OUR MORAL WEAKNESS. A MOST curious feature of the unparalleled war power of the nation is the moral weakness of its representative men. It is still the more curious because revolutions are generally attended by too fanatical a conformity to the views and prejudices of the dominant party. In our own case we have reached that point of extreme gentleness which enables our enemies to inflict injuries and commit depredations with almost perfect impunity. Our grand operations are embarrassed by unrecognized bands, our soldiers are murdered in cold blood, citizens speak treason under the very ears of commanding officers, give information to the enemy, and perform other acts of the most culpable character, without experiencing severer punishment, as a rule, than a few days' confinement in a guard-house; or, with equal lack of justice, others are imprisoned for months without trial, and very probably upon mere suspicion. We are not surprised, then, that the subjection of the spirit and strength of the rebellion has not been altogether commensurate with the gigantic triumphs and efforts of our armies. There are several reasons for this strange fact, all of which originate in a deficiency in moral strength. The first is, the mistaken conservatism, the retrospective tendency of the leading minds of our armies. The past is merely a lesson of experience, they consider it an unsolved problem. They are not up to the social ideas of the year. They still linger upon the threshold of the rebellion. They have fought and won great battles. For what? The principles of '61. They need to be advanced. The people are striving for the theories of a quarter of a century ahead. In the beginning, the war on the part of the Government was defensive. The South was the aggressor. The loyal people rallied to the defence of their flag, their nationality, their constitution, and their honor. The disloyal element, intent upon a separate national existence, endeavored to rend asunder the strong bonds that bind the Union into one of the great states of the world. At first it was supposed the action of the South was the overfanaticism of a few misguided communities. A few months later demonstrated this opinion was a mistake. Unfortunately, at the end of more than three years of toil and danger, there are many men of our armies who have not yet discovered their error. They still labor in the dangerous belief that the South is to be induced to submit by courteous means. The war, consequently, drags along, and is gradually exhausting the powers of the nation. VOL. III.-24 There is not the least question, had the moral force of the commanders of our armies been as remarkable as their ability to cope with the enemy in the field, we would have had peace before this. To compel a people into submission by strength of arms may succeed in the beginning, but when backed by a weak, inefficient, and partial administration of law and order, the most that can be expected is but a semblance of obedience, a suppressed enmity, and an uprising the moment the actual presence of bayonets is removed. A powerful hand would have insured the reverse. There is no control which people so long remember, as that which emanates from the exercise of a rigid and just authority. Had this been the case in the local administrative department upon the occupation of territory, how different would have been the results of the victories, which have been thrown away by mismanagement and misgovernment. In Palpable injustice in some instances, and partial and dangerous forbearance in others, have done their natural work, and bitter enmity has resulted in one case, while contempt has followed in the other. There is no motive so uncompromising, when brought in antagonism to military force, as the spirit, the moral being of a people. Armies may conquer territories, devastate fields, burn cities, destroy commerce, but they can never extinguish that inner being, which burns in the breasts of men. Bayonets may destroy individuals, but they can never destroy a people. Military power may subject but it cannot conquer. Moral influence soothes the body and controls the mind. men, the average of moral is greater than physical strength. The obduracy of the former controls all of the latter. Put men to the rack, their moral strength supports them in their suffering. The patriot woman by the side of her bleeding husband, by moral force rises into that sublime condition that weeps not over the sacrifice of being or companionship, but weeps that she has no other sacrifices to make. The moral strength of the Revolution triumphed over Great Britain. The moral force of the armies of 1865 will alone triumph over the revolution in the South. We do not mean to convey the idea that the South is to be conquered by moral influence alone, nor even do we mean that moral tone and leniency, without justice, are synonymous. The difficulty has been in the fact that the war has been conducted merely in the light of the operations of armies. Campaigns against the enemy, when the people at home, our most dangerous enemy, have been entirely disregarded and overlooked. It is but natural to suppose that all the people of the South are hostile, and all should be treated in that light. Authority should be so exercised that those who are semi-hostile may reap the benefit of their obedience to the laws and Constitution of the United States in accordance with their repentance and disposi tion to become peaceable and reformed citizens of the United States. The transgression of orders, however, in their case, should be as severely punished as in the case of determined and known enemies. The opinion, that we have been more deceived by the rascality of Southern Union men than by real rebels, compromises the dignity of the national cause. Union men, like the majority of all men, will grasp at opportunities. Men are selfish. If a Union man does wrong, punish him. Punish all men who do wrong. In insurrectionary districts it is necessary to have a force with which to enforce obedience. This force should not be used to oppress and annoy the people and disturb order, but to free them and preserve peace. Another, and perhaps the real reason for our continued failure in the war, is the absence of a defined, distinct, and determined governmental policy towards the South, prescribed by the Executive and enforced by the army. The army has been left in a fog. This is no apology for the army, for had its commanders, as a rule, been bold men, they might have made a policy of their own, and worked an impression upon the mind of the South which would not soon be forgotten. Sherman has accomplished more through his iron determination, than by the steel weapons of his armies. The one merely cleared away the rubbish, the other built the super structure. In the outset the Government was too pacific; afterwards it was neither pacific nor specific. The authorities, to lay down a code of general principles, stern but equitable in spirit, and irrevocable in execution, would attain the results which alone will govern and subject the turbulent characters of the South. There are minds open to conviction, there are others who, beast-like, mistake their instincts for the dictates of reason. To define a policy, and require every Southern man to obey or suffer the