[Morris v. The Lessee of Harmer's Heirs.] to the location of the ground; and George W. Jones, as such agent, accepted a deed, and took possession of the land according to the boundaries described in the deed: the lessors of the plaintiff are concluded by his acts, and the plaintiffs cannot recover. 3. If, upon the whole evidence, the jury believe that Mrs. Harmer, the next friend of the minors in prosecuting the bill in chancery, and obtaining the decree given in evidence, authorized George W. Jones to obtain the deed of release, under the decree, and to take possession of the lands; and that George W. Jones, under this authority, [*565 as agent for the complainants obtaining the decree, and, in conjunction with the attorney for the complainants in obtaining the decree, assented to the location of the ground, and George W. Jones, as such agent, accepted a deed, and took possession of the land according to the boundaries described in such deed, and continued that possession, exercising acts of ownership as agent after all the lessors of the plaintiff obtained their full age; and the defendants purchased before the lessors of the plaintiffs disavowed the acts of George W. Jones, and without any notice or knowledge of an intention of the lessors of the plaintiffs to disavow the acts of said Jones, public sale of the adjacent lands being made, with the knowledge of said Jones, and no notice given by him that the lessors of the plaintiffs (he continuing their agent) had disavowed, or intended to disavow, his acts in locating the lands, and taking a deed for and possession thereof: the plaintiffs cannot recover. 4. That the deed of release from E. Stone to T. Kirby, and the decree from the sheriff to T. Kirby, given in evidence in this cause, for part of the lands previously released by E. Stone to the lessors of the plaintiffs, under the decree, in execution of a contract paramount to the original title of E. Stone, and decreed to be executed, did not, in law, divest the title of the lessors of the plaintiffs, previously acquired to the lands so released by E. Stone to Kirby, and conveyed by the sheriff to Kirby, and the continuance of the lessors of the plaintiff in possession of all the land released to them, under the decree, and taken possession of by George W. Jones, and retaining the title thereto, is, in law, a continued affirmance of the acts of George W. Jones as their agent, which cannot be disavowed without releasing to E. Stone, and restoring to him the possession of that fraction of the land, released under the decree which the location claimed in the first does not cover. 5. That the relation in which the defendants are proved to stand to those under whom they claim title, does not warrant the jury to infer that the defendants had knowledge that the lessors of the plaintiff's had disavowed, or intended to disavow, the location as accepted by George W. Jones. The second instruction proceeds upon the ground, that the authority given by Mrs. Harmer to Jones, his assenting to [*566 accept the release of Stone, and taking possession of the land released, concluded the plaintiffs from a right to recover; although they were minors, and never personally assented thereto. From [Morris v. The Lessee of Harmer's Heirs.] what has been already said, this instruction was properly refused. Mrs. Harmer had no authority to bind the heirs by the acceptance of any release, not conforming to the decree. The third instruction proceeds upon the ground, that the acceptance of the release by Jones, under the authority of Mrs. Harmer, and the possession of the land by Jones as agent, and continuing that possession after the plaintiffs attained full age, and until after the defendants had made their purchases of the land, without any disavowal or notice of disavowal by the plaintiffs of the acts of Jones; would preclude the plaintiff's from a right to recover. We think, for, reasons already given, the law is otherwise, and therefore the instruction was rightly refused. The fourth instruction affirms, that the release of Stone to Kirby for part of the land included in the prior release of Stone, under the decree, did not divest the legal title of the plaintiffs to the lands so released to them. So far the instruction prayed was undoubtedly correct. But it did not stop here, but proceeded to declare, that the continuance of the plaintiff in possession of the land so released by Stone, under the decree, was a continued affirmance of the acts of Jones as their agent, which could not be disavowed without releasing to Stone, and restoring to him the possession of that fraction of the land released, which the decree did not cover. To this instruction there are two objections. The first is, that if the release to Kirby by Stone, and the conveyance by Kirby to Jones, were for the exclusive benefit of the heirs of Harmer, and to quiet their title to that fraction of land, (as the evidence in the case asserts,) no such release could be now required, since the plaintiffs would be entitled to it by an independent title. But the other is equally decisive. If the plaintiffs possess a legal title to the land in controversy, not founded on that release, it can furnish no bar to their right to recover, that there exists an equitable claim against them to surrender other land taken under that release, to which ex æquo et bono, they are not entitled. The instruction was, therefore, properly refused. The fifth and last instruction proceeds upon the ground, that *567] *knowledge on the part of the defendants, that the plaintiffs had disavowed, or intended to disavow, the location as accepted by Jones, might vary the right of the plaintiffs to recover; and that the relation in which the defendants are proved to stand to those under whom they claim title, did not warrant the jury to infer, that the defendants had that knowledge. This instruction is open to the objection, that it asks the court to decide upon a matter of fact, as to what the relation was, in which the defendants were proved to stand, to those under whom they claim title. But the decisive answer is, that it asks an instruction upon a point of law, not shown to have any legal bearing upon the case. It could have no influence upon the cause, if given, and might have had a tendency to mislead the jury. It was, therefore, properly refused by the court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs. EX PARTE TOBIAS WATKINS. Habeas corpus. W., at May term, 1829, of the circuit court of the district of Colum- The eighth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which declares TOBIAS WATKINS, by Mr. Brent, his counsel, presented a petition to the court, setting forth that at the term of the circuit court of the district of Columbia, holden for the county of Washington, on the first Monday of May, 1829, certain