[Lessee of Livingston v. Moore and others.] This view of the acts of the state is clearly not to be sustained by a reference to the facts of the case. As to the judgment of 1797, that is unquestionably a judicial act; and as to the settled accounts, the lien is there created by the act of men who, quoad hoc, were acting in a judicial character; and their decision being subjected to an appeal to the ordinary, or rather the highest of the tribunals of the country, gives to those settlements a decided judicial character: and were it otherwise, how else are the interests of the state to be protected? The body politic has its claims upon the constituted authorities, as well as individuals; and if the plaintiffs' course of reasoning could be permitted to prevail, it would then follow, that provision might be made for collecting the debts of every one else, but those of the state must go unpaid, whenever legislative aid became necessary to both. This would be pushing the reason and nature of things beyond the limits of natural justice. It is next contended, that the acts of 1806 and 1807 are unconstitutional and void, because contrary to the ninth section of the Pennsylvania bill of rights, which provides, in the words of magna charta, that no one shall be deprived of his property but by the laws of the land. This exception has already been disposed of by the view that has been taken of the nature and character of those laws. It has been shown that there is nothing in this provision either inconsistent with natural justice or the constitution of the state: there is nothing of an arbitrary character in them. They are also charged with being contrary to the ninth article of the amendments of the constitution of the United States, and the sixth section of the Pennsylvania bill of rights, securing the trial by jury. 552 As to the amendments of the constitution of the United States, they must be put out of the case; since it is now settled that those amendments do not extend to the states: and this observation disposes of the next exception, which relies on the seventh article of those amendments. As to the sixth section of the Pennsylvania bill of rights, we can see nothing in these laws on which to fasten the imputation of a violation of the right of trial by jury; since, in creating the lien attached to the settled accounts, the right of an appeal to a jury is secured to the debtor: and as to the inquest given under the execution law, with a view to ascertaining if the rents and profits can discharge the debt in a limited time, as a prelude to the right of selling; we are well satisfied that there is no more reason for extending the provision of the amendment to that inquest, than there would be to the inquest of a coroner, or any other mere inquest of office. The word trial, used in the sixth section, clearly points to a different object; and the distinction between trial by jury and inquest of office, is so familiar to every mind, as to leave no sufficient ground for extending to the latter that inviolability which could have been intended only for the former. The one appertains to a mere remedy for the recovery of money, which may be altered at any time without any danger to private security; the other is justly regarded in every state in the union, as among the most inestimable privileges of a freeman. VOL. VII.-2 K [Lessee of Livingston v. Moore and others.] The two remaining grounds urged for impugning the constitutionality of these laws, have been disposed of by observations already made. It only remains to consider the point made upon the rejection of certain evidence proposed to be introduced; the object of which was to invalidate the settled accounts, by showing that, in fact, the accounts between the state and Nicholson never were settled, that is, finally and conclusively settled. Here again, as was remarked of the evidence already considered, admitting the fact proposed to be proved, what could it avail the party in this suit? As far as the accounts were settled and certified, the law gave the lien for the amount certified; and why should that benefit be deferred until the last possible shilling in dispute should be finally passed upon; delayed perhaps until lost, or until the debtor could no longer parry the decision; and thus give a preference to others at his will? If, then, the fact intended to be established by the evidence could not have availed the plaintiffs, the court could have committed no error in rejecting it, whatever may have been the reasons given for the rejection. *553] We are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment below, and it will accordingly be affirmed, with costs. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs. 410 GEORGE MORRIS AND DAVID GWYNNE, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE LESSEE OF JOSIAH HARMER'S HEIRS. Ejectment for a lot of ground in the city of Cincinnati. A question as to the admission of the evidence of the declaration of a deceased person, as to boundary. Historical facts of general and public notoriety may be proved by reputation, and that reputation may be established by historical works, of known character and accuracy. But evidence of this sort is confined in a great measure to ancient facts which do not presuppose better evidence in existence; and where, from the nature of the transaction, or the remoteness of the period, or the public and general reception of the facts, a just foundation is laid for general confidence. The work of a living author who is within the reach of the process of the court, can hardly be deemed of this nature. He may be called as a witness; he may be examined as to the sources and accuracy of his information; and especially if the facts which he relates are of a recent date, and may be fairly presumed to be within the knowledge of many living persons, from whom he has derived his materials; there would seem to be cogent reasons to say that his book was not, under such circumstances, the best evidence within the reach of the parties. Special circumstances, which were considered as exempting the evidence contained in a book, called the "Picture of Cincinnati," of the date of the survey of the city and laying out lots in part of the same, from the common rule, which justified its admission. The plat of the lots in the city of Cincinnati, which had been recorded, and on which the streets and alleys in the same were designated, and which had been generally recognized and used in the surveys of the lots laid down in the same, was properly admitted in evidence. The legal title to lands in Ohio can only be passed by a proper conveyance by deed, according to the laws of the state. IN error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio. This was an action of ejectment prosecuted by Eliza Harmer, Josiah Harmer, and William Harmer, children and heirs at law of Josiah Harmer, deceased, against George Morris and David Gwynne, to recover possession of a part of a town lot in the city of Cincinnati. On the trial of the cause, the defendants