CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES. 1. Forgery. 2. Robbing the mail. 3. Construction of the act of congress passed the 5th of May, 1830, entitled "an act for the further extending the powers of the judges of the superior court of the territory of Arkansas, under the act of the 26th May, 1824, and for other purposes." Sampeyreac v. The United States. 222. 4. Under the provisions of an act of congress passed on the 26th May, 1824, proceedings were instituted in the superior court of the territory of Arkansas, by which a confirmation was claimed of a grant of land alleged to have been made to the petitioner, Sampeyreac, by the Spanish government, prior to the cession of Louisiana to the United States by the treaty of April 3d, 1803, This claim was opposed by the district attorney of the United States; and the court after hearing evidence, decreed that the petitioner recover the land from the United States. Afterwards, the district attorney of the United States, proceeding on the authority of the act of 8th May, 1830, filed a bill of review founded on the allegation that the original decree was obtained by fraud and surprise, that the documents produced in support of the claim of Sampeyreae were forged, and that the witnesses who had been examined to sustain the same were perjured. At a subsequent term Stewart was allowed to become a defendant to the bill of review, and filed an answer, in which the fraud and forgery are denied, and in which he asserts that if the same were committed, he is ignorant thereof, and asserts that he is a bona fide purchaser of the land for a valuable consideration, from one John J. Bowie, who conveyed to him the claim of Sampeyreac by deed, dated about the 22d October, 1828. On a final hearing, the court being satisfied of the forgery, perjury and fraud, reversed the original decree. Held, that these proceedings were legal, and were authorized by the act of the 5th of May, 1830. Ibid. 5. Almost every law providing a new remedy, affects and operates upon causes of action existing at the time the law is passed. The law of 1830 is in no respect the exercise of judicial powers; it only organizes a tribunal with the powers to entertain judicial proceedings. The act, in terms, applies to bills filed, or to be filed. Such retrospective effect is no unusual course in laws providing new remedies. Ibid. 6. The act of 1830 does not require that all the technical rules in the ordinary course of chancery proceedings on a bill of review shall be pursued in proceedings instituted under the law. Ibid. 7. Construction of the acts of congress relative to drawback on refined sugar. Barlow v. The United States. 404. 8. The legislature did not, in the enactments in reference to drawback, intend to supersede the common principle of the criminal as well as the civil jurisprudence of the country, that ignorance of the law will not exempt its violation. Ibid. 1. 9. The act of the 27th of March, 1804, by which the president of the United States was authorized to attach to the navy yard at Washington a captain of the navy for the performance of certain duties, was correctly construed by the head of the navy department until 1829, allowing to the defendant commissions on the sums paid by him, as the special agent of the navy department in making the disbursements. United States v. Macdaniel. 10. A seizure of sugars was made under an allegation that they were of a different quality from that mentioned in the entry. By the court. The statute: under which these sugars were seized and condemned, is a highly penal law, and should, in conformity with the rule on the subject, be construed strictly. If either through accident or mistake the sugars were entered by a different denomination from what their quality required, a forfeiture is not incurred. United States v. Eighty-four Boxes of Sugar. 453. 11. Heads of the public departments of the government. 12. Public accounts. 13. Set-off. CONSTRUCTION OF STATE LAWS. 1. Construction of the insolvent laws of Louisiana. Breedlove et al. v. Nicolet et al. 413. 2. The titles to lands under the acts of the legislature of the state of Pennsylvania, providing for the sale of the landed estate of John Nicholson, in satisfaction of the liens the state held on those lands, and the proceedings under the same, are valid. Lessee of Livingston v. Moore. 469. CONSTRUCTION OF STATE LAWS. 3. These acts, and the proceedings under them, do not contravene the provisions of the constitution of the United States, in any manner whatsoever. Ibid. 4. The words used in the constitution of Pennsylvania in declaring the extent of the powers.of its legislature, are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the powers exercised over the estate of John Nicholson. Ibid. 5. The common law of England, and all the statutes of parliament made in aid of the common law, prior to the fourth year of the reign of king James the first, which are of a general nature, and not local to the kingdom, were expressly adopted by the Virginia statute of 1776; and the subsequent revisions of its code have confirmed the general doctrine on this particular subject. Scott v. Lunt's Administrator. 596. CONSULS. 