[Ex parte Bradstreet.] by the said supreme court, that the peremptory writ of the United States issue requiring and commanding you, the said judge of the said district court, to reinstate and proceed to try and adjudge, according to the law and right of the case, the several writs of right and the mises therein joined, lately pending in your said court between the said Martha Bradstreet, demandant, and Apollos Cooper and others, the tenants aforesaid; therefore, you are hereby commanded and enjoined, that immediately after the receipt of this writ, and without delay, you reinstate and proceed to try and adjudge according to the law and right of the case, the several writs of right and the mises therein joined, lately pending in your said court between the said Martha Bradstreet, demandant, and the said Apollos Cooper and others, the tenants herein above named, so that complaint be not again made to the said supreme court; and that you certify perfect obedience and due execution of this writ to the said supreme court, to be held on the first Monday in August next. Hereof fail not at your peril, and have then there this writ. Witness the honourable John Marshall, chief justice of said supreme court, the second Monday of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three. 484 W. T. CARROL, Clerk of the supreme court of the United States. *THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, COMPLAINANT, V. THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS. MR. ROBBINS, solicitor for the complainant, having renewed his motion of last term in this case, prayed the court to award such process, and in such form, as the court may deem proper. On consideration of the motion made in this case, it is now here ordered by the court that process of subpoena be, and the same is hereby awarded as prayed for by the complainant, and that said process issue against "The commonwealth of Massachusetts." 2 a 2 485 INDEX OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. ACTION. 1. A suit on a recognizance of bail is an original proceeding. A scire facias upon a judgment is to some purposes only a continuation of the former suit. But an action of debt on a judgment is an original suit. Davis v. Packard. 276. 2. An action of debt on a recognizance of bail may be brought in a different court from that in which the original proceedings were commenced. Ibid. 3. Action of covenant brought by the plaintiff in error to recover the amount of certain rents alleged to have been due and in arrear from the defendant since the death of his intestate under an indenture, by which a certain annual rent was reserved out of the property conveyed by the indenture, and which the grantee covenanted to pay; a clause of re-entry for non-payment of the rent being contained in the deed. By the court: it is firmly established, that on a covenant to pay rent, reserved by the deed granting real estate subject to the rent, the personal representatives of the covenantor are liable for the non-payment of the rent, after an assignment, although there may also be a good remedy against the assignee. The laws of Virginia have not, in this respect, narrowed down the responsibility existing by the common law in England. Scott v. Lunt's Administrator. 596. 4. The assignee of a fee farm rent, being an estate of inheritance, is, upon the principles of the common law, entitled to sue therefor in his own name. It is an exception from the general rule, that choses in action cannot be transferred, and stands upon the ground of being, not a mere personal debt, but a perdurable inheritance. Ibid. 5. Action on a bond executed by William Carson, as paymaster, and signed by A. L. Duncan and John Carson as his sureties, conditioned that William Carson, paymaster for the United States, should perform the duties of that office within the district of Orleans. The breach alleged was that W. C. had received large sums of money in his official capacity, in his lifetime, which he had refused to pay into the treasury of the United States. The bond was drawn in the names of Abner L. Duncan, John Carson and Thomas Duncan as sureties for William Carson, but was not executed by Thomas Duncan. There were no witnesses to the bond, but it was acknowledged by all the parties to it before a notary public. The defendants, the heirs and representatives of A. L. Duncan, in answer to a petition to compel the payment of the bond, say that it was stipulated and understood, when the bond was executed, that one Thomas Duncan should sign it, which was never done, and the bond was never completed; and therefore A. L. Duncan was never bound by it: they also say, that, as the representatives of A. L. Duncan, they are not liable for the alleged defalcation of William Carson, because he acted as paymaster out of the limits of the district of Louisiana; and the deficiencies, if any, occurred without the limits of the said district. Before the jury were sworn the defendants offered a statement to the court for the purpose of obtaining a