than an old and leisurely people. In young states, all men are absorbed in the pursuit of business. Few have wealth, and none think of leisure. Defects in their laws are uncared for, until they produce some glaring injustice, when the excrescences are promptly and carelessly hewn off-often in such a way as to create greater evils. No comprehensive system of reform can be thought of, and the few who urge it are like men crying in the wilderness-or rather, like men who should from the wayside attempt to preach to passengers in a train at full speed.

The first approach to the ideas of Bentham, in any of the states which accepted the common law of England as their own, was in the consolidation of the statutes, which was effected in several states at various times, beginning, we believe, with the revision of 1813 in New York. The Revised Statutes of 1830 went somewhat further, and undertook the entire codification of some branches of the law, especially concerning real estate. It is a curious circumstance that the very authors of these statutes should have been sceptical as to the feasibility of codes, after having themselves made, of their own mere motion, the greatest stride towards codification ever known in that state.

The revision of the statutes did not, however, originate (consciously at least in the minds of its authors) in any scheme of comprehensive reform. Neither did the great and beneficent measure, by which, shortly afterward, imprisonment for debt was abolished. Indeed, this last measure was tried as a mere experiment. Many months were allowed to pass after its enactment, before it was put in force; and the law books of the time express serious doubts as to its remaining a law for even one year. It has stood undisturbed for thirty-two years, and is not in much danger of disturbance

now.

By this time, however, the minds of some energetic and philosophic men had been imbued with the belief that the system of common law needed not merely patching here and there, but a general revision, and a consolidation, so far as should be practicable, into one written body of law. The first practical effort in this direction was made in respect to the procedure of the courts

of justice. We must, therefore, say a few words concerning the condition in which that procedure was, and the efforts which were made to improve it.

Notwithstanding some valuable improvements effected by the Revised Statutes, the system of practice, both at law and in equity, in the state of New York, remained in a very discreditable condition. The new rules and the legislation of 1830, which greatly improved the English practice, were not followed in America, and the procedure of the courts of New York was perhaps more complicated and technical than that of any other state in the Union. Certainly that was the general opinion of lawyers in the other states. The judges, though invested with very broad powers, declined to attempt any thorough reform, and the legislature did not know where or how to begin.

It was well, looking at the result, that these things were so. Law reform needs to enlist the sympathies and interest of lawyers, and the tedious delays and embarrassments of legal practice bore almost as hardly on lawyers as on their clients.

The actual evils of the system then in existence induced a lawyer in active and successful practice, although then comparatively young, to publish a short tract upon the subject. This appeared in 1839, and was followed by pamphlets from other and anonymous pens, all complaining bitterly of the state of the courts and of legal practice, but none having any definite plan of reform to propose.

In 1842, the author of the tract first referred to, Mr. David Dudley Field, submitted to the judiciary committees of the New York legislature some bills embodying a plan of reform, as broad perhaps as the constitution then in force would permit. Even then Mr. Field had arrived at the conclusion that a complete fusion of law and equity was not only desirable but possible, and not only possible but absolutely essential to a complete reform, and to a proper administration of public justice. The Constitution of 1821 appeared to stand in the way of this scheme, and, while waiting for its remodelling, Mr. Field was content to urge an instalment only of his general plan. His sugges

tions-all of which, and more, have been since adopted by half the northern states, and in great part by England and Canada-were then received with respect, but entire incredulity. He stood for some time absolutely alone in his theory of reform.

In 1846, however, an opportunity arrived for which law reformers had anxiously waited. A convention was summoned by a vast majority of the people to revise the constitution of the state. That convention was controlled by men who, if not fully sympathizing with Mr. Field's views, were yet resolved to leave no obstacle in the way of their adoption by the legislature. While a decisive majority refused to blend the administration of law and equity into one system by a provision of the fundamental law, an equally decisive majority refused to deprive the legislature of the power to do so, if it saw fit. This was the wisest disposition of the subject which could be made. It would have been impossible to provide in the constitution all the rules and limitations which were necessary to accompany so great a change, while the way was left perfectly open for the legislature to perform the work in the most thorough manner. The new constitution provided, moreover, for the appointment of commissioners to revise the system of legal procedure, and of other commissioners to reduce to a written code the whole or a part of the common law. These provisions, in themselves, signalized a wonderful progress in public opinion. Twenty years before, the idea of a codification of the law was considered a visionary impracticability, and could have found no recognition in a statute, much less in a constitution.

