making any allowance for the usual intervals between regiments, brigades, divisions, and army corps. So with the wagons. On good roads where trains are kept well closed up, it is calculated that each six-mule team will occupy on an average about sixty (60) lineal feet; this would give about ninety (90) teams to the mile, a large average on most marches, so that six thousand three hundred (6,300) teams would ordinarily require about seventy (70) miles. If the weather or roads are bad, of course they will straggle along indefinitely, and thus require much more. An ambulance on the march usually occupies about forty (40) feet, so that nine hundred (900) ambulances would occupy a distance of about seven (7) miles. So, with the artillery, an army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand (125,000) men will usually have at least two guns to the thousand men, which would make two hundred and fifty guns, or say forty batteries of six pieces each. Now, a battery on the march, as a general thing, will occupy fully three hundred (300) yards, so that forty batteries alone would take about seven (7) miles. These figures, thus roughly taken, foot up one hundred and nineteen (119) miles, as the free and easy marching distance of an army of the size of the two great ones that we have had operating East and West during the past campaign, and this too without counting in accurately our Bedouin Arabs, the cavalry, that always swarm along for miles together, besides, in apparently almost interminable columns. Of course no General with a moderate stock of brains would ever think of marching his troops thus in one continuous line, and hence the necessity of parallel roads in moving an army, to keep your troops massed and well in hand.

From these calculations, thus roughly made, we think there are two conclusions fairly deducible. First, that the movements of large bodies of troops, under the best of circumstances, are ex necessitate rei slow and tedious; and second, that it is impossible for them to move at all without an adequate and well sustained Quartermaster's Department. How the Confederates have managed to get on these four years, the con. dition of Dixie generally considered, is one of the unexplained mysteries of Jeffdom so far, and fairly a prodigy of modern logistics. We commend the above calculations to our parlor soldiers, our carpet knights, and fireside critics generally, and shrewdly suspect that these valiant stay-at-home Jominis would be a little more lenient in their fierce and learned military criticisms, were they to familiarize themselves just a little with the multiplicity and magnitude of the details here involved, before sharpening again their "gray goose quills." Wagons, ambulances, horses, mules, harness, forage, subsistence, clothing, tentage, ammunition, all to be provided by one Department or another, and all to be transported in sufficient quantities, go where

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the army may, and in whatever weather, be it fair or foul. In fact, as we have already said in our January article, an army is simply a vast community on legs, with all its appointments and appurtenances complete, here one day, and the next day gone, bearing within itself all the elements of life and motion," and, when fairly considered in all its aspects, is in truth a most prodigious and wonderful machine. If well organized and thoroughly in hand, with the right men in the right places, and a controlling brain at the top, its Quartermaster's Department can be run as readily as a crack locomotive on the Hudson River Railroad; but without such a Department, the finest army ever on the planet, no matter who commanded it, could never move materially from its base, and it would, in truth, soon go to pieces of its own weight, from the very nature and necessity of things. Bearing this well in mind, it is certainly at least creditable to our Quartermaster's Department that, with the exception perhaps of the Red River campaign, our armies in this war have never anywhere been unduly hampered or embarrassed by our wagon trains, huge and unwieldy as they necessarily appear. For nearly two years and a half in this war, before coming to post duty, it was the fortune of the writer to march with them day after day, in summer and winter, over the vilest of secesh roads, from Yorktown to the front of Richmond and back again, through Burnside's memorable campaign, and to Chancellorsville and back again, through Meade's movement from Culpepper to Centreville and back again; in fact, pretty much all about "the sacred soil of Virginia," where, after a half an hour's rain any day the bottom drops out, and your mules seem more likely to pay a visit to Pekin than to go ahead; and yet, he cannot now recollect an instance where the trains were ever unduly behind on a march, or, so to speak, badly in the way on a retreat. That they ever seriously impeded our armies in the East, on the Peninsula or elsewhere, so as to bring to naught well conceived military movements, "the time has come" for the country to know, has always seemed to those familiar with affairs a small excuse for great failures.

Thus much for wagon transportation, which, after much observation, mostly in the field, we are persuaded can scarcely be improved. The common army wagon might possibly be made a little lighter, in some respects, without impairing its strength or decreasing its durability; and it would, perhaps, be somewhat benefited for most purposes by an efficient lock, within the immediate reach and control of the driver, instead of the primitive lock-chains now in use, that compel him to stop and dismount whenever his wheels require to be locked or unlocked. Yet, take it all in all, with its six mule team well in hand, driven with one line by a detailed Yankee or a live con

VOL. III.-17

traband, seated securely on the rear tongue-mule, and brandishing his blacksnake as the sceptre of his power, it is by far the best and cheapest species of land locomotion that was ever put into the hands of a modern army. So, too, with our ambulances. In the first year of the war we had all sorts and descriptions of ambulances, except the right sort; from the lumbering four-horse coach style to the funny, teetering, tottering, "one-horse shay" style. But the common two-horse or twomule ambulance carriage, as now in use in all of our armies, strong and compact, without being unduly heavy, has long since superseded all others, and will no doubt long maintain its place, as a legitimate cousin of the army wagon.

