Prince de Carignan, he did not dare to accept it; but the Chevalier Buoncompagni was nominated in his stead. Sardinia, held in check by France and Austria, hesitated to take possession of a territory the throne of which was vacant, and which held out its arms to receive her; for, as Lord John Russell stated in March last year, in the House of Commons, The Austrian Government declared that, if a Sardinian soldier should go into Central Italy, they would at once march their troops to oppose them. On the other hand, the Emperor of France declared to the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, that the moment a single Austrian soldier crossed the Po the French army would be marched to oppose them.' Lord John Russell also said, in the same speech, that it was agreed by France, in communication with Austria, that the Congress should be indefinitely postponed;' and it was generally believed that the chief cause of this postponement was the appearance of the pamphlet Le Pape et le Congrès,' bearing the name of M. de la Guernronière, but attributed to the French Emperor, which advocated the restriction of the temporal government of the Pope to Rome alone.*

However this may be, England now came forward with four proposals for settling the difficulty, which were communicated by Lord John Russell to Earl Cowley, our Ambassador at Paris, in a despatch dated the 15th of January :—

1. That France and Austria should agree not to interfere for the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy, unless called upon to do so by the unanimous assent of the five Great Powers of Europe.

2. That in pursuance of this agreement the Emperor of the French should concert with his Holiness the Pope as to the evacuation of Rome by the troops of France.

3. The internal government of Venetia not to be in any way matter of negotiation between the European Powers.

4. Great Britain and France to invite the King of Sardinia to agree not to send troops into Central Italy until its several States and Provinces shall, by a new vote of their Assemblies, after a new election, have solemnly declared their wishes as to their future destiny.'

The French Government at once professed its willingness to accept the first three of these propositions, observing, with respect to the second, that the 'evacuation of Rome must remain sub

A pamphlet published in Paris, under the title of Le Pape et le Congrès, which has created too much stir in the political world not to have attracted your Lordship's attention, is the indirect cause of the postponement. The Austrian Government, it appears, requires an engagement, on the part of the French Government, neither to bring before the Congress themselves the measures of which the pamphlet is the advocate, nor to support them if brought forward by others. The French Government hesitate at entering into any such engagement, and Austria in consequence declines appearing at the Congress.'-Earl Cowley to Lord John Russell, Jan. 1, 1860. Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy, 1860.

ordinate

ordinate to the certainty that no serious danger should result therefrom to the safety of the Holy See.' As regarded the fourth, M. Thouvenel, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that the Emperor 'personally considered the principle laid down by Her Majesty's Government, that the future destinies of the States of Central Italy should be ascertained through the Assemblies, to be equitable and practical. But before taking any steps in conjunction with Her Majesty's Government in the sense *desired by them, His Majesty considered himself to be bound in honour to address himself to the Cabinet of Vienna, to expose what had taken place since the Peace of Villafranca, and to state the reasons which led him to the conclusion that no other solution was possible than that suggested by Her Majesty's Government.' The Austrian Government, however, would not accede to the English views, and France then proposed the following plan:

1. Complete annexation of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to Sardinia. 2. Temporal administration of the Legations of the Romagna, of Ferrara, and of Bologna, under the form of a vicariat, exercised by his Sardinian Majesty, in the name of the Holy See. 3. Reestablishment of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in its political and territorial independence.'

But this did not meet the approval of either Austria or Sardinia. And we do not believe that any ministry could have stood in Sardinia which continued to oppose itself to the demand for annexation, supported by the unanimous vote of the revolted provinces. The result was that the French Government, in face of the inexorable logic of facts,' no longer insisted on maintaining the separate existence of Tuscany as an independent state, but sullenly withdrew, and left Central Italy to determine its own fate.

The question of annexation to Piedmont, or the erection of a separate kingdom, was put to the vote in Tuscany and the Æmilia, and determined by an immense majority in favour of annexation. Baron Ricasoli, who had succeeded Chevalier Buoncompagni as provisional Governor of Tuscany, presented the result of this appeal to universal suffrage to the King on the 22nd of March; and soon afterwards a bill was brought into the Sardinian Chambers to authorise the annexation, and passed into a law.

In the mean time Europe was startled by the announcement that France required a 'rectification' of her frontiers on the side of the Alps. In other words, the French Emperor insisted upon the cession of territory which he had bargained for as the price of assisting Sardinia in her contest with Austria, and obtaining for her a large accession of dominion. The transaction was dis

creditable

creditable to all the parties concerned, and it involved both Governments in duplicity and dissimulation, if not positive falsehood. We can understand the reason why the bargain was concealed, for it was of vital consequence to Napoleon III. at the outbreak of the war that the Great Powers of Europe should have no hint of a scheme which revived awkward recollections of the policy of the First Empire, and, more than anything else, was likely to rally them on the side of Austria. But we do not understand how statesmen of character could bring themselves to deny peremptorily the existence of a scheme which they knew had at one time been arranged, in the hope that a change of circumstances might prevent it from being carried into effect, and so they might escape the odium of ever being known to have entertained it.

We believe the following to be a true account of the facts of the case, although our limits will not allow us to do more than give the most rapid summary of them.