special verdict on the facts, according to the provisions of the act of the legislature of Louisiana of 1818. The court would not suffer the same to be given to the jury for a special finding, because it "was contrary to the practice of the court to compel a jury to find a special verdict." The judge charged the jury that the bond sued upon ACTION. was not to be governed by the laws of Louisiana in force when the bond was signed at New Orlerns, but that this and all similar bonds must be considered as having been executed at the seat of the government of the United States, and to be governed by the principles of the common law; that although the copy of the bond sued on, which was certified from the treasury department, exhibited a scrawl instead of a seal, yet they had a right to presume that the original bond had been executed according to law; and that in the absence of all proof as to the limits of the district of New Orleans, the jury was bound to presume that the defalcation occurred within the district; and if the paymaster acted beyond the limits of the district, it was incumbent on the defendants to prove the fact: held, that there was no error in these decisions of the district court of Louisiana. This is an official bond, and was given in pursuance of a law of the United States. By this law, the conditions of the bond were fixed; and also the manner in which its obligations should be enforced. It was delivered to the treasury department at Washington; and to the treasury, did the paymaster and his sureties become bound to pay any moneys in his hands. These powers exercised by the federal government cannot be questioned. It has the power of prescribing under its own laws, what kind of security shall be given by its agents for a faithful discharge of their public duties. And in such cases the local law cannot affect the contract, as it is made with the government; and, in contemplation of law, at the place where its principal powers are exercised. Duncan's Heirs v. The United States. 435. ADMIRALTY. 1. A libel was filed in the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, against the steamboat Planter, by H. and V., citizens of New Orleans, for the recovery of a sum of money alleged to be due to them, as shipwrights, for work done and materials found in the repairs of the Planter. The libel asserts that, by the admiralty law and the laws of the state of Louisiana, they have a lien and privilege upon the boat, her tackle, &c., for the payment of the sums due for the repairs and materials, and prays admiralty process against the boat, &c. The answer of the owners of the Planter avers that they are citizens of Louisiana, residing in New Orleans; that the libellants are also citizens, and that the court have no jurisdiction of the cause. Held, that this was a case of admiralty jurisdiction. Peyrouz et al. v. Howard et al. 324. 2. By the civil code of Louisiana, workmen employed in the construction or repairs of ships or boats enjoy the privilege of a lien on such ships or boats, without being bound to reduce their contracts to writing, whatever may be their amount; but this privilege ceases if they have allowed the ship or boat to depart without exercising their rights. The state law, therefore, gives a lien in this case. Ibid. 3. In the case of the General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438, S. C. 4 Peters' Condensed Reports, it is decided that the jurisdiction of the admiralty in cases where the repairs are upon a domestic vessel, depends upon the local law of the state. Where the repairs have been made or necessaries furnished to a foreign ship, or to a ship in the ports of a state to which she does not belong, the general maritime law gives a lien on ships as security; and the party may maintain a suit in the admiralty to enforce his right. But, as to repairs or necessaries in the port or state to which the ships belong, the case is governed altogether by the local law of the state; as no lien is implied unless it is recognized by that law. But if the local law gives the lien, it may be enforced in the admiralty. Ibid. 4. The services in this case were performed in the port of New Orleans, and whether this was within the jurisdiction of the admiralty or not, depends on the fact whether the tide in the Mississippi ebbs and flows as high up the river as the port of New Orleans. The court considered themselves authorized judicially to notice the situation of New Orleans, for the purpose of determining whether the tide ebbs and flows as high up the river as that place; and being satisfied that although the current of the Mississippi at New Orleans may be so strong as not to be turned backwards by the tide, yet the effect of the tide upon the current is so great as to occasion a regular rise and fall of the water; New Orleans may be properly said to be within the ebb and flow of the tide, and the jurisdiction of the admiralty prevails there. Ibid. 5. In order to the decision whether the admiralty jurisdiction attaches to such |