[United States v. Brewster.] the sections of the bank charter which refer to "bills,"" notes," and "bills of exchange," thus showing that the "notes" of the bank, and "bills of exchange" are not the same; while upon other words used in the eighteenth section, the offence charged against the defendant might have been the foundation of an indictment, the court would decide whether in this case as a "bill" or "note," the draft set forth in the indictment was properly described. He also cited 10 Petersd. 44; 2 East's Cr. Law, 876; 10 Petersd. 51. The following certificate was directed to be issued to tne circuit court. On a certificate of division in opinion of the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern *dis*167] trict of Pennsylvania, and on the question and point on which the judges of that court were opposed in opinion, and which was certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel: on consideration whereof, this court is of opinion, that the genuine instrument, of which the said false, forged and counterfeited instrument, in the certificate of division mentioned, is in imitation, is not a bill issued by order of the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, according to the true intent and meaning of the eighteenth section of the act of congress, passed on the 16th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixteen, entitled "an act to incorporate the subscribers of the Bank of the United States:" whereupon it is ordered and adjudged by this court, that it be certified to the said circuit court of the district of Pennsylvania, that the genuine instrument, of which the said false, forged and counterfeited instrument in the certificate of division mentioned is in imitation, is not a bill issued by order of the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, according to the true intent and meaning of the eighteenth section of the act of congress, passed on the 16th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixteen, entitled, "an act to incorporate the subscribers of the Bank of the United States." 124 FARMERS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA, V. JOHN HOOFF, ET AL. R. being indebted to the Farmers' Bank of Alexandria, on certain promissory notes exceeding in amount one thousand dollars, conveyed to H. a lot of ground in Alexandria, exceeding one thousand dollars in value, devised to her by her husband, to secure the payment of the said notes by sale of the lot. R. claimed an estate in fee in the property conveyed to the trustee. The sum due to the bank was reduced by payments to less than one thousand dollars, and R. being deceased, a bill was filed by the bank to compel the trustee to sell the property conveyed to him by R. for the payment of the balance of the debt. The circuit court decreed that R. held no other interest in the property than a life estate, and dismissed the bill. The complainants appealed. On a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, the debt remaining due to the bank being less than one thousand dollars, the amount required to give jurisdiction in appeals and writs of error from the circuit court of the district of Columbia; it was held that the real matter in controversy was the debt claimed in the bill; and though the title of the lot might be inquired into incidentally, it does not constitute the object of the suit. The appeal was dismissed. ON appeal from the circuit court of the United States of the district of Columbia for the county of Alexandria. In the circuit court of the county of Alexandria the appellants filed a bill setting forth that a certain Mary Resler being indebted to the Farmers' Bank of Alexandria, as drawer of certain promissory notes, amounting to one thousand two hundred and sixty-seven dollars, which notes were renewed and were afterwards reduced by payments, in order to secure the payment of the sum remaining due to the bank on the 10th of September, 1823, made and executed a deed to John Hooff, one of the defendants, by which certain real estate in the city of Alexandria, was conveyed to him in trust to secure the payment of the amount due on said notes. The title of Mary Resler to the property so conveyed, was derived from the will of her deceased husband; and the bill claims that she took a fee simple in the property, to be defeated by her marrying again, and she having died without marrying, the property is liable to her debts. The bill proceeds to state, that James Galt and others, also *appellees, contend that Mary Resler took, under the will of [*169 her husband, no more than a life estate in the property so conveyed in trust; and that John Hooff, the trustee, declines making a sale of the property to satisfy the debt due to the appellants. The bill asks a discovery of the asserted title of the appellees, that the equity of redemption set up by the appellees may be foreclosed, and that the trustee be decreed to sell the premises. The bill also asks for an account from the administrator of Mary Resler. The answer of John Galt, one of the appellees, denies the title of Mary Resler in the property conveyed by the deed of trust to have been a fee simple in her; and asserts that the fee in the same descended to the respondent and to his brothers, and asserts that Mary [Bank of Alexandria v. Hooff et al.] Resler took no more in the premises, under the will of her deceased husband, than an estate for life. The circuit court, being of opinion that Mary Resler took no more than an estate for life under the will of her deceased husband; and conveyed to the appellant, by the deed, no more than such an estate, dismissed the complainant's bill. From this decree the appellants appealed to this court. Mr. Fendall moved to dismiss the appeal; this court having no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, unless the sum in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars. It was admitted that the debt due to the bank from Mary Resler, at the time the bill was filed, did not exceed seven hundred dollars; and an affidavit was exhibited to the court to prove the estate held by the trustee exceeded one thousand dollars in value. Mr. Fendall cited Columbian Insurance Company v. Wheelwright, 7 Wheat. 534; Oldgrant, on the demise of Meredith v. M'Kee, 1 Peters, 248; and Ritchie v. Mauro, 2 Peters, 248. He contended that the only amount in controversy was the sum due to the appellants. It is the beneficial amount; that which will result to a party in the event of the suit, which gives jurisdiction. Mr. Lee, contra, argued that the title to the estate conveyed *170] *to the trustee was the question in the court, and this court would look alone to the value of the estate. