were scattered over the world: some of them were in the China seas, some in the Pacific, some in the Mediterranean, some in our own part of the world, and some in another. The actual force employed in the blockading service did not give one vessel for every fifty miles of coast. In addition to these considerations, it had been shown by unquestionable evidence, furnished in part by the officials of the European powers themselves, that the few Southern ports really guarded by naval forces of the Yankees had been invested so inefficiently that hundreds of entries had been effected into them since the declaration of the blockade.

During nearly two years of struggle had this boasted "neutrality" of the European powers operated as active hostility against us, for they had helped the enemy to prevent us, with a force which was altogether inadequate, from obtaining supplies of prime necessity.

Nor was this all. We had no commerce; but in that the enemy was rich. We had no navy; in that he was strong. Therefore, when England and her allies declared that neither the armed cruisers nor the prizes of either of the belligerents should have hospitality and protection in neutral ports, the prohibition, directed against both belligerents, was in reality effective against the Confederate States alone, for they alone could find a hostile commerce on the ocean.

Thus it was that, in the progress of the war, the neutral nations of Europe had pursued a policy which, nominally impartial, had been practically most favorable to our enemies and most detrimental to us.

The temper which this injustice produced in the South was fortunate. The South was conscious of powers of resistance of which the world was incredulous; and the first feverish expectations of recognition by the European powers were replaced by a proud self-reliance and a calm confidence, which were forming our national character, while contributing at the same time to the immediate successes of our arms.

The recognition by France and England of Lincoln's paper blockade, had by no means proved an unmitigated evil to us. It had forced us into many branches of industry, into which, but for that blockade, we should have never entered. We had excellent powder-mills of our own, and fine armories which

turned out muskets, rifles, sabres, &c. The war found no. more than half a dozen furnaces in blast in the whole Confed eracy, and most of those had been destroyed by the enemy. But the government had given such encouragement to the iron men that new mines had been opened in other parts of the Confederacy, and furnaces enough were already up or in the course of erection, to supply the wants of the government. In the last spring we had planted not more than one-fourth of the usual breadth of land in cotton, and our surplus labor was directed to breadstuffs and provisions. All these were the fruits to us of a blockade which threatened England especially with a terrible reaction of her own injustice, and was laying up a store of retribution for Europe.

CHAPTER V.

Movements in the West.-The splendid Programme of the Yankees.-Kentucky the critical Point.-Gen. Kirby Smith's Advance into Kentucky.-THE BATTLE OF RICHMOND.-Reception of the Confederates in Lexington.-Expectation of an Attack on Cincinnati.-Gen. Bragg's Plans.-Smith's Movement to Bragg's Lines.-Escape of the Yankee Forces from Cumberland Gap.-Affair of Munfordsville.-Gen. Bragg between the Enemy and the Ohio.-An Opportunity for a decisive Blow.-Buell's Escape to Louisville.-The Inauguration of Governor at Frankfort.-An idle Ceremony.-Probable Surprise of Gen. Bragg.-THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE.-Its Immediate Results in our Favor.-Bragg's failure to concentrate his Forces.-His Resolution of Retreat.-Scenes of the Retreat from Kentucky.-Errors of the Campaign.A lame Excuse.- Public Sentiment in Kentucky.-The Demoralization of that State.-The Lessons of Submission.

On the same day that victory perched on our banners on the plains of Manassas, an important success was achieved by our brave troops in another part of the Confederacy. A victory gained at Richmond in Kentucky gave a companion to Manassas, and opened in the West a prospect of the advance of our troops simultaneous with the dawn of new hopes and aspirations in the East.

A few paragraphs are sufficient for the rapid summary of events necessary to the contemplation of the situation in the West, in which the battle of Richmond was won.