1. The record of the proceedings in this case, brought up with the writ of error to the court for the correction of errors of the state of New York, showed that the suit was commenced in the supreme court of the state of New York, and that the plaintiff in error, who was consul-general of the king of Saxony, did not plead or set up his exemption from such suit in the supreme court; but, on the cause being carried up to the court for the correction of errors, this matter was assigned for error in fact; notwithstanding which, the court of errors gave judgment against the plaintiff in error. The court of errors of New York having decided that the character of consul did not exempt the plaintiff in error from being sued in the state court, the judgment of the court of errors was reversed. Davis v. Packard. 2. As an abstract question, it is difficult to understand on what ground a state court can claim jurisdiction of civil suits against foreign consuls. By the constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; and the judiciary act of 1789 gives to the district courts of the United States, exclusively of the courts of the several states, jurisdiction of all suits against consuls and vice consuls, except for certain offences enumerated in the act. Ibid. 276. 3. If a consul, being sued in a state court, omits to plead his privilege of exemption from the suit, and afterwards, on removing the judgment of the inferior court to a higher court by writ of errror, claims the privilege, such an omission is not a waiver of the privilege. If this was to be viewed merely as a personal privilege, there might be grounds for such a conclusion, but it cannot be so considered; it is the privilege of the country or government which the consul represents. This is the light in which foreign ministers are considered by the law of nations; and our constitution and law seem to put consuls on the same footing in this respect. Ibid. 4. If this privilege or exemption was merely personal, it can hardly be supposed that it would have been thought sufficiently important to require a special provision in the constitution and laws of the United States. Higher considerations of public policy, doubtless, led to the provision. It was deemed fit and proper, that the courts of the government, with which rested the regulation of foreign intercourse, should have cognisance of suits against the representatives of such foreign governments. Ibid. 5. The action in the supreme court of New York against the defendant, was on a recognisance of bail, and it was contended that this was not an original proceeding, but the continuance of a suit rightfully brought against one who was answerable to the jurisdiction of the court in which it was instituted, and in which the plaintiff in error became special bail for the defendant; and therefore the act of congress did not apply to the case. Held, that the act of congress being general in its terms, extending to all suits against consuls, it applied to this suit. Ibid. COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. The question before the court was, whether the charge to the jury in the circuit court contains any erroneous statement of the law. By the court. In.ex amining it for the purpose of ascertaining its correctness, the whole sc and bearing of it must be taken together. It is wholly inadmissible to ta up single and detached passages, and to decide upon them without atten ing to the context, or without incorporating such qualifications and explanations as naturally flow from the language of other parts of the charge. The whole is to be construed as it must have been understood, both by the court and the jury, at the time it was delivered. Magniac v. Thompson. 343 CRIMES. CRIMES. 2. Robbing the mail of the United States. DECISIONS OF STATE COURTS. The rule of law being once established by the highest tribunal of a state, courts which propose to administer the law as they find it, are ordinarly bound, in limine, to presume that, whether it appears from the reports or not, all the reasons which might have been urged, pro or con, upon the point under consideration, had been examined and disposed of judicially. Lessee of Livingston v. Moore. 469. DEPOSITIONS. Morris v. The Lessee of Harmer's Heirs. 554. DUTIES. 1. Construction of the acts of congress relative to drawback on refined sugar Barlow v. The United States. 404. 2. The legislature did not in the enactments in reference to drawback intend to supersede the common principle of the criminal as well as the civil jurisprudence of the country, that ignorance of the law will not exempt its violation. Ibid. 3. Sugars were seized on an allegation that they were of a different quality from that stated in the entry. By the court. The statute under which these sugars were seized and condemned, is a highly penal law, and should, in conformity with the rule on the subject, be construed strictly. If either through accident or mistake the sugars were entered by a different denomi nation from what their quality required, a forfeiture is not incurred. United States v. Eighty-four Boxes of Sugar. 453. EJECTMENT. Lands and land titles. ERROR. 1. The court refused to quash a writ of error on the ground that the record was not filed with the clerk of the court until the month of June, 1832, the writ having been returnable to January term, 1832. The defendant in error might have availed himself of the benefits of the twenty-ninth rule of the court, which gave him the right to docket and dismiss the cause. Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood et al. 144. 