penalty, would effect more than the innumerable petty annoyances to which they are now subjected without any distinct object. The secret is this the war is generally misunderstood. It is construed as a crusade against the whole people of the South, when in reality it should be against the powers that control the revolution. Destroy the head of the rebellion, and you shatter its members. Too much personal spite and prejudice have been mixed up in the war, and no results corresponding with the magnitude of our efforts need be expected until this be changed. By adopting, so to speak, a rational rule of action, and holding subordinates to a rigid accountability for its enforcement, would have the effect of at least uniformity of conduct towards the people of the South, and let them know what to expect. It is not supposed the Government at Washington can give the details of administration for each State or locality in the South, any more than it was able to plan in the cabinet the details of distant campaigns. The features of a policy could be prescribed, and each commanding officer should be responsible that the policy be carried out. As matters now stand, upon the occupation of a certain district, an officer is appointed, with certain undefined administrative, legislative, and judicial powers. That officer is generally of little account in the field. He assumes his position and rules the people in as great a variety of ways as his feelings or prejudices may prompt. He is practically responsible to no higher authority than himself, except in case of open crime; and the people, instead of being impressed with the power of the United States, are most usually convinced of its weakness. We must have the best men of our armies to govern conquered territory. Common sense, integrity, and strength of will are better than the highest scholastic abilities, or, as is more frequently the case, old age and its gentleness, or influence and its usual ignorance and arrogance. This point is sadly overlooked. Anybody is liable to be provost-marshal under the present ideas. It will be different when it is realized that to break up the rebel armies is not going to bring about peace, that the people must be influenced. This is to be accomplished only by consistent, equitable, and impartial measures. They must feel the effects of war, without engendering its animosities. They must feel its inexorable necessities, before they can realize the pleasures and amenities of peace. We want determined and unrelenting men, who can exercise their powers, with all the relentless rigors of justice. Our commanders are too democratic. They lose sight of the necessities of their situations. An army is a despotism. It can be nothing else, short of anarchy. The government of the people of the South will of necessity have to be a despotism; let it be a just one until the people are willing to restore themselves to the privileges of pure democracy. Our commanders have been as great in battle as in other respects they have been at fault. For instance: It is not magnanimous to sacrifice a thousand lives, conquer territory, and then support its inhabitants, let them do as they please; turn loose able-bodied men who take arins, turn guerrillas. We capture them and treat them as prisoners of war. Humanity was designed for peace, not for war. If we show mercy towards a legitimate enemy, it is magnanimity; if we execute a traitor, it is philanthropy. Humanity is a vulgar virtue; equitable mercy is the highest of human efficiencies. Boldness is a happy fault. The nation is being ruined because it is too subjective. One of the very few officers in high command that has shown himself equal, so to speak, to the social, or, perhaps more correctly, the local inuences of the South, is General Sherman. He seems to be a stern, imperturbable soldier, with more brain than heart, but sufficient of the latter to answer the demands of the times. He rose slowly and amid a singular category of accusations. In 1861 he was accused of insanity; time has convinced us of the reason for the assertion. Sherman, though right, was ahead of the times. All thinkers are crazy, because their ideas are too large for the comprehension of small intellects. General Sherman has written several letters of instruction to his subordinate commanders upon the subject of the war, the treatment of the people of the South, and other matters more or less bearing upon national topics. The correct reasoning of these documents and the beneficial effects which they may have in directing the mind into profitable contemplation, have induced us to make some extracts from these letters, as not inappropriate in connection with the subject we have been considering. They contain valuable suggestions. The war and its relation to the Government, subjects which in both cases have led to much speculation among politicians and writers, are discussed by the General from a military standpoint, which probably will prove the best and most successful in the end. He says: "The war which prevails in our land is essentially a war of races. The South ern people entered into a clear compact of government, but still maintained a species of separate interests, history, and prejudices. These latter became stronger and stronger, till they have led to a war, which has developed fruits of the bitterest kind. "We of the North are, beyond all question, right in our lawful cause, but we are not bound to ignore the fact that the South have prejudices which form part of their nature, and which they cannot throw off without an effort of reason or the slower process of natural change. Now the question arises, should we treat as absolute enemies all in the South who differ from us in opinion or prejudices-kill or disable them? Or, should we give them time to think, and gradually change their conduct so as to conform to the new order of things which is slowly and gradually creeping into their country? "When men take arms to resist our rightful authority, we are compelled to use force, because all reason and argument cease when arms are resorted to. When the provisions, forage, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is clearly our duty and right to take them, because otherwise they may be used against us. "In like manner, all houses left vacant by an inimical people are clearly our right, or such as are needed as storehouses, hospitals, and quarters." In another place: "For my part, I believe that this war is the result of false political doctrine, for which we are all as a people responsible, viz.: that any and every people have a right to self-government; and I would give all chance to reflect, and when in error to recant. "In this belief, while I assert for our Government the highest military prerogatives, I am willing to bear in patience that political nonsense of slave-rights, State rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, and such other trash, as have deluded the Southern people into war, anarchy, bloodshed, and the foulest crimes that have disgraced any time or any people. "I know slave-owners, finding themselves in possession of a species of property in opposition to the growing sentiment of the whole civilized world, conceived their property in danger, and foolishly appealed to war; and by skilful political handling |