ference" the extension of the political system of the Allies to any portion of the continent, speaks with warmth of those whom it terms "our Southern brethren." In this respect it savours more of Monroe than of Adams. A single phrase, inserted perhaps by the President, or adopted by Adams as a harmless concession to the views of his colleagues, cannot of itself disprove his authority. The logical conclusion seems to be that the conception of the Monroe Doctrine and much of its phraseology came from Adams, and that the share of Monroe did not extend beyond revision. In insisting upon the right of every people to choose its own form of government without external interference, also, the declaration is affirming but not creating, the Law of Nations. The kernel of this part of the Monroe Doctrine then in its second form as in its first, is a vague declaration of policy and in no way a formulation of rules prevailing between states. . . No line or paragraph of the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, represents an addition to the body of rules prevailing between States. From the first word to the last, it is a declaration of the policy of a single power. ... In its latest development, then, as throughout its history, the Monroe Doctrine has induced confusion of thought. The flood of sentiment and rhetoric poured out on both sides of the Atlantic has in great part obscured the truth. It has served, none the less, to establish the position of the Monroe Doctrine as a political force, which however esteemed must be recognized. Above all, by the Old World and the New, it must be understood. WILLIAM FIDDIAN REDDAWAY, Monroe Doctrine. 82-151. ᎻᎪᎡᎢ (1901) No one who knows the cautious and somewhat sluggish mind of Monroe could suppose a priori that he had the genius to meet and counteract the double danger; the real author and probable penman of the famous declaration of 1823 was John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State. He had already rapped the knuckles of the Russian ambassador on the Oregon question, and he threw all his immense energy into the task of nerving up the President to a strong announcement. The result was the annual message of December 2, 1823, embodying what was thereafter called "The Monroe Doctrine," the essentials of which are three statements. . . . It will be seen that the Monroe doctrine was not intended by Monroe to be a code of international law, but was called out by a special set of circumstances long since outgrown aggressions by Russia and by allied Europe. So far as it referred to the future, the doctrine was intended to state a kind of quid pro quo. . . The extension of the term Monroe Doctrine from the limited form given it by John Quincy Adams to that stated by Secretary Olney has of course a reason: there is an apparent advantage, when the United States takes up a position in American diplomacy, in bringing it within the Monroe Doctrine; because it may then be urged that foreign powers which ignore or question our positions have had many decades of notice, and hence are sinning against light. But it is impossible to appeal to a part of the principle and to ignore the rest; and the history of the doctrine shows absolutely that down to 1895 the United States always asserted a special American influence, on the ground that it left to European powers a similar special interest in Europe. This is simply a doctrine of the permanent subdivision of the earth into two spheres of influence, each of which could get on without the other, and in each of which the interference of the other would be unwarranted. There was really no such separation in 1823, and every year draws the ends of the earth closer together. To claim the Monroe Doctrine as still our guiding principle is to suggest to other nations that the United States has no power outside America. The two areas are not separate and never can be separated; the United States is a world power, and cannot claim the special privileges of a diplomatic recluse, and at the same time the mastery of the Western Hemisphere. ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, The Monroe Doctrine, in Harper's Monthly, 1901. CHAPTER XXI THE RIGHTS OF SLAVES AND OF THEIR RACE (1857) SUGGESTIONS THE Dred Scott Decision was pronounced on the 6th of March, 1857. The following excerpts are chosen from the reports made by ChiefJustice Taney, and the dissenting opinion delivered by Justice Curtis. The interest which gathers about the question of slavery and its eventual death-blow has to this generation of students a purely historic bearing; but that slavery did exist, and that it was possible for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to defend it in an official report, makes the study of one of the most famous decisions of the Court a necessary preparation for the later investigation of the enfranchisement of the coloured race. In examining the opinion of the Court, we are amazed that less than fifty years ago such conditions could have existed. To appreciate fully these discussions for and against the Dred Scott Decision, it is necessary to study into the Northern and Southern points of view, and to investigate the social conditions, and the moral energy which had their share in shaping the doctrines and politics of the respective leaders in this great issue. For Outlines and Analysis, see Appendix B, § 6. DOCUMENTS Extracts from the Opinion of the Court in the Dred Scott Decision, March 6th, 1857 The text is Mr. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney delivered the from 19 How- opinion of the Court. ard, 399. Dred Scott, a This case has been twice argued. After the arslave born in gument at the last term, differences of opinion were Missouri, having lived found to exist among the members of the Court; north of the and as the questions in controversy are of the high est importance, and the Court was at that time Missouri line for four much pressed by the ordinary business of the term, years, it was deemed advisable to continue the case, and claimed his direct a re-argument on some of the points, in order freedom, that we might have an opportunity of giving to the Sandford, whole subject a more deliberate consideration. It who had has accordingly been again argued by counsel, and titular owner considered by the Court; and I now proceed to after his redeliver its opinion. from one become his turn south of the compro There are two leading questions presented by the mise line. record: 1. Had the Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between these parties? And The Circuit Court of Missouri decided in his favour. The Supreme Court of Mis 2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has souri regiven erroneous or not? versed the decision, and The plaintiff in error, who was also the plaintiff remanded in the Court below, was, with his wife and children, it back. In Nov., held as slaves by the defendant, in the State of 1853, Dred Missouri; and he brought this action in the Circuit Scott entered Court of the United States for that district, to assert the title of himself and his family to freedom. suit against Sandford in Circuit Court States. The declaration is in the form usually adopted in of the United that State to try questions of this description, and Sandford decontains the averment necessary to give the Court nied the jurisdicjurisdiction; that he and the defendant are citizens tion-but of different States; that is, that he is a citizen of the Court affirmed it; Missouri, and the defendant a citizen of New York. and then deThe defendant pleaded in abatement to the juris- cided against Dred Scott diction of the Court, that the plaintiff was not a ontheground citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his of the decideclaration, being a negro of African descent, whose sion of the Missouri ancestors were of pure African blood, and who were higher Court. brought into this country and sold as slaves. In 1856 the case came up To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the de- in the Sufendant joined in demurrer. The Court overruled preme Court the plea, and gave judgment that the defendant should answer over. And he therefore put in sundry pleas in bar, upon which issues were joined; of the United States to which Dred Scott had finally ap pealed, and and at the trial the verdict and judgment were in decision was his favor. Whereupon the plaintiff brought this March, 1857. writ of error. rendered in 2. Before we speak of the pleas in bar, it will be proper to dispose of the questions which have arisen on the plea in abatement. That plea denies the right of the plaintiff to sue in a court of the United States, for the reasons therein stated. If the question raised by it is legally before us, and the Court should be of opinion that the facts stated in it disqualify the plaintiff from becoming a citizen, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, then the judgment of the Circuit Court is erroneous, and must be reversed. It is suggested, however, that this plea is not before us; and that as the judgment in the Court below on this plea was in favor of the plaintiff, he does not seek to reverse it, or bring it before the Court for revision by his writ of error; and also that the defendant waived this defence by pleading over, and thereby admitted the jurisdiction of the Court. . . . Constitution, The words 'people of the United States' and Art. iv. sect.citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word citizen' in the Consti Constitution, 2, §§ 1, 2, 3. |