excepted to the admission of certain evidence, and to the instructions given by the court to the jury upon matters of law. To reverse the judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, they prosecuted this writ of error. [*555 The case was argued by Mr. Ewing, for the plaintiffs in error; and by Mr. Caswell, for the defendants. The facts of the case, and the questions of law which were presented for decision, are fully stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error to revise the judgment of the circuit court for the district of Ohio, rendered against the plaintiffs in error, who were the original defendants in an action of ejectment, commenced in that court in 1828. [Morris v. The Lessee of Harmer's Heirs.] The original suit is for a lot of land situate in Cincinnati. The original plaintiffs are the heirs of Gen. Josiah Harmer; and claim title to the premises under a deed executed by John Cleves Symmes, then proprietor of the lands, including the whole city, on the 6th of May, 1791, acknowledged on the 28th of November, 1804, and recorded on the 30th of the same month. The boundaries stated in the deed are as follows: "on the south on the front or river street, lying directly in front of fort Washington, being twelve rods wide on the street, including two lots, and extending northerly from the said front street twenty rods to the south side of the second street from the Ohio, and adjoining the said second street twelve rods from east to west; and on the east bounded by the lands of his excellency Governor St. Clair." These lots were without the original bounds of the city. At the time when this deed was executed, Symmes had not procured a legal title thereto under his contract with the United States for his purchase; but he subsequently obtained it in 1794. The defendants, at the trial, set up title to the premises derived under one Ethan Stone, who purchased the lands mentioned in the deed from Symmes to Harmer, at a sheriff's sale, on an execution by one Lamma against Symmes, and as his property, in March, 1803. At the trial there was a good deal of evidence as to the location and boundaries of the lots conveyed by the deed of Symmes to *556] Harmer, and comprehending the premises; and this *constituted one of the points in controversy. The defendants, also, to rebut the plaintiffs' title, gave in evidence the record of the proceedings in a suit in chancery, prosecuted by Harmer against Stone in the supreme court of Ohio in 1811; the object of which was to procure a decree against Stone for a release and surrender of his title to these lots, under the sheriff's sale; upon the ground expressly stated in the bill, that the deed of conveyance from Symmes to Harmer, in 1791, (the former having then acquired no legal title,) conveyed only an equitable title to Harmer, and that Stone had full notice thereof at the time of his purchase under the sheriff's sale. Pending the proceedings, Harmer died, and the suit was revived in behalf of the widow and heirs of Harmer; all of whom, except one, were then under age, and prosecuted their suit by their mother as their next friend. Afterwards, in 1817, a decree was made in favour of the plaintiffs, directing Stone to release all his title to the land according to the boundaries contained in the deed from Symmes to Harmer; and to yield up the possession accordingly. The heirs of Harmer did not all arrive at age until 1825. After the rendition of this decree, one George W. Jones was employed by Mrs. Harmer to procure a release from Stone pursuant to the decree. He testified that he came to Cincinnati in 1821. That before leaving the city of Philadelphia, Mrs. Harmer requested him to take the agency of their claim in Cincinnati, then in the hands of Jesse Hunt, and to receive a conveyance from Stone of the lands decreed to the heirs of Harmer, and take possession of the same. That, at that time, all [Morris v. The Lessee of Harmer's Heirs.] the heirs except one were minors, and with her who was of full age, he had no conversation respecting the matter; nor had he any written authority to act as agent for any of them. That after his arrival at Cincinnati he applied to Stone for a conveyance; and after some difficulty and delay, he got him to go upon the ground in company with Mr. Este, the attorney at law for Harmer's heirs, and Mr. Gest, a surveyor, and the land was set off by Stone, as he (Stone) claimed was correct. The surveyor handed him a plan of survey; and Stone executed a release of the same to Harmer's heirs. That the witness knew nothing of the situation of the town, or the true locality of the lots. He had no agency in, nor did he ever know of the additional description of the four town lots as *mentioned [*557 in the deed of release made by Stone; nor did he know that it conveyed other or different ground than was described in the deed made by Symmes to Harmer. It was also proved on the part of the plaintiffs, that in 1824 an execution was issued against Stone, and levied upon a triangular piece of ground at the junction of Ludlow and Front streets, (part of the premises included in the deed of release of Stone, and contended to be not included in the deed of Symmes to Harmer,) as Stone's property, and bought at the sheriff's sale, in February, 1825, by one Timothy Kirby, who afterwards, in June, 1827, conveyed the same to Jones; and Stone afterwards, in August of the same year, upon a representation that it was bought by Jones for Harmer's heirs, to quiet their title, executed a release thereof to Kirby. It was also proved that Harmer's heirs have always been in the undisturbed possession of the land released by Stone to them, under the decree. That about the year 1821 or 1822, Josiah Harmer, one of the heirs, then a minor, but who came of age in 1823, came to Cincinnati; and wishing to erect a house on the corner of the triangular piece of ground above referred to, contracted for the building of the same, which was erected thereon, and has ever since been in the possession and occupancy of persons holding under Harmer's heirs, and paying rent to them. This statement of facts is necessary to understand the instructions prayed of the court, which will hereafter come under consideration Before proceeding to consider them, it will be proper to dispose of some minor exceptions taken to certain evidence, which was admitted at the trial. It has been already stated, that one of the points of the controversy at the trial was as to the true location and boundary of the lots conveyed by Symmes to Harmer. One Thomas Henderson, a witness, among other things, testified that "he had heard a number of the old citizens of Cincinnati, now dead, speak of the situation of the lots sold by Symmes to Harmer; and named particularly Joel Williams, one of the old proprietors of the other part of the town, and David Zeigler, who, he said, was the reputed agent of Gen. Harmer; and in the conversation spoken of, warmly censured Ethan Stone for attempting to take from Harmer his property." The de |