[Ex parte Madrazzo.] unlawful acts of the pretended purchaser of the same; but the same remain the property of the libellant. The libel further states that the governor of the state of Georgia, on the 20th of May, 1820, on the pretence that the said negroes had been illegally transported to the Creek nation, and unlawfully imported into the United States from some foreign place, with intent to hold them to service and labour, filed a libel in the district court of the United States for the district of Georgia, alleging the unlawful importation, and that a demand of them had been made by the society for the colonization of free people of colour in Africa; which the governor alleged he was desirous of complying with, if authorized to do so by a decree of the court. No specification is made of the number of the slaves, and no mention is made of the illegal seizure and sale of the slaves, in the information, or of the payment of the forty thousand dollars into the treasury of the state of [*630 Georgia. The libel further states, that William Bowen, who had purchased the slaves, the cargo of the Isabelita, put in a claim for the whole of the said slaves, on the 7th November, 1820; alleging that they were his property, and were not intended to be introduced into the United States, but had been carried into the Creek nation for safety, with the intention to remove them to West Florida, a colony of Spain; the truth of which allegation the libellant admits. The libellant, hearing of the proceedings in the district court of Georgia, filed a libel claiming the slaves; and the district court dismissed the claim of William Bowen and of the libellant, and decreed in favour of the governor of Georgia. That decree, on appeal to the circuit court of the United States was reversed; the claims of the state of Georgia and of William Bowen were dismissed; and that court decreed that the said slaves should be restored to the libellant, Juan Madrazzo, together with the proceeds of them, sold and paid into the treasury of the state of Georgia. From this decree, the governor of Georgia, on behalf of the state, appealed to this court. From the district court of the United States of Georgia, a warrant of arrest upon the libel of this libellant was issued; but the execution being prevented or evaded by the government and officers of the state of Georgia, the same was never served. A monition was also issued, and served on the governor and treasurer of the state of Georgia. The libel proceeds to state the proceedings in the circuit court of the sixth circuit, in which it was ordered that it should be held a sufficient execution of the warrant, if the governor of Georgia should sign an acknowledgement that the slaves were held by him, subject to the jurisdiction of the court; upon which, on the 15th of May, 1823, John Clark, the governor of Georgia, signed a paper filed in the court on the 24th December, 1823, by which he acknowledged, that the governor of Georgia held the negroes levied on by virtue of sundry executions by the sheriff of Baldwin county, "subject to the [Ex parte Madrazzo.] order of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Georgia, after the claim of the said sheriff, or prior thereto if the claim 631] in the circuit court shall be adjudged to have priority of the proceeding in the state court." The libel states that the executions referred to had been levied on the slaves as the property of William Bowen, and the proceedings in the case showed that the same did not belong to him. That the li bellant relied on the stipulation entered into by the governor of Georgia, by which the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States was admitted; and he proceeded to prosecute his appeal in the circuit court, in which no exception to its jurisdiction in the case was suggested or moved. In the circuit court the rights of the libellant were established; the illegal outfit of the Successor was fully proved; and every other matter shown to entitle him, as a Spanish subject, to the restitution of his plundered property. From the decree of the circuit court, appeals were entered to the supreme court of the United States. The libel then states the proceedings in the cases in the supreme. court of January term, 1828, as the same are reported in 1 Peters' Supreme Court Reports, 110, &c., and complains that the jurisdiction of the supreme court, in the case, was denied by the governor of Georgia on behalf of the state, in direct violation of the stipulation entered into by him, consenting to, and acknowledging the said jurisdiction; by which the said court were prevented proceeding to give a decree or judgment in the case. That by reason of the proceedings aforesaid, and of other acts of the state of Georgia, her officers and agents, which the libel alleges to have been tortious, and by the sale and dispersion of the slaves, the libellant is prevented seizing or identifying his property; he is without remedy or redress, unless this court will cause the state of Georgia to do him right in the premises. Wherefore the libellant prays the court to award admiralty process against the state of Georgia, to be issued and served as the court may direct, citing the said state of Georgia, as well as all others concerned, to show cause why the proceeds of the said slaves, paid into the treasury of the said state, should not be paid over to the libellant; the slaves remaining in the possession of the state restored to him; a just and reasonable compensation decreed to him for the slaves, con632] verted to her own use, or otherwise taken by the state; and such other damages allowed to him as the owner of the slaves, as the court might think proper, against the state of Georgia, &c. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court. The case is not a case where the property is in custody of a court of admiralty, or brought within its jurisdiction, and in the possession of any private person. It is not, therefore, one for the exercise of that jurisdiction. It is a mere personal suit against a state to recover proceeds in its possession, and in such a case no private person has a right to commence an original suit in this court against a state. 7p 633 GEORGE W. WARD AND RICHARD K. CALL, REGISTER AND RE- SAME APPELLANTS V. JACOB ROBINSON AND F. SWEARINGEN. A mandamus was issued by the superior court of appeals of the eastern middle district of Florida, directed to the register and receiver of the western land district of Florida, commanding them to permit the entry and purchase of certain lands. From this proceeding, the register and receiver appealed to this court. The appeal was dismissed; the proceeding at mandamus being at common law, and therefore the removal to this court should have been by writ of error. APPEALS from the court of appeals for the territory of Florida. Mr. White moved to dismiss these cases, on the grounds that the proceedings were at law in the courts of the United States for the territory of Florida, and that they had been brought up from the court of appeals of that territory, by appeals instead of by writs of error. On the 13th December, 1826, on the application of the appellees to the superior court of appeals for the middle district of Florida, a mandamus was issued directed to George W. Ward, the register of the western land district of Florida, and to Richard K. Call, receiver of public moneys in said district, commanding them to permit the persons praying for the mandamus to enter and purchase certain sections of land, described in the writ, under the provisions of the act of congress of the 22d of April, 1826, which gave rights of pre-emption in the purchase of land to certain settlers in the states of Alabama and Mississippi, and the territory of Florida. From the superior court, the case was removed by a writ of error, to the court of appeals for the territory of Florida; and, on the 21st of January, 1831, the order of the superior court was affirmed by the court of appeals. From this judgment the United States appealed to this court. The court ordered the appeal to be dismissed; the proceeding by mandamus being at common law, and therefore the cases should have been brought up by writs of error. 