2. The appropriate use of a writ of error, coram vobis, is to enable a court to correct its own errors, those errors which precede the rendition of the judgment. In practice the same end is now generally attained by motion, sustained, if the case require it, by affidavits; and the latter mode has superseded the former in the British practice. Ibid. 3. In the circuit court for the district of Kentucky, a judgment in favour of the plaintiff, in an ejectment, was entered in 1798, and no proceedings on the same until 1830; when the period of the demise having expired, the court, on motion, and notice to one of the defendants, made an order inserting a demise of fifty years. It having been afterwards shown to the court that the parties really interested in the land, when the motion to amend was made, had not been notified of the proceeding, the court issued a writ of error coram vobis, and gave a judgment sustaining the same, and that the order extending the demise should be set aside. From this judgment a writ of error was prosecuted to this court; and it was held that the judgment on the writ of error coram vobis, was not such a judgment as could be brought up by a writ of error for decision to this court. Ibid. EVIDENCE. 1. Papers translated from a foreign language, respecting the transactions of foreign officers, with whose powers and authorities the court are not well acquainted, containing uncertain and incomplete references to things well understood by the parties, but not understood by the court, should be carefully examined, before it pronounces that an officer holding a high place of trust and confidence, has exceeded his authority. United States v. Perche man. 51. 2. On general principles of law, a copy of a paper given by a public officer, whose duty it is to keep the originals, ought to be received in evidence. Ibid. 3 What will be deemed sufficient evidence of diligent and sufficient search for a lost or mislaid original paper, to permit a copy to be read as secondary evidence. Minor v. Tillotson. 99. 4. The rules of evidence are adopted for practical purposes in the administration of justice. And although it is laid down in the books as a general rule EVIDENCE. that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit of, must be given; yet it is not understood that this rule requires the strongest possible assurance of the matter in question. The extent to which the rule is to be pushed is governed, in some measure, by circumstances. If any suspicion hangs over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld, a more rigid inquiry should be made into the reasons for its non-production. But where there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required is reasonable diligence to obtain the original. Ibid. 171. 5 No evidence can be looked into in this court, which exercises an appellate jurisdiction, that was not before the circuit court; and the evidence certified with the record must be considered here as the only evidence before the court below. If, in certifying a record, a part of the evidence in the case had been omitted, it might be certified in obedience to a certiorari; but, in such a case, it must appear from the record that the evidence was used or offered to the circuit. Holmes et al, v. Trout et al. 6. Agreements had been made, under which depositions taken in other cases where the same questions of title were involved, should be read: in evidence, and on the hearing in the circuit court these depositions were read: afterwards, on an appeal to this court, the decree of the circuit court was reversed, and by the decree of reversal the parties were permitted to proceed de novo. When the case was again heard in the circuit court the defendant objected to the reading of the depositions, asserting that the decree of reversal annulled the written certificate of the parties for the admission of testimony. By the court. The consent to the depositions was not limited to the first hearing, but was co-extensive with the cause. The words in the decree of reversal, that the parties may proceed de novo, are not equivalent to a dismission of the bill without prejudice; nor could the court have understood them as affecting the testimony in the cause; or setting aside the solemn agreement of the parties. The testimony is still admissible to the extent of the agreement. Vattier v. Hinde. 252. 7. A question as to the admission of evidence of the declaration of a deceased person, as to boundary. Morris v. Harmer's Lessee. 554. 8. Historical facts of general and public notoriety may be proved by reputation, and that reputation may be established by historical works, of known character and accuracy. But evidence of this sort is confined in a great measure to ancient facts which do not presuppose better evidence in existence; and where, from the nature of the transaction, or the remoteness of the period, or the public and general reception of the facts, a just foundation is laid for general confidence. Ibid. 9. The work of a living author who is within the reach of the process of the court, can hardly be deemed of this nature. He may be called as a witness; he may be examined as to the sources and accuracy of his information; and especially if the facts which he relates are of a recent date, and may be fairly presumed to be within the knowledge of many living persons, from whom he has derived his materials, there would seem to be cogent reasons to say that his book was not, under such circumstances, the best evidence within the reach of the parties. Ibid. 10. Special circumstances, which were considered as exempting the evidence contained in a book, called the "Picture of Cincinnati," of the date of the survey of the city and laying out lots in