When the question of the intervention of France in Italy was originally discussed between the French and Sardinian Governments; or rather, if we are rightly informed, between the Emperor and Count Cavour at a confidential interview, it was agreed or 'understood,' that if the result of the war should be to free Lombardy and Venetia from the grasp of Austria, and annex them to Piedmont, France was to receive Savoy and Nice, or at all events Savoy, as the consideration for her services. At that time there was no idea on the part of the contracting parties that Tuscany and the Emilia would demand to be incorporated with Sardinia. It was, as the lawyers say, a casus omissus, and unprovided for in the agreement. But the event falsified the expectation. Austria retained Venetia, and Central Italy resolved to join Piedmont. The French Emperor now claimed the fulfilment of the contract, but Sardinia demurred. She took her stand on the letter of the bond: Savoy and Nice were to be the equivalent of Lombardy and Venetia; but Venetia still remained in the hands of Austria, and her chains were riveted by the Peace of Villafranca. The terms of the bargain therefore, not having been kept by France, were not binding upon Sardinia. The French Emperor seems to have admitted the force of this reasoning, or at all events he yielded to it, and did not insist upon his demand; and thus it was that Count Walewski, on the 8th of July, 1859, declared to Earl Cowley, the British Ambassador at Paris, that, if at any time the idea of annexing Savoy to France had been entertained, it had been entirely abandoned.' But when it became apparent that the whole of the Emilian provinces, and in all probability

Tuscany

Tuscany also, would become united to Piedmont, he revived the dormant claim, on the ground that the meaning of the agreement was, that, if Sardinia obtained by the aid of French arms a substantial increase of territory on one side of the Alps, she was to make a cession to France on the other.* And to this he conceived himself entitled, even if Tuscany were excluded from the annexation.†

The Sardinian Government, however, conscious of the extreme unpopularity it would incur by giving up provinces one of which was the most ancient inheritance-nay, the very cradle of the House of Savoy, and too glad to find a pretext for escaping from the fulfilment of the odious bargain, resisted the claim. And now the machinery was put in motion whereby the compulsion of authority is made to assume the appearance of a voluntary act, and a fictitious majority obtained by dexterous intrigue is called the national will, expressed under the imposing name of universal suffrage.

We will not waste words upon the impudence of the attempt to make it appear that the agitation of the question of annexation to France in Savoy and Nice was a spontaneous movement; but soon afterwards the question became the topic of universal discussion, and Europe, although indignant at being duped, laughed at the idea of danger to France because Piedmont was likely to double her territory and population. At this juncture the inhabitants of Chambéry adopted at a public meeting an address to King Victor Emmanuel, declaring their wish to remain under the dominion of the House of Savoy, and the Governor of that province stated that, having asked instructions from Turin, he had received the following reply :—

"The policy of the Government of his Majesty is known; it has not varied. The Government never entertained the idea of ceding Savoy to France. Questioned already previously by the party who dared to moot the separation, the Government did not even think it necessary to reply.'

We never heard that the statement of the Governor was disavowed by Count Cavour, and yet it seems distinctly at variance with the facts. On the 4th of February M. Thouvenel informed Lord Cowley, in Paris, that 'it was true that, among the possible arrangements discussed between the two Governments when they found themselves likely to be engaged side by side in war with Austria, was the cession to France, under certain contingencies,

* See Lord Cowley's speech in the House of Lords, April 23, 1860.

+ M. Thouvenel to Baron de Talleyrand, Feb. 24, 1860. Correspondence on Affairs of Italy.

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of Savoy and the county of Nice.'* And in a speech made by Count de Persigny in the Council General of the Department of the Loire, at the end of August, when he was the Ambassador of France at our Court, he said :-'Even before the beginning of the war we had warned Sardinia that if events should bring about a great kingdom in Italy, we should demand that the slopes of the Alps should not remain in its hands.' Does any one believe that Count Cavour refused to listen to the possible arrangement,' or that he gave any hint to France that his Government would reşist the demand'? It is indeed pitiable to see the way in which the Sardinian Government affected to make Europe believe that they yielded at last to the popular will, and that in ceding Nice and Savoy they merely paid homage to the new principle of universal suffrage invoked to determine the alle giance of subjects. They might have said 'We bow to a supreme necessity,' and the reason would at least have been understood. But what are we to think of the sincerity of the minister who could write as Count Cavour wrote to M. Thouvenel on the 2nd of March ?

'We feel too deeply what Italy owes to the Emperor not to pay the most serious attention to a demand based on the principle of respect for the wishes of the inhabitants. His Majesty's Government would never consent, with even the greatest prospective advantages, to cede or exchange any one of the parts of the territory which has formed for so many ages the glorious inheritance of the House of Savoy. But the King's Government cannot refuse taking into consideration the changes which passing events in Italy may have introduced into the situation of the inhabitants of Savoy and Nice. At the moment when we are loudly demanding for the inhabitants of Central Italy the right of disposing of their destiny, we cannot, without incurring the charge of inconsistency and injustice, refuse to the King's subjects dwelling on the other side of the Alps the right of freely manifesting their will. However poignant the regret we should feel, if the provinces, once the glorious cradle of the monarchy, could decide on demanding their separation from the rest of the King's dominions in order to join other destinies, we should not refuse to acknowledge the validity of this manifestation declared legally and conformably with the prescriptions of Parliament.'

The farce accordingly was played out, the ballot-box was opened, and, by the conjuring process of universal suffrage under the provident care of French emissaries and electioneering agents, the two provinces transferred themselves from Sardinia to France, and another blow was struck at the settlement of 1815.

*Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell, Feb. 5, 1860. Correspondence on proposed annexation of Savoy and Nice, 1860.

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