THE NEW INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPHS. No. 10. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 5 SIR: This government considers that our relations in Europe have reached a crisis, in which it is necessary for it to take a decided stand, on which not only its immediate measures, but its ultimate and permanent policy can be determined and defined. At the same time it neither means to menace Great Britain nor to wound the susceptibilities of that or any other 10 European nation. That policy is developed in this paper. The paper itself is not to be read or shown to the British secretary of state, nor are any of its positions to be prematurely, unnecessarily, or 15 indiscretely made known. But its spirit will be your guide. You will keep back nothing when the time arrives for its being said with dignity, propriety, and effect, and you will all the while be careful to say nothing that will be incon- 20 gruous or inconsistent with the views which it contains. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Memorandum Upon the Appeal of Admiral Schley. [The conduct of Rear-Admiral Schley during the Santiago campaign gave rise to so much adverse comment that in July, 1901, he asked the Navy Department to take such action as it might deem best fitted to 25 bring the matter of his conduct under discussion by his fellow-officers. Secretary Long convened a court of inquiry, which, in December, reported the following Opinion. OPINION. "Commodore Schley, in command of the Flying Squadron, should have proceeded with utmost dispatch off Cienfuegos and should have maintained a close blockade of that port. He should have endeavored on May 23, at Cienfuegos, to obtain 5 information regarding the Spanish squadron by communicating with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him at 8.15 a. m. of that date. He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba with all dispatch and should have disposed his vessels with a IO view of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron. 15 20 He should not have delayed the squadron for the Eagle. He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his squadron. He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Department's order of May 25. He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago Harbor on May 29 and 30. He did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the Colon and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31. By commencing the engagement on July 3 with the port battery and turning the Brooklyn around with port helm Commodore Schley 25 caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the Vizcaya and Colon. The turn of the Brooklyn to starboard was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels. The turn was made toward the Texas and caused that vessel to stop and to back her 30 engines to avoid possible collision. Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieut. Commander A. C. Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed between them. Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the 35 Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise. His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading. His conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-possessed, and he 40 encouraged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and men to fight courageously." To this Admiral Dewey, the president of the Court, appended his own opinion on the following matters, "In the opinion of the undersigned the passage from Key West to Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible dispatch, Commodore Schley having in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers. The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective. Commodore Schley in permitting the steamer Adula to enter the port of Cienfuegos expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish Squadron from her when she came out. 5 The passage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-two miles south of Santiago was made with as much dispatch as was possible 10 while keeping the squadron a unit. The blockade of Santiago was effective. Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our squadron off Santiago when the Spanish Squadron attempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898. He was in absolute command, and is entitled 15 to the credit due to such commanding officer for the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish ships." Record of Court of Inquiry II, pp. 1829–30. 1902. The Court recommended that in view of the length of time elapsed since the events no further action should be had. Rear-Admiral Schley 20 at once filed exceptions to the findings of the Court; and Rear-Admiral Sampson traversed the view of Admiral Dewey as to the person in command during the fight. Secretary Long, after reviewing the case in the light of the exceptions, and the traversing of Admiral Sampson, approved the findings of the whole Court, and those of the majority as contrasted 25 with those of Admiral Dewey. He approved also the action of the whole Court in not expressing an opinion as to the person in command and their recommendation that no further action be taken. RearAdmiral Schley appealed from this decision to the President, and the attorneys of Admiral Sampson addressed the President on the ques- 30 tion of the commanding officer in the battle. The following memorandum, or letter, was the President's settlement of the matter.] WHITE HOUSE, February 18th, 1902. I have received the appeal of Admiral Schley and the answer thereto from the Navy Department. I have exam- 35 ined both with the utmost care, as well as the preceding appeal to the Secretary of the Navy. I have read through all the testimony taken before the Court and the statements of the counsel for Admirals Sampson and Schley; have examined all the official reports of every kind in reference to the 40 Santiago naval campaign, copies of the logbooks and signal 5 books, and the testimony before the Court of Claims, and have also personally had before me the four surviving captains of the five ships, aside from those of the two admirals, which were actively engaged at Santiago. It appears that the Court of Inquiry was unanimous in its findings of fact and unanimous in its expressions of opinion on most of its findings of fact. No appeal is made to me from the verdict of the Court on these points where it was unanimous. I have, however, gone carefully over the eviIo dence on these points also. I am satisfied that on the whole the Court did substantial justice. It should have specifically condemned the failure to enforce an efficient night blockade at Santiago while Admiral Schley was in command. On the other hand, I feel that there is a reasonable doubt whether 15 he did not move his squadron with sufficient expedition from port to port. The Court is a unit in condemning Admiral Schley's action on the point where it seems to me he most gravely erred; his "retrograde movement " when he abandoned the blockade, and his disobedience of orders and 20 misstatement of facts in relation thereto. It should be remembered, however, that the majority of these actions which the Court censures occurred five weeks or more before the fight itself; and it certainly seems that if Admiral Schley's actions were censurable he should not have been left as 25 second in command under Admiral Sampson. His offenses were in effect condoned when he was not called to account for them. Admiral Sampson, after the fight, in an official letter to the Department alluded for the first time to Admiral Schley's “reprehensible conduct" six weeks pre30 viously. If Admiral Schley was guilty of reprehensible conduct of a kind which called for such notice from Admiral Sampson, then Admiral Sampson ought not to have left him as senior officer of the blockading squadron on the 3d of July, when he (Sampson) steamed away on his proper errand 35 of communication with General Shafter. We can therefore for our present purposes dismiss consid eration of so much of the appeal as relates to anything except the battle. As regards this, the point raised in the appeal is between Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley, as to which was in command, and as to which was entitled to the credit, if either of them was really entitled to any unu- 5 sual and preeminent credit by any special exhibition of genius, skill, and courage. The Court could have considered both of these questions, but as a matter of fact it unanimously excluded evidence offered upon them, and through its President announced its refusal to hear Admiral Sampson's 10 side at all; and in view of such exclusion the majority of the Court acted with entire propriety in not expressing any opinion on these points. The matter has, however, been raised by the President of the Court. Moreover, it is the point upon which Admiral Schley in his appeal lays most stress, 15 and which he especially asks me to consider. I have therefore carefully investigated this matter also, and have informed myself upon it from the best sources of information at my command. The appeal of Admiral Schley to me is not, as to this, the 20 chief point he raises, really an appeal from the decision of the Court of Inquiry. Five-sixths of the appeal is devoted to this question of command and credit; that is, to matter which the Court of Inquiry did not consider. It is in effect an appeal from the action of President McKinley three years 25 ago when he sent in the recommendations for promotion for the various officers connected with the Santiago squadron, basing these recommendations upon his estimate of the credit to which the officers were respectively entitled. What I have to decide, therefore, is whether or not President 30 McKinley did injustice in the matter. This necessarily involves a comparison of the actions of the different commanders engaged. The exhaustive official reports of the action leave little to be brought out anew; but as the question of Admiral Sampson's right to be considered in chief command, 35 which was determined in his favor by President McKinley, |