Definition. For definition and discussion of treason, see U. S. v. Werner (D. C. 1918), 247 Fed. 708.

To constitute a levying of war, there must be an assemblage of persons for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose. Enlistment of men to serve against Government is not sufficient. When war is levied, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are traitors. Any assemblage of men for the purpose of revolutionizing by force the Government estab lished by the United States in any of its Territories, although as a step to, or the means of executing some greater projects, amounts to levying war. The traveling of individuals to the place of rendezvous is not sufficient; but the meeting of particular bodies of men, and their marching from places of partial, to a place of general, rendezvous, is such an assemblage as constitutes a levying of war. Ex parte Bollman (1807), 4 Cranch, 75, 125, 2 L. Ed. 554.

A conspiracy to prevent by force, the execution of any one law of the United States in all cases, is a treasonable conspiracy; and if there be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of carrying this intention into effect-that is, of acting together, and preventing by force the execution of the law generally-this constitutes a levying of war, and involves the crime of treason. Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (C. C. 1842), Fed. Cas. No. 18,275; Charge to Grand Jury, Fugitive Slave Law (C. C. 1851), Fed. Cas. No. 18,262; Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (D. C. 1863), Fed. Cas. No. 18,274.

The sudden outbreak of a mob, or the assembling of men, in order, by force, to

prevent the execution of a law in a par ticular instance, and then to disperse, without any intention of continuing together or reassembling for defeating the law generally and in all cases, is not a levying of war such as constitutes treason. Charge to Grand Jury, Fugitive Slave Law (C. C. 1851), Fed. Cas. No. 18,262; Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (D. C. 1863), Fed. Cas. No. 18,274.

The combination of a body of men, with the design of seizing, and the actual seizing, of the forts and other public property of the United States, is a levying of war against the United States, and is treason. Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (C. C. 1861), Fed, Cas. No. 18,270; Id. (D. C. 1863), 18,274.

A combination to suppress the excise officers of the Government, and prevent the execution of an act of Congress, accompanied by a display of force, consisting of a number of men arrayed in a military manner, and with arms, and by acts of violence, for the purpose of compelling an excise officer to resign his commission, is a levying of war, and constitutes treason. U. S. v. Mitchell (C. C. 1795), Fed. Cas. No. 15,788, 2 Dall. 348, 1 L. Ed. 410; Same v. Vigol (C. C. 1795), Fed. Cas. No. 16,621, 2 Dall. 346, 1 L. Ed. 409.

To go, with a large party, in arms, marshaled and arrayed, to the houses of officers of the excise, and there commit acts of violence and devastation, with the avowed object of suppressing such offices, and compelling the resignation of the officers for the purpose of nullifying an act of Congress, is treason. Id.

Opposing, by force of arms, an act of Congress, with a view to defeating its efficacy, and thus defying the authority of the Government is levying war against the

United States, and constitutes treason. Case of Fries (C. C. 1799), Fed. Cas. No. 5,126.

An insurrection to resist by force the execution of a Federal tax law, or the militia called out to enforce it, on any ground whatever, is a levying of war against the United States. Case of Fries (C. C. 1800), Fed. Cas. No. 5,127.

A conspiracy to raise an insurrection to resist the execution of a Federal statute by force is only a misdemeanor. Treason is not committed until the persons proceed to carry the intention into execution by force. Id.

Either acts of hostility and resistance to the Government, or a hostile intention in the body assembled, are necessary to convert a meeting of men with ordinary ap pearances into an act of levying war. A treasonable intent on the part of the leader, uncommunicated to the assemblage, is not sufficient. U. S. v. Burr (C. C. 1807), Fed. Cas. No. 14,694a.

An intention to commit treason against the United States by levying war, not carried out by the actual assembling of troops, is not punishable as treason. Id.

The engaging or enlisting of men for levying war against the United States, not followed by a future embodying of such men, is not punishable as treason. Id.

The fact of levying war may consist of a multiplicity of acts performed in different places by different persons, and any one of such persons, when leagued in the general conspiracy, is liable as a principal traitor. Id.

If there be an assembly of persons, with force, with an intent to prevent the collection of lawful taxes or duties levied by the Government, or to destroy all customhouses, or to resist the administration of justice in the courts of the United States, and the assemblage proceed to execute this purpose by force, this is treason against the United States. Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (C. C. 1842), Fed. Cas. No. 18,275.

If the assembly is arrayed in a military manner, if they are armed and marched in military form, for the express purpose of overawing and intimidating the public, and thus attempt to carry into effect the treasonable design, this will, of itself, amount to a levy of war, although no actual blow be struck or engagement take place. Id.

There may be treason against a State by levying war which is aimed altogether against the sovereignty of the State.

Id.

To constitute treason against the United States by levying war, there must be a levying of war against the United States in their sovereign character and not merely a

levying of war exclusively against the sovereignty of a particular State. Id.

Direct proof of the combining to prevent the enforcement of a law may be found in declared purposes of the individual party before the actual outbreak, or it may b derived from proceedings of meetings in which he took part openly, or which he either prompted or made effective by his countenance or sanction, commending, counseling, or instigating forcible resistance to the law. Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (C. C. 1851), Fed. Cas. No. 18,276.

The words "levying war," as used in the constitutional definition of "treason," include not only the act of making war for the purpose of entirely overturning the Government, but also any combination forcibly to oppose the execution of any public law of the United States, with intent to prevent its enforcement in all cases, if accompanied or followed by an act of forcible opposition to such law in pursuance of such combination. Charge to Grand Jury, Neutrality Laws and Treason (C. C. 1851), Fed. Cas. No. 18,269; Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (C. C. 1851), Fed. Cas. No. 18,276.

