, exaggeration, willful misrepresentation, and boasting came from the victors. When the loyal section woke up to the realities of the defeat, and began to see that a large disciplined army and a long contest would be required to put down the Rebellion, reasons for this first defeat were eagerly and credulously sought. Many of those who had cried "On to Richmond," were now willing to take back seats, and keep their hands from meddling. But the great masses were still ready to pass judgment on the conduct of the campaign. What was then seen dimly was in time plain enough. It was a very difficult matter in the North to believe that Southern generals and Southern soldiers were superior, and few did believe it. While this idea went up at the South, it was justly scouted down in the loyal section. Everybody was blamed for the disaster, and everybody set out with a determination to see the disgrace wiped out. On the Union side this was a great advantage derived from the misfortune. Still the national cause suffered by the defeat both at home and abroad. A great and, perhaps, unavoidable difficulty at this time, as in most others throughout the war, was that the world depended largely for information upon the hundreds of newspaper reporters who followed the armies, and upon the unofficial and partisan newspapers. As a general rule, probably the reporters and letter-writers with the army were disposed to tell the truth, but they saw so little, and took so much for granted, and wrote amidst such limited circumstances that nothing better should have been expected of them. Many of the partisan newspapers started out willfully to distort, exaggerate, and misrepresent everything they touched in favor of their own side. The disposition to exaggerate was everywhere, both North and South, extreme and appalling, among all classes of people. There was no place, indeed, where this spirit was not found; not even in the pulpit, nor in the prayers of the most pious. Perhaps the most notable case of foreign misrepresentation, of the most premeditated, determined, unmitigated, and wicked sort was that of "The London Times." Of this unprincipled but influential English paper, Samuel A. Goddard, of Birmingham, says in his work entitled "Letters on the American. Rebellion:" "At the outbreak 'The London Times' declared with exultation that the 'great experiment had failed,' that the 'great Republic had broken up;' the success of the Rebellion being simply a question of time. Therefore, in accordance with its proverbial tactics of endeavoring to be on the winning side, it lent its whole weight and influence to the rebels, in order to obtain the result predicted and ardently wished, and its sophisms, its misrepresentations, its insolence throughout the conflict, in treating of American affairs knew no bounds. It sent its correspondent to America for the express purpose of damaging the Union and bolstering up the rebel cause." Wm. H. Russell, this correspondent, was quite successful in carrying out the exact purpose for which he was sent over here. He wrote up the South, and wrote down the Government, and the truth never constituted any fixed part of his inclinations or work, otherwise he would not have been executing his master's will. In looking back from this remote date several more or less important things appear as causes of the loss of the first great battle on the Union side. Among these causes, it may not be necessary to mention the fact of the Union General moving out and beginning the assault on Sunday. If he had not taken this step the rebels would have done so on the same day. It is, however, certainly true that had he selected his position on the high lands about Centerville, it would have been greatly to his advantage and possibly led to his final overthrow of the enemy, had he awaited to be attacked. But the intelligence and judgment of him who holds to the belief that the misfortune of the national army was owing to its bringing on the battle on Sunday may well be questioned; nor does he demonstrate his claim to superior and commendable piety by such belief, perhaps. Still even in war, customary considerations, as well as religious verity, point to the voluntary observance of the Sunday. Among the undebatable causes of the defeat were indecision and delays at Washington, and in the prog |