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court. This is a motion to dismiss an appeal from a decree of the court of the United States for this district, sitting in the county of Alexandria; because the matter in controversy does not amount to one thousand dollars. The bill was filed for the purpose of obtaining a decree for the sale of a lot, on which a deed of trust had been given to secure the payment of a sum of money amounting with interest to less than one thousand dollars. The bill was dismissed, and from this decree an appeal was taken. The appellant alleges, in support of the jurisdiction of the court, that the real question is, whether the debtor be entitled to the lot, and as that is worth more than one thousand dollars, this court may take jurisdiction, though the sum claimed in the bill is less. The court is of a different opinion. The real matter in controversy is the debt claimed in the bill; and though the title of the lot may be inquired into incidentally, it does not constitute the object of the suit. The appeal is dismissed. 126 JOHN HOLMES, MICHAEL OMEALY, RICHARD CATON, HUGH PELLEES. Questions on the validity of certain entries of lands in the state of Kentucky. It has been a settled principle in Kentucky that surplus land does not vitiate an The principle is well settled, that a junior entry shall limit the survey of a prior entry, to its calls. This rule is reasonable and just. Until an entry be surveyed, a subsequent location must be governed by its calls; and this is the reason why it is essential that every entry shall describe with precision the land designed to be appropriated by it. If the land adjoining to the entry should be covered by a subsequent location, it would be most unjust to sanction a survey of the prior entry beyond its calls, and so as to include a part of the junior entry. The locator may survey his entry in one or more surveys, or he may, at pleasure, withdraw a part of his entry. When a part of a warrant is withdrawn, the rules of the land office require a memorandum on the margin of the record of the original entry, showing what part of it is withdrawn. In giving a construction to an entry, the intention of the locator is to be chiefly regarded, the same as the intention of the parties in giving a construction to a contract. If a call be impracticable, it is rejected as surplusage, on the ground that it was made through mistake; but if a call be make for a natural or artificial object, it shall always control mere course and dista ice. Where there is no object called for to control a rectangular figure, that form shall be given to the survey. No evidence can be looked into in this court, which exercises an appellate jurisdiction, that was not before the circuit court; and the evidence certified with the record, must be considered here as the only evidence before the court below. If, in certifying a record, a part of the evidence in the case had been omitted, it might be certified in obedience to a certiorari; but in such a case, it must appear from the record that the evidence was used or offered to the circuit court. Under the laws of Kentucky, the cancelling of a deed does not reinvest the title in the grantor. *APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. [*172 In the circuit court the appellants filed their bill in November, 1815, setting forth a title to ten thousand acres of land derived under an entry made by Edward Voss, on the 11th of October, 1783, upon which patents duly issued, and charging that the defendants were in possession of the said lands claiming title under entries made subsequent to that of Edward Voss. The bill prayed a discovery, that the defendants may be decreed to convey to the complainants their respective claims, to render possession of the land withheld, and for other and further relief. After various proceedings in the case, by amended bills and other [Holmes and others v. Trout and others.] wise, from 1815, the circuit court at May term, 1829, gave the following opinion and decree: The complainants state in their bill that "Edmund Voss, on the 11th day of October, 1783, made, with the surveyor of the proper county, the following location: Edward Voss enters ten thousand acres by virtue of two treasury warrants, Nos. 8991 and 8990, beginning at the north-west corner of Patton's eight thousand four hundred acres survey; thence, with Allen's line, westwardly to the river, and along Robert's line on the east for quantity; also, five thousand acres by virtue of treasury warrant, No. 8989, beginning at the south-west corner of Patton's eight thousand four hundred acres survey, then westwardly with Patton, Pope and Thomas' survey; thence up the river, and on Patton's line on the east, for quantity." That surveys having been duly executed on said entries, the same were assigned to a certain Peyton Short, to whom patents were issued bearing date the 12th and 14th days of March, 1790; that on the 10th day of December, 1796, Short conveyed to John Holmes, by deed, his whole claim to the land in controversy, but that by contract, it is now jointly held by the said Holmes and the other complainants; and that the above deed is held for their joint benefit. The complainants further state that conflicting entries have been made by different persons since their location on the same land, and elder patents obtained; and they pray that a conveyance may be decreed to them on the ground of their prior equity. In their answers, *the defendants deny the equity set forth in the complainants' *173] bill; and, having the elder legal title founded upon valid entries and surveys, they pray that the bill may be dismissed. Since the commencement of the present term, the complainants have filed an amended bill, stating that the whole of the land in contest was purchased for the use and benefit of Holmes, Slater, Caton and Omealy; and that, subsequently, by the consent of Caton and Slater, Omealy became their trustee; that an agreement was entered into between the complainants and a certain John Breckenridge deceased, by which he undertook to render certain services, for which he was to have one moiety of the land; that the original deed to Holmes, never having been recorded, was handed to said Breckenridge, with other papers relating to the business, and with directions to Short to make a deed to the complainants and Breckenridge; that the said Breckenridge was in possession of the deed to Holmes, and authorized to receive a conveyance from Short to himself; and the complainants agreed with Short to cancel the deed to Holmes, which was done by delivering it to Short, who cancelled it by erasing his name, and a new deed was made by him to Breckenridge, and to William Omealy as trustee for John Holmes and William Slater, and to Hugh Thompson, as trustee for Richard Caton, bearing date 21st day of September, 1804. The amended bill further states that Breckenridge departed this life in 1806, before his part of the contract was performed, and that a bill was filed against his heirs by the complainants for a reconveyance of the land; that, on the final |