The North had prepared a splendid programme of operations in the country west of the Alleghanies. But few persons on the Southern seaboard had adequate ideas of the grandeur of the enemy's preparations, or of the strength of the forces concentrating on the march in the Western country. These preparations exceeded in magnitude all military movements designed or attempted since the commencement of the war; for they contemplated not only the expulsion of our forces from Kentucky and Tennessee and the States west of the Mississippi, but the penetration through the Gulf States of the heart of the South. The army, now well on its way into Middle Tennessee, had Northern Alabama and Georgia for its ultimate destination; that of Grant was already advanced into Mississippi; that of McClernand, organizing at Columbus and

Memphis, was intended to operate on the Mississippi; another army was already operating in Missouri and Arkansas; and a gunboat fleet had been placed on the waters of the Mississippi which was said to be terrible in destructiveness, and impreg nable in strength. Such was the extent of the enemy's plans of campaign in the West.

The situation left the South but little choice than that of making an aggressive movement by which North Alabama and Middle and East Tennessee might be cleaned of the forces of the enemy, and they compelled to fall bak to assist Gen. Buell in Kentucky-this State being fixed as the critical point in the West, and the field of the active campaign. The brief retirement of Gen. Beauregard from active command on account of ill health, which was made shortly after his evacuation of Corinth, left the way open to the promotion of Gen. Bragg, a favorite of the administration, who had a certain, military reputation, but, as an active commander in the field, had the confidence neither of the army nor of the public. The first steps of the campaign were easily decided by this commander: it was to use the forces of Gen. Kirby Smith to threaten Cincinnati, and thus distract the attention and divide the forces of the enemy; while Gen. Bragg himself, co-operating with Smith, was to fulfil the great purpose of the campaign, which was the expulsion of the enemy from Kentucky and the capture of Louisville-thus subjecting the whole of that great grain-growing and meat-producing commonwealth, with all its rich stores, to our control.

Early in the month of August, Gen. McCown, under the orders of Gen. Smith, moved his division from London to Knoxville in East Tennessee. Thence our troops moved to the gaps in the Cumberland mountains, being joined by Claiborne's division at the lower gap, when the whole force was ordered through, with the trains and artillery. From this time our troops made forced marches until they reached Barboursville, which is on the main thoroughfare by which the Yankees received their supplies at the gap by way of Lexington. Halting there long enough only to get water, our wearied army was pushed on to the Cumberland ford. Here a few days' rest was allowed to the troops, who had performed their hard march over stony roads, with their almost bare feet, and with

green corn garnished with a small supply of poor beef for their food.

THE BATTLE OF RICHMOND.

On the 29th of August our troops were in striking distance of the enemy at Richmond. Until our advance descended the Big Hill, it met with no opposition from the enemy. Here, on the morning of the 29th, the enemy was discovered to be in force in our font, and a bold reconnoissance of the cavalry under Colonel Scott, in the afternoon, indicated a determination to give us battle. Although Churchill's division did not get up until quite late in the afternoon, and then in an apparently exhausted state, Gen. Smith determined to march to Richmond the next day, even at the cost of a battle with the whole force of the enemy. The leading division, under Gen. Claiborne, was moved early the next morning, and, after advancing two or three miles, they found the enemy drawn up in line of battle in a fine position, near Mount Zion church, six miles from Richmond. Without waiting for Churchill's division, Claiborne at once commenced the action, and by halfpast seven o'clock in the morning, the fire of artillery was orisk on both sides. As our force was almost too small to storm the position in front, without a disastrous loss, Gen. Churchill was sent with one of his brigades to turn the enemy's right. While this movement was being executed, a bold and well-conducted attempt on the part of the enemy, to turn Claiborne's right, was admirably foiled by the firmness of Col. Preston Smith's brigade, who repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. In the mean time Gen. Churchill had been completely successful in his movement upon the enemy's right flank, where, by a bold charge, his men completed a victory already partially gained by the gallantry of our troops on the left.

The Yankees having been repulsed and driven in confusion from this part of the field, might have retreated without risking another passage at arms, had they not misapprehended our

movements.

Gen. Smith having ordered the cavalry to go around to the north of Richmond and attempt to cut off the retreat of the