presentments and indictments were found against him, upon three of which indictments trials were had and verdicts passed against him, and judgments on such verdicts respectively were pronounced by the court, purporting to condemn him to certain terms of imprisonment, and also to the payment of certain pecuniary fines and costs, for the supposed offences therein. For the nature of those proceedings, the petitioner referred to the exemplifications filed in this court, with an application made to the court at January term, 1830, 3 Peters' Rep. 193. The 7p 568 431 663 7p 568 61f 142 7p 568 641 347 7p 568 771 166 [Ex parte Watkins.] petition stated that immediately after the rendition of such judgments, and in pretended execution of the same, on the 14th day of August, 1829, he, the petitioner, was committed to the common jail of the county of Washington, and there remained until the terms of imprisonment imposed by the several judgments had expired, the same having expired on the 14th day of May, 1830: and that ever since that time he has been, and still is detained in the criminal apartment of the prison under the colour and pretence of authority, not only of the judgments, but of three certain writs issued on the 16th day of February, 1830, by the clerk of the circuit court of Washington county, by special orders of the district attorney of the United States for the district of Columbia, as he has been informed and believes, at the request and by direction of the president of the United States. That he is illegally detained in prison by the authority of the said writs, as he is well advised; and avers that they give no authority for his commitment and detention, having been not only illegally and oppressively issued, but he has been by them deprived of the privilege secured to him by the laws of the land, to be released from imprisonment on the ground of his insolvency, and being unable to pay his debts. *The writs gave no authority for his present detention and *570] imprisonment, for a longer period than the first Monday in May, 1830; since which time, even admitting the writs to have been legally issued, his imprisonment has been illegal and oppressive, and without any authority whatever. That the fines are excessive, and as such, contrary to the laws of the land, as he was at the time they were imposed, and ever since has been unable to pay the same, and it is not the law of the land that a citizen shall be confined for life for fines which he cannot pay. He has been refused the benefit of the insolvent laws, and if relief cannot be obtained from this court, from his inability to pay the fines he will be confined for life. The petition "prays the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus to be directed to the marshal of the district of Columbia, in whose custody, as keeper of said jail, your petitioner is, commanding him to bring before your honours the body of your petitioner, together with the cause of his commitment, and especially commanding him to return with said writ, the record of the proceedings upon said indictments, with the judgments thereupon, and the several writs under the supposed authority of which your petitioner is now detained, as aforesaid, in a criminal apartment of said jail, by the supposed authority, and in virtue of said several writs." The court granted a rule to show cause returnable on a subsequent day of the term. The case was argued by Mr. Brent and Mr. Coxe, for the relator; and by Mr. Taney, attorney-general, for the United States. Mr. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the court. This is an application to the court to award a writ of habeas cor [Ex parte Watkins.] pus to bring up the body of Tobias Watkins, a prisoner asserted to be illegally confined in the common jail of Washington county in the district of Columbia, under process of execution issued from the circuit court of the United states for the same district.. A rule was served upon the attorney-general, to show cause why the application should not be granted; and the cause has been fully argued upon the return of that rule. It is admitted, that all the facts existing in the case have been laid before the court, exactly [*571 as they would appear, if the habeas corpus had been duly awarded and returned; so that the judgment, which the court are called upon to pronounce, is precisely that, which ought to be pronounced upon a full hearing upon the return to the writ of habeas corpus, and it has accordingly been so argued at the bar. The material facts are as follows. Watkins was tried at the May term of the circuit court, 1829, upon three several indictments found against him at that term for certain offences against the United States; and being found guilty, was upon each indictment sentenced to imprisonment for three calendar months, and to pay certain fines, to wit, on one indictment two thousand dollars, on another, seven hundred and fifty dollars, and on a third three hundred dollars, with costs of prosecution. There is no award in either of the judgments, that the prisoner stand committed until the sentence be performed. Under these sentences Watkins was immediately committed to jail by the then marshal of the district; and upon the expiration of his office, which was after the term of imprisonment was exhausted, and the appointment of a successor, he was delivered over in jail with other prisoners to his successor; and he has ever since been detained in custody. The terms of imprisonment awarded by the judgments expired on the 14th of May, 1830. On the 3d day of September, 1829, the district attorney sued forth three several writs of fieri facias, to levy the aforesaid fines; upon which due return was made by the marshal of nulla bona. Upon the 16th of February, 1830, the district attorney sued forth three several writs of capias ad satisfaciendum against Watkins to levy the same fines, which were all returnable to the then next May term of the circuit court. By these precepts the marshal is commanded to take Watkins, and him safely keep, so that he have his body before the circuit court on the first Monday of May then next, to satisfy unto the United States the fine, costs, and charges... No return was made to the circuit court by the marshal according to the exigency of these writs; and nothing further appears upon the records and proceedings of the court until the 10th day of January, 1833, when the late marshal of the district made a return to each capias ad satisfaciendum as follows. "Cepi. Delivered over to my successor in office." [*572 Upon this state of the facts several questions have arisen and been argued at the bar; and one, which is preliminary in its nature, at the suggestion of the court. This is, whether, under the circumstances of the case, the court possessed jurisdiction to award the writ |