And in 1864 conditions were such in the loyal states of the Union as to cause the disclosures of the Jaquess-Gilmore interview with Davis to exercise a deciding influence in the Presidential campaign then in progress, and to rescue the nation from the calamity of the defeat of President Lincoln, which would surely have been accomplished but for the influence of this divinely ordered and divinely prospered embassy of peace.

To achieve that result those two brave and consecrated Christian men voluntarily entered upon and courageously and wisely prosecuted their very dangerous mission, with no other aid or encouragement from the Government than permission to risk all in an effort so seemingly unpromising and full of peril.

CONFEDERATE TESTIMONY

When Mr. Gilmore's article appeared in the Atlantic Monthly it immediately attracted the attention of the world and exerted a tremendous influence upon the attitude of European powers to the Confederacy. This fact caused Mr. Benjamin to send to Mr. Mason, and to the other diplomatic agents of the Confederacy in Europe, a letter in which he gives his version of the Jaquess-Gilmore interview with Mr. Davis and himself.

Mr. Benjamin's statement of the facts in the case are in agreement with the statements in the Gilmore article save only that he states that Gilmore and Jaquess claimed to be acting under the authority of President Lincoln. This claim, however, is contradicted by the letter of the envoys requesting an interview with Mr. Davis. Mr. Benjamin says:

"The President (Jefferson Davis) came to my office at 9 o'clock in the evening, and Colonel Ould came a few moments later with Messrs. Jaquess and Gilmore. The President said to them that he had heard, from me, that they came as messengers of peace from Mr. Lincoln; that as such they were welcome; that the Confederacy had never concealed its desire

for peace, and that he was ready to hear whatever they had to offer on that subject. . . . The President answered that as these proposals had been prefaced by the remark that the people of the North were a majority, and that a majority ought to govern, the offer was, in effect, a proposal that the Confederate States should surrender at discretion, admit that they had been wrong from the beginning of the contest, submit to the mercy of their enemies, and avow themselves to be in need of pardon for crimes; that extermination was preferable to such dishonor. . . . That the separation of the states was an accomplished fact; that he had no authority to receive proposals for negotiations except by virtue of his office as President of an independent Confederacy, and on this basis alone must proposals be made to him."11

Jefferson Davis' version in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 610, corroborates both Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Benjamin as to the terms discussed.12

ERRORS CORRECTED

Very remarkable indeed was the vigilance with which President Lincoln guarded and kept all knowledge of this movement within the narrowest possible limits. This rigidly maintained secrecy, while necessary to its success, was productive of one very undesirable result in that the President's private secretaries, because of their lack of knowledge of the embassy and of President Lincoln's interest and part in it, were unable to write its history with the accuracy and faithfulness that characterizes the monumental record of war-time events of which they had personal knowledge.

Those very worthy gentlemen in their great work, "Abraham Lincoln, A History," in referring to Colonel Jaquess, say: "With some force of character and practical talent, his piety

11 Benjamin to Mason, August 25th, 1864, Richmond Daily Dispatch, August 26th, 1864.

12 Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History, Vol. IX., pp.

211-212.

and religious enthusiasm touched that point of development which causes men to be classed as fanatics or prophets as success or failure waits on the unusual efforts to which they sometimes dedicate themselves."

This classes Colonel Jaquess as a prophet, seeing that his "unusual efforts" were marvelously, successful, but as I have shown, and as is admitted in a statement by these same authors in their "History," and copied on a later page of this chapter, such a designation of Colonel Jaquess, though not intended by them, does not seriously conflict with the following characterization of the Colonel by General Rosecrans: "He is a hero-John Brown and Chevalier Bayard rolled into one, and polished up with common sense and a knowledge of Greek, Latin and the Mathematics."13

The same "History" further affirms: "Instead of trusting to Church influence he (Colonel Jaquess) at once addressed himself to the ordinary military channels for communication with the South." Of course he did. Colonel Jaquess never intimated that he had any thought of "trusting to church influence” to enable him to proceed on his journey. When he first asked for permission to engage in this work he said: "God has laid the duty upon me," but like the “remarkably level-headed man" Mr. Lincoln declared him to be, and like the true soldier he was, he said in the same letter: "If He puts it into the hearts of my superiors to allow me to do so I shall be thankful." Colonel Jaquess was an officer in the Army, and never for a moment had he lost sight of the fact that he was subject to military orders. As Ezra and Nehemiah asked permission of the king to obey the call of God to go to Jerusalem to restore the temple and the walls of the city, so Colonel Jaquess applied "to the ordinary military channels" as the only method by which he had any right to proceed with the work to which he was well assured that he had been divinely called.