part of the same, from the common rule; which justified its admission. Ibid. 11. The plat of the lots in the city of Cincinnati, which had been recorded, and on which the streets and alleys in the same were designated, and which had been generally recognized and used in the surveys of the lots laid down in the same, was properly admitted in evidence. Ibid. 12. The depositions of several witnesses, clerks in the counting-house of the plaintiffs, were admitted on the trial of the cause, in which the witnesses stated that they knew that a letter of credit was considered by the plaintiff as covering any balance due by C. H. to them for advances from time to time, to the amount of eight thousand dollars; that advances were made, and moneys paid by them on account of C. H. from the time of receiving the said letter, predicated on the letter, always protecting the plaintiffs to the amount of eight thousand dollars; and that it was considered in the counting-house as a continuing letter of credit, and so acted upon by the plaintiff's. Held, that this evidence was rightly admitted to establish that credit had been given to C. H. on the faith of it, from time to time, and that it was EVIDENCE. treated by the plaintiffs as continuing guarantee; so that if, in point of law, it was entitled to that character, the plaintiffs' claim might not be open to the suggestion that no such advances, or acceptances, or endorsements had been made upon the credit of it. The evidence was not open to the objection, that it was an attempt by parol evidence to explain a written contract. Douglass et al. v. Reynolds et al. 113. FLORIDA TREATY. 1. Florida land claims. 2. Even in cases of conquest, it is very unusual for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right, which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world, would be outraged; if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled on a change in the sovereignty of the country, by the Florida treaty. The people change their allegiance, their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property remain undisturbed. Had Florida changed its sovereign by an act containing no stipulation respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all those who became subjects or citizens of the new government would have been unaffected by the change. It would have remained the same as under the ancient sovereign. United States v. Percheman. 51. 3. The language of the second article of the treaty between the United States and Spain, of 22d February, 1819, by which Florida was ceded to the United States, conforms to this general principle. Ibid. 4. The eighth article of the treaty must be intended to stipulate expressly for the security to private property, which the laws and usages of nations would, without express stipulation, have conferred. No construction which would impair that security, further than its positive words require, would seem to be admissible. Without it, the titles of individuals would remain as valid under the new government as they were under the old. And those titles, so far at least as they were consummated, might be asserted in the courts of the United States, independently of this article. Ibid. 5. The treaty was drawn up in the Spanish as well as in the English language. Both are original, and were unquestionably intended by the parties to be identical. The Spanish has been translated; and it is now understood that the article expressed in that language is, that "the grants shall remain ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of them, to the same extent," &c. thus conforming exactly to the universally received law of nations. Ibid. 6. If the English and Spanish part can, without violence, be made to agree, that construction which establishes this conformity ought to prevail. Ibid. 7. No violence is done to the language of the treaty by a construction which conforms the English and Spanish to each other. Although the words "shall be ratified and confirmed," are properly words of contract, stipulating for some future legislation, they are not necessarily so. They may import "they shall be ratified and confirmed" by force of the instrument itself. When it is observed in the counterpart of the same treaty, executed at the 4 same time, by the same parties, they are used in this sense, the construction is proper, if not unavoidable. Ibid. 8. In the case of Foster v. Elam, 2 Peters, 253, this court considered those words importing a contract. The Spanish part of the treaty was not then brought into view, and it was then supposed there was no variance between them. It was not supposed that there was even a formal difference of expression in the same instrument, drawn up in the language of each party. Had this circumstance been made known, it is believed it would have produced the construction which is now given to the article. Ibid. FLORIDA LAND CLAIMS. 1. Juan Percheman claimed two thousand acres of land lying in the territory of Florida, by virtue of a grant from the Spanish governor, made in 1815. His title consisted of a petition presented by himself to the governor of East Florida, praying for a grant of two thousand acres, at a designated place, in pursuance of the royal order of the 29th of March, 1815, granting lands to the military who were in St. Augustine during the invasion of 1812 and 1813; a decree by the governor, made 12th December, 1815, in conformity to the petition, in absolute property, under the authority of the royal order, a certi |