Mr. Field, very soon after the adoption of the new constitution by the people, published another tract, urging the complete fusion of law and equity. Eminent jurists (such as the late Judge SANDFORD), who had doubted the wisdom of the change before, withdrew their opposition when the Court of Chancery, as a separate institution, was abolished, feeling that the double jurisdiction could not be well administered by one set of judges. Thus, although he found no one to co-operate actively with him, Mr. Field met with but slight opposition, and carried with him the sanction of a number of the leading members of the New York bar, when he visited

Albany in 1847, for the purpose of inducing the legislature to instruct the commissioners on practice and pleading to prepare a system uniform in its application to cases of legal and equitable cognisance. In this purpose he was successful, and the commissioners were so instructed by law.

It might naturally have been expected that when the legislature had determined to adopt a theory of which Mr. Field was the first, and for years the only advocate in this country, that they would have made him one of the commissioners to carry it into effect. But it was not so. The uncompromising advocates of any reform are almost invariably the objects of a prejudice which survives all objections to the reform itself. The legislature voted to adopt Mr. Field's plans, and to exclude him from all part in the honor of enacting them. He had not asked, or hinted a desire for the post, and was not disappointed.

Nevertheless, the preconcerted plan broke down. When the commissioners met, Mr. Loomis was fully imbued with the new doctrines. Mr. Hill was strongly opposed to them, and the decision lay with the late David Graham. Belonging to a conservative party, himself a conservative man-being engaged in a large and brilliant practice-the author of some works having a wide sale, which would be superseded by any radical change-having just issued a new edition of his treatise on practice, the best ever published, before or since-having in it expressed his belief that no radical changes would be made-his nature, his associations, his interests as a lawyer and an author, his pride of consistency, and his pride of opinion, all combined to induce him to take part with Mr. Hill. It is highly honorable to his sense of good faith and of loyalty to his constituents that Mr. Graham took the opposite course. Certainly we do not impute the slightest misconduct to Mr. Hill, who acted in accordance with his sober judgment as to the welfare of the state; but we do think that Mr. Graham judged rightly in holding himself bound, by the clear instructions of the legislature, to abandon his own peculiar ideas and to carry out the theory of the statute under which he acted.

Mr. Hill resigned in September 1847, and the legislature having

met again, a caucus was hastily summoned to choose his successor. Mr. Flanders, of Franklin (now, by the way, a peace Democrat, while Mr. Field is a war Republican), who was then in the Assembly, without any consultation with Mr. Field, strenuously and successfully urged his nomination and election.

The commission, as thus reconstructed, was homogeneous and effective. The main principles of a code of procedure were agreed upon, and within five months the code and the accompanying report were drawn up, revised, printed, and laid on the desks of the legislature. This code was almost entirely the work of Mr. Field.

Peculiar circumstances gave the commission great influence with the New York legislature of 1848. It was overwhelmingly Whig, and its members knew that they owed their election to the abstention of the "Barnburners" of the Democratic party in the fall of 1847. Mr. Field was one of the most prominent and able men of that section of the party. Mr. Loomis was scarcely less prominent in it. Mr. Graham was a leading Whig. The legislature was accordingly attentive to every wish of the commissioners, and almost obsequious in its concurrence with their views. A few amendments were made in the Senate, but when the bill came down to the Assembly, Mr. James Brooks (curious fact!) moved its reference to a select committee to report complete the same day. Of course the committee never examined the bill-the chairman ran around for the signatures of his fellow-members-the bill was reported without amendment, and passed unanimously.

And thus, with scarcely a murmur of opposition, the project which only six years before had seemed even to its author but a remote vision, was embodied into a law which, though fiercely assailed, has weathered all storms, and established itself impregnably in the jurisprudence of the country.

This was, however, the first and last instance of unanimity in regard to the code.

The mass of the legal profession were not prepared to hear of the enactment of the measure so soon. They had supposed that it would be referred to the next legislature, and adopted, if at all, only after much consideration and extensive revision. They