To be employed in actual service in an aimy raised to oppose the Government in its action, or directly or indirectly to aid or assist in the levying or embodying of a military force for the subversion of the Government, are plainly acts of "levying war," and involve the commission of the crime of treason. The constitutional definition of treason, however, is of broader sig. nification, and includes all those who join a hostile army after war is begun. Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (C. C. 1861), Fed. Cas. No. 18,272.

All persons engaged therein are by the law regarded as levying war against the United States; and all who adhere to them are to be regarded as enemies; and all who give them, in any part of the United States, aid and comfort come within the provisions of the act of Apr. 30, 1790, and are guilty of treason. Id.

A letter of marque issued by an insurrectionary government, which has not been recognized by the legislative and executive departments of the existing Government, is no defense to treason in levying war under such letter. U. S. v. Greathouse (C. C. 1863), Fed. Cas. No. 15,254.

Levying war against the United States by citizens of the Republic, under the pretended authority of the new State government of North Carolina, or of the so-called "Confederate Government," is treason against the United States. Shortridge v. Macon (C. C. 1867), Fed. Cas. No. 12,812.

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Levying war against the United States by persons however combined and confederated, even though successful in establishing their actual authority in several States, is treason. Keppel v. Petersburg R. Co. (C. C. 1868), Fed. Cas. No. 7,722.

If a convention, legislature, junto, or other assemblage entertain the purpose of subverting the Government, and to that end pass acts, resolves, ordinances, or decrees, even with the view of raising a military force to carry their purpose into effect, this alone does not constitute a levying of war, Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (D. C. 1863), Fed. Cas. No. 18,274.

If a body of men be actually assembled in force, in a condition to make war, in order to overturn the Government at any one place by force, this is levying war. It is not necessary that the assemblage should be with military arms and array; numbers alone may supply the requisite force. Id. Adhering to enemies and giving them aid and comfort.-The going from the enemy's squadron to the shore for the purpose of peaceably procuring provisions for the enemy is not an act of treason; otherwise where provisions are carried toward the enemy with intent to supply them, though such intention is defeated. U. S. v. Pryor (C. C. 1814), Fed. Cas. No. 16,096.

Delivering up prisoners and deserters to an enemy is treason, and nothing but a well-grounded fear of life will excuse the act. U. S. v. Hodges (C. C. 1815), Fed. Cas. No. 15,374.

A person present, directing, aiding, abetting, counseling, or countenancing the vi olence, or tf, though absent at the time of its actual perpetration, he yet directed the act, or devised or knowingly furnished the means for carrying it into effect, and instigated others thereto, he is guilty of treason, Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (C. C. 1851), Fed. Cas. No. 18,276.

The words, "adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort," include, in general, any act committed after war actually exists which indicates a want of loyalty to the Government and sympathy with its enemies, and which, by fair construction, is directly in furtherance of their hostile designs. Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (C. C. 1861), Fed. Cas. No, 18,272.

Mere expressions of opinion indicative of sympathy with the public enemy are not sufficient, under the Constitution and laws, to warrant a conviction of treason. Id.

After war actually exists, it is treasonable to sell to, or provide arms or munitions of war, or military steres and supplies, including foods, clothing, etc., for the use of the enemy; tɔ bize, sell, or furnish boats,

railroad cars, or other means of transportation, or to advance money or obtain credits for the use and support of the hostile army; and to communicate intelligence to the enemy by letter, telegraph, or otherwise, relating to the strength, movements, or position of the army. Id.

Overt acts which, if successful, would advance the interests of the rebellion, amount to aid and comfort, though they failed. U. S. v. Greathouse (C. C. 1863), Fed. Cas. No. 15,254.

If war be actually levied at one place, and any person actually engaged therein send them arms, money, provisions or intelligence for the purpose of aiding them, he is guilty. Charge to Grand Jury, Treason (D. C. 1863), Fed. Cas. No. 18,274.

And it makes no difference how distant he may be from the place of the assemblage of the enemy. Id.

It is treason for a citizen or other person not commissioned within the United States to abet France during a maritime war with her. (1798) 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 84.

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Felonious intent.-Treason in the assembling of bodies of men, armed or arrayed in warlike manner, is determined by the intent. If the purpose be of a private nature, it is not treason, regardless of the acts actually committed; otherwise, where the intent is to effect some object of general public nature. Case of Fries (C. C. 1800), Fed. Cas. No. 5,127.

If a man joins and acts with an assembly of people, his intent is always to be considered and adjudged to be the same as theirs; and the law judges of the intent by the fact. Case of Fries (C. C. 1800), Fed. Cas. No. 5,127.

A conspiracy to resist by force the execution of a law of the United States in particular instances only, for personal or pri vate purposes only, is not treason. U. S. v. Hoxie (C. C. 1808), Fed. Cas. No. 15,407.

A felonious intent is necessary to commit treason. The Ambrose Light (D. C. 1885), 25 Fed. 408, 427.

Duress and compulsion.-The putting in fear which is sufficient to excuse the perpetration of a criminal act must proceed from an immediate and actual danger threatening the life of the accused. The apprehension of the loss of property or of slight or remote injury to the person is not sufficient. U. S. v. Vigol (C. C. 1795), Fed. Cas. No. 16,621.

Except in the case of force under a personal fear of death, a private soldier or subordinate officer can not excuse a treasonable act on the ground of compulsion. U. S. v. Greiner (D. C. 1861), Fed. Cas. No. 15,262.