In the matter of water transportation, however, we surmise there is probably room for considerable reform. The war has now continued so long, and the transport service of the army generally has been so extensive, that it is time the whole subject of sea-going vessels was at least tolerably reduced to order and system. The same remark will apply substantially to river transportation, though in a more limited sense, because the difference of depths in our rivers requires a greater variety in the vessels used. The expeditions to Hatteras, to Port Royal, to New Orleans, to Texas, and now more recently to Wilmington, as well as the continuous work that resulted after most of these, together with our heavy operations on the James, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Mississippi, have all given us a wide and rich experience, from which many profitable lessons ought now to be drawn. The first and most obvious one, it seems to us, is that the time for make-shifts and expedients as to transport vessels is past, and the time for some uniformity as to character and equipment, some adaptation to the end desired, and much real comfort and security, as well as economy, has now come. Had the probable magnitude and extent of our marine service been rightly comprehended in the beginning of the war, and the Quartermaster's Department been directed to govern itself accordingly, the Government might have had ere now a magnificent fleet of National transports, built or at least adapted to their special service, lightly armed for whatever emergency might occur, and with officers and crews regularly commissioned and enlisted for the peculiar duty required of them.

It requires no extraordinary knowledge, we suppose, for any one to perceive that an army transport, to be thoroughly effective, needs special adaptation to the end had in view. Transports merely for subsistence, forage, &c., of course, need not vary materially from ordinary sea-going vessels. But transports intended for troops and animals, it is obvious at a glance, require certain marked and peculiar features, without which it is simply impossible to secure the best and largest service in

the shortest possible time. They must be, first, staunch and strong, without being clumsy, roomy and of moderate' draft, but need not be swift, except in special instances; and, secondly, they should be so constructed and equipped, with bunks, gunracks, water-tanks, fire-apparatus, &c., for troops, and stalls, feeding-troughs, water, &c., for animals, that the largest possible carrying capacity, compatible with comfort and security, may be always obtained from the smallest possible space afloat. Then again all Government transports, for whatever duty, it seems to us, should be of a peculiar build or finish, so as to be readily recognizable as public vessels, the same as our Navy, the country, and the ocean over. So, too, to our mind, each one should go equipped with a light armament of handy guns, ready for defence, or offence either, for that matter, on a moderate scale, should occasion require. One thing more is necessary to secure safe and thorough handling of such vessels, and that is, well selected and well disciplined officers and crews. These are only obtainable by a well digested system of commissions and enlistments, having in view the special service required of them, and "to this complexion," we predict, will our marine service" come at last," and thus rid itself of the nondescript, hybrid seamen,-neither sailor, soldier, nor yet civilian, that so much embarrass and, in too many instances, half paralyze it now. Some such plan (we care not for details), if adopted in time, would have been far cheaper to the nation in the long run, because by regulating every thing, it would have prevented, to a great extent, the ruinous prices we have often had to pay, and would have substantially abolished the wide discrepancies between charter parties, wages, &c., now frequently found existing among equal steamers, belonging at least to adjacent, if not the same, ports. Such a plan, surely, it is obvious to every one, would have met, much more fully, the peculiar wants and necessities of the service, than our present slip-shod, incongruous, get-along-somehow, make-shift system, that gives the Government, at best, it is notorious, only hulks and tubs, instead of trim and serviceable transports, and, as is proven by the experience of Great Britain, in her East Indiamen and otherwise, is entirely feasible, if only taken vigorously in hand. We repeat, we doubt not that this will ultimately be "the conclusion of the whole matter" in our own case, as it has already been, we believe, with most European nations; and then the Quartermaster's Department will prove itself as free and independent on the river and the sea, as it now is confessedly able and strong upon the land.

[To be continued.]

CAPTURES AND PRIZE MONEY.

IN reading General Sherman's report of the capture, in Savannah, of thirty odd thousand bales of cotton and other property, to the value of many millions of dollars, the questions were asked: "If Admiral Dahlgren had captured this property on the ocean or in Savannah River, would not the proceeds have been distributed as prize money? prize money? And if so, why are not General Sherman and his army entitled to the same reward?" These inquiries caused us to examine the laws of capture and prize, and we submit to our readers some of the results of this investigation.

CAPTURES.

As a general rule of war, all property of an enemy, and all property of a neutral which has become hostile by its position or use, or the acts of its owner, is subject to capture. That which is captured afloat on the ocean, in ports or rivers, is called prize, and that which is captured by land forces or on land is usually called booty, although included in the general term prize. The title to all booty is deemed to pass to the captor as soon as he gains a firm possession; but that to maritime prizes is not considered complete till the captured property is formally condemned by a prize court.

The general rule which subjects all enemy's property on land to capture has been somewhat modified by modern usage, although the principle is recognized in all legal divisions. This modification is only in regard to private property. All movable property belonging to the hostile State is subject to be seized and appropriated to the use of the captor. The rule extends to the property of municipal and other public corporations, and includes not only implements and munitions of war, but also provisions, and whatever else may be useful to either of the belligerents in prolonging the war.

In regard to private property on land, writers on international law give three cases where it is unquestionably liable to seizure and confiscation: First, by way of penalty for military offences; second, by way of contributions for the support of an invading army, and as an indemnity for expenses incurred in reducing and governing the territory conquered or occupied; and, third, private property taken on the field of battle, or in a captured fortress or town. We copy the remarks of General Halleck under these three heads: