and so arranged that its contents may be made available with the least labor or confusion. This volume exhibits the same defects as all the late State Reports, where every case is required to be reported; it is crowded with an infinite number of useless cases, and by consequence the important cases are far too briefly discussed, and the arguments of counsel almost entirely excluded. The attempt, too, at simplifying pleadings, by means of codes of practice, makes more controversy than it saves. There are some cases in this volume which do not seem to admit of any question; as for instance, whether a licensed vender of spirituous liquors. can carry on his business through the instrumentality of an agent: Pickens vs. State, p. 116. And some others, which are decided contrary to what we had supposed the law to be: as in Roy vs. McMurtry, p. 307— that where the maker of a promissory note is inquired of by a person who had already purchased the note, as to its validity, and he answers that it is all right, and that he will pay it, and agrees to pay ten per cent. interest for an indefinite delay of payment, to which the holder of the note assents, by waiting until his assignor becomes insolvent, such facts will not estop the maker from defending against an action upon the note on the ground of a failure of the consideration! But the question of estoppels in pais is one of great uncertainty; but if any case is clear from all doubt, we should have supposed this was. I. F. R. THE PRACTICE IN PROCEEDINGS IN THE PROBATE COURTS, &c., &c. With an Appendix of Practical Forms; designed for the use of Executors and others having business in the Probate Court. By WILLIAM L. SMITH, Counsellor at Law. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1863. We have received this compend of probate law and practice, of 365 pages, 12mo., which appears to us a very useful and convenient book for such persons as it is designed to aid-those who have occasion to transact business in the probate courts, but are not educated to the profession. And it is certainly a useful book even to professional men. I. F. R. REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, at April and November Terms, 1862, and January Term, 1863. By E. PECK, Counsellor at Law. Vol. XXIX. Chicago: E. B. Myers, 1863. This volume of Mr. Peck's reports contains an unusual number and proportion of valuable cases; cases where the questions involved are important and difficult, and where they have been elaborately considered by the court and the counsel, and where the briefs of counsel are given at length, as to the points upon which the case is made to turn. Such cases are valuable to the profession throughout the country. There are many cases of this character in the present volume, among which we would refer to Curtiss vs. Brown, p. 201; Nicoll vs. Ogden, p. 323; American Express Co. vs. Pinckney, p. 392. From the cursory examination we have been able to give it, the volume seems to us a very valuable onc. I. F. R. A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY AND ADMIRALTY; with an Appendix containing the English and American Statutes of Limitations. By J. K. ANGELL. Fourth Edition, Revised and greatly Enlarged. By JOHN WILDER MAY, Counsellor at Law. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1861. We venture to call attention to Mr. May's edition of Mr. Angell's excellent work on Limitations. Mr. Angell was one of the most accurate and reliable of the American law writers, and this is one of his most carefully prepared works; and Mr. May seems to have faithfully performed the office of a careful editor, in bringing the authorities upon the several questions discussed down to the time of publication. It is a book which all practical lawyers will find of indispensable use. We have heard a tradition, which we regard as authentic, that Lord Brougham, in a letter addressed to the author, not many weeks before his death, pronounced this the most complete and able treatise upon the subject which the bar of England and America has yet produced. We are sure no one at all familiar with the work would be inclined to attribute this opinion to any of his lordship's peculiar idiosyncrasies upon the law. We should certainly regard this opinion as entirely normal, whatever we might feel compelled to say of some of his lordship's speculations upon the law. I. F. R. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE FOREIGN LAW. By WILLIAM W. STORY. Third Edition, with large Additions to the Text and Notes. By J. C. PERKINS. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1862. This edition of Mr. Story's valuable treatise upon the Law of Sales, seems to have been prepared with Mr. Perkins's usual painstaking and laborious research. Few cases of much value have escaped his careful scrutiny, and we believe the work is by far the most perfect upon the subject now in use. We commend it to the favorable consideration of the profession. It is scarcely needful to add, that the mechanical execution of the book is all that one could desire. I. F. R. THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER. FEBRUARY, 1864. CONFLICT OF LAWS AFFECTING MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND SCOTCH LAW. THE VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIVORCES. 1. In Roman Catholic countries divorce is left chiefly with the church. 2. Now conceded that an English marriage may be dissolved by foreign decree. 3. Warrender vs. Warrender embraces principles of universal application. 4. Marriage is a contract dependent upon the existing municipal laws. 5. But this principle is denied, when it is attempted to govern the contract by the law of its creation. 6. It is virtually adopted in the case of Warrender vs. Warrender, but not in terms. 