In referring to Colonel Jaquess' letter to President Lin

13 Down in Tennessee, p. 240.

coln from Baltimore, the "History" says: "But Mr. Lincoln did not need any further report from Colonel Jaquess. To his quick eye this brief letter told all the writer intended to communicate, and much more which his blinded enthusiasm could not comprehend. . . The President could not make himself a party to the well meant but dangerous petty intrigue. Colonel Jaquess was left strictly to his own course, and after waiting at Baltimore till his patience was exhausted, he returned to his regiment in the West to do better service as a soldier than as a diplomat.'

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These very uncomplimentary and disparaging references to Colonel Jaquess and his return to his regiment should be read in connection with the statement that Colonel Jaquess, at that time, reached his regiment just in time for the bloodiest battle of the war-the Battle of Chattanooga, in which he performed as heroic and signal service as marked the record of any leader of a thousand men, in any battle of the war.

The intimation in the "History" that the President's failure to answer Colonel Jaquess' letter from Baltimore was due to his lack of interest in the movement and his wish not to hear further from the Colonel relative to that matter, is answered by the statement that when on the 1st of April, 1864, Mr. Lincoln was asked why he did not answer Colonel Jaquess' letter sent him from Baltimore, he promptly and with manifest surprise said: "I never received his letter." This fully explains why Colonel Jaquess did not receive a reply to the letter sent the President after his return from his first mission. That letter, as will be seen, was withheld from the President by his secretary, who, at that time, was in charge of his mail. It was natural and prudent, as I have already stated, for that secretary, knowing nothing of the Jaquess matter, to regard this letter as one which should not be given to the President; but the facts as here set forth explain the matter fully and show Mr. Lincoln's great interest in the mission and the difficulties which he encountered in giving it 14 Abraham Lincoln, A History, Vol. IX., pp. 204-205.

encouragement and aid without giving embarrassing recognition of the Confederacy.

When President Lincoln read Colonel Jaquess' letter to Mr. Gilmore, in which he referred to his letter sent the President from Baltimore, Mr. Lincoln very earnestly said: "He has got something worth hearing. What a pity it is that they did not give me that letter."

Concerning Colonel Jaquess' proposition said "History" says: "President Lincoln saw clearly enough the futility of all such projected negotiations." But President Lincoln, as before stated, when this matter was first considered by him, declared that the proposition was "the first gleam" of hope he had obtained, and "that the higher powers were about to take a hand in this business and bring about a settlement." And as shown by his attitude toward this enterprise from the first, it elicited and held his interest and secured from him all the encouragement and assistance he could wisely give to it.

That it was understood by those who were associated with Mr. Lincoln in this enterprise that the President gave it his approval is shown by the following statement of General Garfield in a letter dated June 17th, 1863: "Colonel Jaquess has gone on his mission. The President approved it, though, of course, he did not make it an official matter.'

In the "History," the plan which Jaquess and Gilmore submitted to Jefferson Davis is spoken of as "the plan of adjustment which their imagination had devised and which was as visionary as might be expected from the joint effort of a preacher and a novelist. .. Mr. Lincoln had not thought of nor hinted at any such scheme to Mr. Gilmore, and he would not and could not have accepted it even if it had been agreed to or offered by the rebels."15

.

Fully to correct this serious error it is only necessary to remember that on the preceding pages of this chapter it is shown that the plan thus characterized by the authors of the "History" was carefully prepared by President Lincoln him15 Abraham Lincoln, A History, Vol. IX., p. 209.