471 651 635 661 617 7p 634 129 681 7p 634 137 452 137 643 EX PARTE MARTHA BRADSTREET, IN THE MATTER OF MARTHA Mandamus. In the district court of the northern district of New York, writs of right were prosecuted for lands lying in that district, and neither in the writs, or in the counts, was there an averment of the value of the premises being sufficient in amount to give the court jurisdiction. The tenants appeared, and moved to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction; which motion was granted. Subsequently, the demandant moved to reinstate the cases and to amend, by inserting an averment that the premises were of the value of five hundred dollars; which motion was denied by the court. The demandant also moved the court to compel full records of the judgments and orders of dismission, and of the process in the several suits, to be made up and filed, so that the demandant might have the benefit of a writ of error to the supreme court, in order to have its decision upon the grounds and merits of such judgments and orders. The district court refused this motion. On a rule in the supreme court for a mandamus to the district judge, and a return to the same, it was held, that the refusal to allow the amendment to the writ and count, by inserting the averment of the value of the property, was not the subject of examination in this court. The allowance of amendments to pleadings is in the discretion of the judge of the inferior court; and no control over the action of the judge in refusing or admitting them will be exercised by this court. The court granted a mandamus requiring the district judge to have the records of the cases made up, and to enter judgments thereon, in order to give the demandant the benefit of a writ of error to the supreme court. In cases where the demand is not for money, and the nature of the action does not require the value of the thing demanded to be stated in the declaration, the practice of this court, and of the courts of the United States has been, to allow the value to be given in evidence. This court will not exercise any control over the proceedings of an inferior court of the United States, in allowing or refusing to allow amendments in the pleadings, in cases depending in those courts; but every party in such courts has a right to the judgment of this court in a suit brought in those courts, provided the matter in dispute exceeds the value of two thousand dollars. AT the January term of this court in 1832, on the motion of Mr. Jones, counsel for the demandant, the court granted "a rule on the district judge of the district court of the United States for the northern district of New York, commanding him to be and appear before this *635] court, either in person or by an attorney of this court, on the first day of the next January term of this court, to wit on the second Monday of January, Anno Domini, 1833, to show cause, if any he have, why a mandamus should not be awarded to the said district judge of the northern district of New York, commanding him, "1. To reinstate, and proceed to try and adjudge, according to the law and right of the case, the several writs of right and the mises thereon joined, lately pending in said court, and said to have been dismissed by order of said court, between Martha Bradstreet, demandant, and Apollos Cooper et al. tenants. "2. Requiring said court to admit such amendments in the form of pleading, or such evidence as may be necessary to aver or to ascertain the jurisdiction of said court, in the several suits aforesaid. "3. Or if sufficient cause should be shown by the said judge on the return of this rule, or should otherwise appear to this court, [Ex parte Bradstreet.] against a writ of mandamus requiring the matters and things aforesaid to be done by the said judge; then to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue from this court, requiring the said judge to direct and cause full records of the judgments or orders of dismission in the several suits aforesaid, and of the processes of the same, to be duly made up and filed, so as to enable this court to reexamine and decide the grounds and merits of such judgments or orders upon writs of error; such records showing upon the face of each what judgments or final orders dismissing, or otherwise definitively disposing of said suits, were rendered by the said district court; at whose instance, upon what grounds, and what exceptions or objections were reserved or taken by said demandant, or on her behalf, to the judgments or decisions of the said district court in the premises, or to the motions whereon such judgments or decisions were found; and what motion or motions, application or applications, were made to said court by the demandant, or on her behalf, and either granted or overruled by said district court, both before and after said judg ments or decisions dismissing or otherwise finally disposing of said suits; especially, what motions or applications were made by said demandant or on her behalf to said district court, to be admitted to amend her counts in the said suits, or to produce evidence to [*636 establish the value of the lands, &c. demanded in such counts, together with all the papers filed, and proceedings had in said suits respectively." 6 Peters, 774. The honourable Alfred Concklin, judge of the district court of the United States for the northern district of New York, appeared before the court, by Mr. Beardsley his counsel; and, in pursuance of the rule, made the following statement as a return thereto. "To the supreme court of the United States. In answer to a rule granted by your honourable court, the certified copy whereof, hereunto annexed, was on the 21st of December instant served upon him, the undersigned begs leave respectfully to state, as follows: "1. That after the mises had been joined in the several causes mentioned in the rule, motions were made therein on the part of the tenants that the same should be dismissed upon the ground that the counts respectively contained no allegation of the value of the matter in dispute; and that it did not therefore appear by the pleadings that the causes were within the jurisdiction of the court. In conformity with what appeared to have been the uniform language of the national courts upon the question, and his own views of the law; and in accordance especially with several decisions in the circuit court for the third circuit (see 4 Wash. C. C. Rep. 482, 624,) the undersigned granted these motions. Assuming that the causes were rightly dismissed, it follows of course that he ought not now to be required to reinstate them, unless leave ought also to be granted to the demandant to amend her counts. "2. After the dismissal of these causes as above stated, motions were made therein on the part of the demandant, that the same should be reinstated, and that she should be permitted to amend her |