7. Distinction between marriage contracts, and those of a pecuniary character. 8. The English courts uphold marriages celebrated abroad between English residents, even when done to evade the authority of the English law. 9. The American courts do this, even where had in fraud of local law. 10. The subject-matter of a suit for divorce is confined to the place of the domicil. 11. Divorces can only be granted for violations of the law of the forum. 12. Chief Justice GIBSON's exposition of the subject in Dorsey vs. Dorsey. 13. Some of the American states allow divorces for causes arising out of the state 14. The public opinion is very tender towards parties suing for divorce. 15. The effect of ex parte divorces is that which chiefly concerns public justice. 16. We make no question here in regard to the propriety of increasing the facilities for divorce. 17. All parties agree in maintaining the purity of judicial administration. VOL XII.-18 (193) 18. A sovereign state may grant the privilege to marry again. 19. The great question is as to the effect of such license elsewhere. (1.) It will not be claimed that decrees of divorce are decrees in rem.` (2.) The jurisdiction cannot be based upon the consent of the parties. The court must have jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of both the parties. (3.) The subject-matter of a divorce is strictly local, as much as that of crime. (4.) It cannot be enforced except as a breach of an existing law of the forum. (5.) It is as much local as the law of wills, or descents, and pertains to the courts of the domicil. 20. Divorces, if tried abroad, should be tried by the law of the domicil of the parties. 21. It involves not only wrong, but inconsistency, to try such cases by any other law. 22. The Act of Congress, and the Constitution, only apply where the courts have full jurisdiction. 23. Notice of the suit, served cut of the jurisdiction, cannot confer jurisdiction. 24. The comments of SEWALL, J., in Barber vs. Root. 25. The severity of Mr. Justice SEWALL seems neither unjust nor unreasonable. 26. The same view was early adopted in New York: Borden vs. Fitch. 27. And reaffirmed in Bradshaw vs. Heath, and in many recent cases in that state. 28. The same was maintained in Kentucky: ROBERTSON, Chief Justice. 29. Ex parte divorces have been defended in some few states. 30. That is done in Harding vs. Alden, 9 Greenleaf Rep. 140. 31. The same views are elaborately and learnedly defended in Ditson vs. Ditson, 4 R. I. R. 89. 32. The suggestion that Chief Justice SHAW is under mistake, results from misapprehension. 33. There is no doubt of the right of a state to allow its inhabitants to marry again, and to qualify them by decree of divorce. 34. But such a decree is a license to marry another wife, not to put off the former one. 35. This allows a person to have different wives or husbands in different states. 36. It means this or it means nothing. 37. The comments of Chief Justice RUFFIN. 38. The law of domicil as between husband and wife. 1. As the municipal law does not assume to interfere with the obligations, or violations, of the duty resulting from marriage, in many of the countries where the Roman Catholic religion predominates, but leaves that to be administered by the judicial functionaries of the church, pro salute animæ, we do not derive much light upon the subject from the writings of the continental jurists of Europe. Story's Conf. Laws, § 212. And the field embraced by this topic, in the law of Great Britain and America, is sufficiently extended to occupy all the space which we could here devote to it. In France divorces are granted by the civil magistrate for adultery and some other causes. Code Napoleon, B. I. tit. V., ch. VII. 2. The question was long debated, whether an English marriage, which is there held indissoluble except by Act of Parliament, can be dissolved by the decree of any foreign court. It seems to be still regarded as an unsettled question in England. But it having been determined by the House of Lords, in Warrender vs. Warrender, 2 Cl. & Fin. 488, s. c. 9 Bligh 127, that by the law of Scotland, such a decree is valid, and that the Scotch courts have jurisdiction of both parties, by virtue of the husband having his domicil there, and having cited the wife into the courts of that country, and her having made appearance, to contest the case upon all points, embracing the jurisdiction as well as the merits; this having been settled by the court of last resort in England, it has been inferred that the same rule would be applied to the decree when brought in question, directly, in the English courts. 3. We can entertain no question that the principle enunciated in the case of Warrender vs. Warrender, and maintained with so much learning and ability by the elaborate opinions of Lords BROUGHAM and LYNDHURST, is of universal application. Marriage may be regarded, in some sense, as a contract; but it is something. more, and much higher, and more sacred. If not a sacrament, in the strict sense of the canons of the Romish Church, it is the creation of a new relation of a very important and fundamental character, having its influence and control extended to all the interests and relations of social life. We do not propose to discuss the propriety of the rule of law by which it is held indissoluble. We think some good reasons may be urged in favor of even that extreme view. But we shall not stop to discuss that point. But waiving all question in regard to the character and qualities of the marriage relation by the laws of the country where it is solemnized, and conceding that marriage may have been properly solemnized, in conformity to the laws of a country, where it is held absolutely indissoluble, that does not appear to us to reach the point in |